

ВОТУМИ ДОВІРИ/ІНВЕСТИТУРИ ЯК ПРЕДИКТОРИ ФОРМУВАННЯ УРЯДІВ МЕНШОСТІ У ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЯХ

Стаття присвячена розгляду інституту вотуму довіри/інвеститури як предиктора формування урядів меншості у європейських парламентських демократіях. У дослідженні розглянуто політичні (електоральні) й конституційно-правові атрибути, сутність, ознаки, особливості вотумів інвеститури у європейських парламентських демократіях. Крім того, наголос зроблено на позапарламентських та парламентських факторах реалізації вотумів довіри/інвеститури урядовим кабінетам, а також зіставлено виокремлені фактори із частотою формування урядів меншості в окремих країнах.

Ключові слова: уряд, урядовий кабінет, уряд меншості, парламентська демократія, вотум довіри/інвеститури, Європа.

Votes of confidence/investiture as predictors of minority governments formation in the European Parliamentary Democracies

The article is dedicated to analyzing the institute a vote of confidence/investiture as a predictor of minority governments formation in the European parliamentary democracies. The author considered political (electoral), constitutional and legal attributes, characteristics, features and nature of investiture votes in the European parliamentary democracies. The researcher also emphasized on extra-parliamentary and parliamentary factors of vote of confidence/investiture implementation towards governments and mapped the isolated factors with the frequency of minority governments formation in some countries.

Keywords: government, governmental cabinet, minority government, parliamentary democracy, vote of confidence/investiture, Europe.

Political theory and practice provide evidence for the fact that parliamentary democracies, including European ones, regardless or almost regardless of the forms and public administration systems implemented in them, are divided into systems of positive and negative parliamentarism. The key indicator of the outlined distinction is the presence (constitutional stipulation)

or absence (constitutional non-stipulation) of vote of confidence/investiture in a predicted/hypothetical government. Furthermore, votes of confidence/investiture, by definition, are distinguished due to the point whether voting for the act of government formation is constitutionally presupposed, i.e. if there is an outlined legislative requirement of receiving a parliamentary majority's investiture by a new governmental cabinet, what is especially essential within the context of minority governments' phenomenon¹. Besides, the rules of government formation differ in the procedural rules of getting votes of confidence/investiture by governments on the part of legislatures: in the format of absolute, simple or negative majority of legislative deputies. Finally, governments are interested in votes of confidence/investiture due to their subject and the stage of government formation processes they are applied at. In general, it means that any effective/successful vote of confidence/investiture results in termination of a government formation process and development of a new governmental cabinet. That is why, the current research, aimed at studying the influence of votes of investiture as institutional and constitutional preconditions for minority governments formation in the European parliamentary democracies, is of great importance and can be even called crucial, as it can institutionally speak for stipulation of certain governmental types in one institutional environment or another. It has been studied on the basis of factual theoretical papers by N. Ajenjo, S. Martin, B. E. Rasch², T. Bergman³, J. A. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. E. Rasch⁴, J. Huber⁵, J. Druckman, M. Thies⁶, K. Strom, W. Müller, D. M. Smith⁷ and others.

They logically argue that votes of confidence/investiture in the European parliamentary democracies correlate depending on variations of certain institutional and procedural details. Such presentation of a problem fully works with a classical methodology of neo-institutionalism, where "the importance of institutions" has been repeatedly reasoned. It is revealed in a number of procedural determinants of votes of confidence. For instance, investiture rules of government formation may appear as advanced ("ex ante"), as well as resultant ("ex post")⁸. The former, for example, are found when the parliament

¹ J. A. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. E. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Paper prepared for presentation at the 7th ECPR general conference, Sciences Po, Bordeaux, September 4-7, 2013.

² N. Ajenjo, S. Martin, B. E. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote in Parliaments and Government Formation*, Paper prepared for presentation at the Oslo-Rome International Workshop on Democracy, The Norwegian Institute in Rome, November 7-9, 2011.; B. E. Rasch, N. Ajenjo, *The vote of investiture in parliaments: types, origin, causes and political consequences*, Proposal for the ECPR Research Sessions 2012, EUI Florence, June 19-22, 2012.

³ T. Bergman, *Formation Rules and Minority Governments*, "European Journal of Political Research", 1993, vol 23, nr 1, s. 55-66.

⁴ J. A. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. E. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Paper prepared for presentation at the 7th ECPR general conference, Sciences Po, Bordeaux, September 4-7, 2013.

⁵ J. Huber, *The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Political Science Review", 1996, vol 90, nr 2, s. 269-282.

⁶ J. Druckman, M. Thies, *The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration*, "American Journal of Political Science", 2002, vol 46, nr 4, s. 760-771.

⁷ K. Strom, W. Müller, D. M. Smith, *Parliamentary control of coalition governments*, "Annual Review of Political Science", 2010, vol 13, s. 517-535.; K. Strom, *Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation*, [w:] K. Strom, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 55-106.

⁸ R. Kiewiet, M. McCubbins, *The Logic of Delegation. Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1991.; A. Lupia, *Delegation and its Perils*, [w:] K. Strom, W. Müller T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, s. 33-54.; K. Strom, *Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation*, [w:] K. Strom, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 55-106.; J. A. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. E. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Paper prepared for presentation at the 7th ECPR general conference, Sciences Po, Bordeaux, September 4-7, 2013.

or leading chamber (legislature in general) elects the prime-minister among other nominated persons. However, the latter prevail, when the parliament or leading chamber (legislature in general) must just confirm the candidate for the prime-minister position, nominated by another political actor. Votes of confidence/investiture also differ in the requirements of the parliamentary majority, i.e. rules of decision-making processes, concerning votes of confidence/investiture. One singles out systems where the need for the existence of absolute, qualified or negative majority from the nominal composition of legislature is institutionalized (sometimes in the form of both chambers of the parliament)⁹. Correlation of vote of confidence/investiture procedures is time oriented: there are cases of short-term votes of investiture, and there are instances of long-term and stage votes of investiture. Different are the results of unsuccessful votes of confidence/investiture: in some cases the process of government formation and its getting vote of confidence starts from the beginning; in other cases it institutionalizes an obligatory resignation of the parliament or its leading chamber; and in other cases the process of government formation by other political actors is presupposed etc. It demonstrates that reality of votes of confidence/investiture procedures is variegated and diverse, and this, therefore, may have various consequences on various types of government formation, including minority cabinets.

Moreover, it intensifies the theoretical essence of parliamentary democracies, namely “the chain” of delegation of authority and responsibilities, where the crucial role is cast to the parliament (leading chamber of the parliament), which is a key/formative agent and principal. There is a number of reasons for this: first of all, formation of the government, which reveals in choosing a variant of the governmental cabinet, its confirmation or no-objection, as well as its support, is believed to be a key function of the parliament in the parliamentary model of democracy; secondly and this directly comes to light from the previous statement, in the process of new governments formation (as the parliaments’ agents) the parliament is responsible (if it is institutionalized legislatively) to employ votes of confidence/investiture, which may be posed or may not be posed as the institutional restrictions of negotiation process in the midst of a “government formation game”, thus in this way the parliament (being a principal) is able to influence the type of the parliament to be formed; thirdly, the significance of the parliament’s (or leading chamber of the parliament) investiture/forming influence can be revealed in the fact that in some countries vote of confidence/investiture procedure may be applied as a certain “signal/advertising” instrument¹⁰, which allows political parties to try and implement pre-election agreements, concerning formation of hypothetical governments, before a factual (post-election) governmental cabinet is created; fourthly, the influence of the parliamentarian investiture is disclosed in the fact that it can rise the legitimacy level of the political government, especially governmental cabinet, what lasts over a longstanding period or is based in its preferences on an average/medial voter. But even despite this, a significant role within the context of vote

⁹ J. Druckman, M. Thies, *The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration*, “American Journal of Political Science”, 2002, vol 46, nr 4, s. 760-771.

¹⁰ A. Blais, P. Loewen, M. Ricard, *The Government Life-Cycle*, [w:] B. Cross (ed.), *Democratic Reform in New Brunswick*, Wyd. Canadian Scholars Press 2007, s. 39-57.; P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

of confidence/investiture in some parliamentary democracies is played by the presidents, especially if they are in charge of nominating and appointing government originators, prime-ministers (who till the moment of investiture on the part of the parliaments or leading chambers of the parliaments are in fact positioned as originators), as well as certain ministers of the cabinets. The presidents' positions are especially strengthened in the course of government formation processes, when they are authorized to dismiss the parliaments or leading chambers of the parliaments, if the latter are not able to give vote of confidence to the governmental cabinets, i.e. finish the process of their formation.

Proceeding to determination and comparative analysis of the national parameters of vote of confidence/investiture in the European parliamentary democracies, one should keep in mind that governmental cabinets may change not only after the parliamentary elections, but in between the parliamentary elections (scheduled or pre-term). At the same time, as the scholars argue¹¹, it is of great current interest that some European parliamentary democracies by these or other institutional and party-oriented reason, almost never test and endorse practices of government changing in between or during the parliamentary terms, while other parliamentary democracies take such changes for granted, and finally the rest of parliamentary democracies use pre-term parliamentary elections as instruments for confirmation or making adjustments to the composition or performance of governmental cabinets. From this perspective, it is quite significant that if votes of investiture are constitutionally preconditioned and institutionalized, then they are employed in formation of any new governmental cabinet, either after the elections or in-between. In regard to the investiture-forming influence of the head of the state, it is implemented along the same lines: if the president's influence over a governmental cabinet formation is institutionalized legislatively, it concerns formation of any new governmental cabinet, and not only the post-election one. A specific exception among the European parliamentary democracies was represented by Greece, which institutionalized, that in spite of formal identity of the processes of receiving votes of confidence/investiture by governments after the elections and in-between them, the head of the state (president, elected by the parliament) is vested with bigger authority, in terms of nominating the prime-minister of the government, which is formed in-between the elections, then in terms of nominating the prime-minister of the government, formed after the elections¹². Such provision of the Constitution of 1975 was canceled out in 1986, when certain amendments to the main Law were adopted. According to it the head of the state in-between the elections has the right to appoint/nominate the person, proposed by the party, which is responsible for the position of the prime-minister in the former government.

¹¹ N. Ajenjo, S. Martin, B. E. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote in Parliaments and Government Formation*, Paper prepared for presentation at the Oslo-Rome International Workshop on Democracy, The Norwegian Institute in Rome, November 7-9, 2011.

¹² J. A. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. E. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Paper prepared for presentation at the 7th ECPR general conference, Sciences Po, Bordeaux, September 4-7, 2013.

Table 1. Statistics of Post-election and In-between Election Minority Governmental Cabinets in. Different Frames of Votes of Confidence/Investiture in the European Systems of Positive and Negative Parliamentarism (as of December 2015)

| Country | Number of parliamentary elections | Number of minority cabinets | Number/percentage of post-election minority cabinets | Number/percentage of in-between election minority cabinets |
|---|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|--|
| SYSTEMS OF POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARIANISM IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | | | | |
| Belgium (since 1946) | 22 | 7 | 6/85,7 | 1/14,3 |
| Greece (since 1974) | 17 | 2 | 2/100,0 | 0/0,0 |
| Ireland (since 1944) | 20 | 12 | 9/75,0 | 3/25,0 |
| Spain (since 1977) | 12 | 9 | 8/88,9 | 1/11,1 |
| Italy (since 1946) | 18 | 26 | 8/30,8 | 18/69,2 |
| Malta (since 1962) | 12 | 1 | 1/100,0 | 0/0,0 |
| Germany (since 1949) | 18 | 0 | 0/0,0 | 0/0,0 |
| Finland (since 2000) | 4 | 0 | 0/0,0 | 0/0,0 |
| France (1945–1958) | 5 | 3 | 2/66,7 | 1/33,3 |
| Total, N ^o /% | 128 | 60 | 36/60,0 | 24/40,0 |
| SYSTEMS OF POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARIANISM IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | | | | |
| Bulgaria (since 1990) | 8 | 5 | 4/80,0 | 1/20,0 |
| Estonia (since 1992) | 7 | 4 | 0/0,0 | 4/100,0 |
| Latvia (since 1990) | 9 | 9 | 3/33,3 | 6/66,7 |
| Lithuania (since 1990) | 7 | 6 | 1/16,7 | 5/83,3 |
| Poland (since 1989) | 9 | 6 | 2/33,3 | 4/66,7 |
| Romania (since 1990) | 7 | 14 | 3/21,4 | 11/78,6 |
| Serbia (since 2007) | 4 | 0 | 0/0,0 | 0/0,0 |
| Slovakia (since 1990) | 8 | 5 | 1/20,0 | 4/80,0 |
| Slovenia (since 1990) | 8 | 4 | 0/0,0 | 4/100,0 |
| Hungary (since 1990) | 7 | 2 | 0/0,0 | 2/100,0 |
| Croatia (since 2000) | 5 | 4 | 1/25,0 | 3/75,0 |
| The Czech Republic (since 1990) | 8 | 5 | 3/60,0 | 2/40,0 |
| Montenegro (since 2006) | 3 | 0 | 0/0,0 | 0/0,0 |
| Total, N ^o /% | 90 | 64 | 18/28,1 | 46/71,9 |
| SYSTEMS OF NEGATIVE PARLIAMENTARIANISM IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | | | | |
| Austria (since 1945) | 21 | 2 | 1/50,0 | 1/50,0 |
| Denmark (since 1945) | 27 | 35 | 26/74,3 | 9/25,7 |
| Iceland (since 1946) | 21 | 6 | 2/33,3 | 4/66,7 |
| Luxembourg (since 1945) | 16 | 0 | 0/0,0 | 0/0,0 |
| The Netherlands (since 1946) | 21 | 8 | 2/25,0 | 6/75,0 |
| Norway (since 1945) | 18 | 20 | 10/50,0 | 10/50,0 |
| Portugal (since 1975) | 15 | 11 | 7/63,6 | 4/36,4 |
| The UK (since 1945) | 20 | 3 | 2/66,7 | 1/33,3 |
| Finland (till 2000) | 16 | 9 | 2/22,2 | 7/77,8 |
| France (since 1958) | 14 | 8 | 1/12,5 | 7/87,5 |
| Sweden (since 1944) | 22 | 23 | 16/69,6 | 7/30,4 |
| Total, N ^o /% | 211 | 125 | 69/55,2 | 56/44,8 |

Źródło: G. Ieraci, F. Poropat, *Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set*, Wyd. EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste 2013, źródło: http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WP-DISPES-4-2013_full-text.pdf (odczyt: 01 września 2016).; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliaments and governments database (ParGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies: Experimental version*, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> (odczyt: 01 września 2016).; K. Armingeon, D. Weisstanner, L. Knöpfel, *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2012 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member Countries)*, Wyd. Universität Bern 2014.

In general, the above outlined logic of post-election and in-between election governmental cabinets formation, as well as their distinction in accordance with the presence or absence of formal votes of confidence/investiture in parliamentary democracies (despite the influence of the parliaments and presidents on the process of cabinet formation) shows that minority governmental cabinets in the European parliamentary democracies are formed much more often as the post-election ones in the systems of negative parliamentarianism and in the systems of positive parliamentarianism in Western European countries. On the contrary, in-between election minority governments (see table. 1) prevail in Central-Eastern European countries. In total all European systems of positive parliamentarianism conduct a little bit less number of post-election minority governmental cabinets: consequently (as of December 2015), 43,5 % of governments, formed in accordance with such investiture-forming logic against 56,5 % of in-between minority cabinets. Absolutely controversial situation can be observed within the European systems of negative parliamentarianism: 55,2 % of post-election minority governments against 44,8 % of in-between election minority governments. From the cross-cultural perspective we can notice that post-election minority cabinets prevail in such countries as Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Sweden, i.e. in the countries, where minority governmental cabinets are institutionalized as the normal results of the election process and are typical consequences of positive or negative votes of confidence/investiture (it testifies that minority governments are not more often formed in the systems with negative rules of vote of investiture). In other European parliamentary democracies minority governmental cabinets are predominantly used on a practical level as ways of overcoming in-between election governmental and political crises, when coalitional majority governments or one-party or coalitional minority governments collapse. This does not mean that in such political systems minority governments are not institutionalized, but signifies that nature and appointment of such governments differ from the countries in comparison with the previous series of results. A rather specific instance (especially among countries, where minority governments are permanently formed) is Norway, where the frequency of post-election and in-between election processes of minority governments formation is comparable. It means that in this country minority governments are particularly institutionalized and may be viewed as a standard result of the election process, and as a typical consequence of the system of negative parliamentarianism, as well as a scenario of overcoming in-between governmental and political crises. At the same time, the abovementioned logic of minority governments formation within the different frames of investiture-forming procedures demonstrate that in some cases of the European parliamentary democracies, the experience and practice of in-between minority governments formation has not been fully or has been just partially tested and endorsed. But taking into account a distinctive nature of minority governmental cabinets, also institutionalized by different patterns of parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture in governmental cabinets, as well as reasoning argued by T. Shmachkova¹³, it becomes obvious that all minority governments (one-party or coalitional)

¹³ T. Shmachkova, *Teoriya koalitsiyi y stanovleniye rossyiskoi mnogopartyynosti (Metodyky ratsyonalyzatsyyi vibora)*, „Polys“, 1996, vol 5, s. 28-52.

should be dichotomized into two models: minority governmental cabinets with unstable support or investiture on the basis of one-time agreement (when the instances of minority governments are occasional and not typical in the inter-institutional environment), and minority governmental cabinets with stable support or investiture on the basis of multiple-time agreement between governmental and non-governmental/oppositional parties in exchange for some acquiescence on the part of governmental parties for non-governmental/oppositional parties (when examples of minority governmental cabinets are permanent, and thus typical in the inter-institutional environment). However, such dichotomy is usually referred to coalitional minority governments, where structures of inter-party relations and competitiveness, including those concerning supporting/investiture to coalitional governmental cabinets in the course of their formation and functioning, are more obvious and extensive.

Table 2. Correlation of Pre-Term Parliamentary Elections Frequency and Minority Governmental Cabinets Formation Frequency in Different Frames of Votes of Confidence/Investiture in the European Systems of Positive and Negative Parliamentarism (as of December 2015)

| Country | Number of all/pre-term Parliamentary elections | Percentage of pre-term parliamentary elections | Number of all governmental cabinets/ minority cabinets | Percentage of minority governmental cabinets |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| SYSTEMS OF POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARIANISM IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | | | | |
| Belgium (since 1946) | 22/16 | 72,7 | 46/7 | 15,2 |
| Greece (since 1974) | 17/6 | 35,3 | 24/2 | 8,3 |
| Ireland (since 1944) | 20/11 | 55,0 | 26/12 | 46,2 |
| Spain (since 1977) | 12/1 | 8,3 | 13/9 | 69,2 |
| Italy (since 1946) | 18/9 | 50,0 | 65/26 | 40,0 |
| Malta (since 1962) | 12/6 | 50,0 | 15/1 | 6,7 |
| Germany (since 1949) | 18/3 | 16,7 | 25/0 | 0,0 |
| Finland (since 2000) | 4/0 | 0,0 | 10/0 | 0,0 |
| France (1945–1958) | 5/2 | 40,0 | 26/3 | 11,5 |
| SYSTEMS OF POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARIANISM IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | | | | |
| Bulgaria (since 1990) | 8/3 | 37,5 | 13/5 | 38,5 |
| Estonia (since 1992) | 7/0 | 0,0 | 15/4 | 26,7 |
| Latvia (since 1990) | 9/2 | 22,2 | 23/9 | 39,1 |
| Lithuania (since 1990) | 7/0 | 0,0 | 18/6 | 33,3 |
| Poland (since 1989) | 9/3 | 33,3 | 21/6 | 28,6 |
| Romania (since 1990) | 7/0 | 0,0 | 22/14 | 63,6 |
| Serbia (since 2007) | 4/2 | 50,0 | 4/0 | 0,0 |
| Slovakia (since 1990) | 8/3 | 37,5 | 15/5 | 33,3 |
| Slovenia (since 1990) | 8/2 | 25,0 | 16/4 | 25,0 |
| Hungary (since 1990) | 7/0 | 0,0 | 11/2 | 18,2 |
| Croatia (since 2000) | 5/0 | 0,0 | 9/4 | 44,4 |
| The Czech Republic (since 1990) | 8/3 | 37,5 | 16/5 | 31,3 |
| Montenegro (since 2006) | 3/2 | 66,7 | 4/0 | 0,0 |

| Country | Number of all/pre-term Parliamentary elections | Percentage of pre-term parliamentary elections | Number of all governmental cabinets/ minority cabinets | Percentage of minority governmental cabinets |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| SYSTEMS OF NEGATIVE PARLIAMENTARIANISM IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | | | | |
| Austria (since 1945) | 21/14 | 66,7 | 33/2 | 6,1 |
| Denmark (since 1945) | 27/20 | 74,1 | 38/35 | 92,1 |
| Iceland (since 1946) | 21/5 | 23,8 | 32/6 | 18,8 |
| Luxembourg (since 1945) | 16/1 | 6,3 | 21/0 | 0,0 |
| The Netherlands (since 1946) | 21/12 | 57,1 | 32/8 | 25,0 |
| Norway (since 1945) | 18/0 | 0,0 | 31/20 | 64,5 |
| Portugal (since 1975) | 15/7 | 46,7 | 24/11 | 45,8 |
| The UK (since 1945) | 20/5 | 25,0 | 25/3 | 12,0 |
| Finland (till 2000) | 16/4 | 25,0 | 44/9 | 20,5 |
| France (since 1958) | 14/6 | 42,9 | 37/8 | 21,6 |
| Sweden (since 1944) | 22/1 | 4,5 | 31/23 | 74,2 |

Źródło: G. Ieraci, F. Poropat, *Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set*, Wyd. EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste 2013, źródło: http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WP-DISPES-4-2013_full-text.pdf (odczyt: 01 września 2016).; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies: Experimental version*, źródło: <http://www.parl.gov.org/> (odczyt: 01 września 2016).; K. Armingeon, D. Weisstanner, L. Knöpfel, *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2012 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member Countries)*, Wyd. Universität Bern 2014.

It is presupposed by formal rules and procedures of votes of investiture and institutionalized variants of overcoming governmental and political crises, which in such cases are mainly correlated with pre-term parliamentary elections. For instance, it is inherent to the countries, where post-election minority governments are permanently formed, as in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Portugal: however the frequency of post-election minority governments formation is mainly caused by pre-term elections, which are rather frequently held. In the rest of the European parliamentary democracies, as the comparative data from Table 2 testify, correlation of pre-term elections and frequency of post-election and in-between election minority governments formation is negative.

Therewith, J. A. Cheibub, S. Martin and B. E. Rasch¹⁴ indicate that the processes of various types of governments formation (in particular minority cabinets) in parliamentary democracies (“assembly/parliamentary confidence”) are influenced not only by formalized and typical parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture (or their absence) and their patterns and constructions, but also other institutional rules, incorporated in the parliaments/leading chambers of the parliaments. Among them: role of the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament in choosing the governmental cabinet (the originator or prime-minister and composition of the government); number of chambers in the parliament, involved in the process of choosing and formation of the government, as well as rules of decision making,

¹⁴ J. A. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. E. Rasch, *To Invest or Not to Invest? Modes of Government Selection in Parliamentary Democracies and their Origins*, Paper prepared for presentation at the workshop on “The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences”, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Salamanca, Spain, April 10-15, 2014, s. 2.

concerning votes of confidence/investiture in the government in every chamber of the parliament; political consequences and further actions in case if the parliament does not choose or form the governmental cabinet.

The role of the parliament or the leading chamber of the parliament while choosing the governmental cabinet (the originator or prime-minister and composition of the government), i.e. the party/parties, which form the governmental cabinet and participate in it, can be inactive, active and reactive. Some European parliaments (i.e. parliaments within the European parliamentary democracies), as a rule under the systems of negative parliamentarianism, do not play any formal-crucial role in choosing and/or forming governmental cabinets. Formally, they are inactive¹⁵. However, in some systems of negative and mainly positive parliamentarianism, the parliaments or leading chambers of the parliaments actively participate in choosing and adopting new governmental cabinets, usually due to the procedure of formal voting, which is called votes of confidence/investiture in the government. Such parliaments are divided into active and reactive: the former applies a practice of advance votes of confidence/investiture; the latter uses a practice of resulting votes of confidence/investiture. Taking into account the institutional and political practice (and not only constitutional institutionalization), it becomes obvious, that among the European parliamentary democracies, the parliaments in their government-forming processes were/are: inactive in Austria, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland (till 2000), France; active in Greece, Estonia, Spain, Malta, Germany, Poland (in 1989–1992), Slovenia, the United kingdom (taking into account voting for investiture of the prime-minister's speech in the newly elected parliament), Finland (since 2000), France (in 1945–1958) and Sweden; reactive in Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland (since 1992), Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Montenegro. An average number of minority governments in the European parliamentary democracies over the period of 1944–2015 was the biggest in the systems of inactive parliaments (10,9), much smaller in the systems of reactive parliaments (6,4), and, finally, the least, in the systems of active parliaments (4,6). A bit different results we obtain due to the analysis of minority governmental cabinets formation frequency: mostly they are formed in the systems of reactive parliaments (34,5 percent), almost identical figures are registered in the systems of inactive parliaments (32,6 percent), and the most infrequent they are in the systems of active parliaments (25,5 percent). It means that minority governments are most frequently formed in the systems of negative parliamentarianism with inactive parliaments and in the systems of positive parliamentarianism with reactive parliaments. On the other hand, they are absolutely rare in the systems with active parliaments.

The number of chambers of the parliament, involved into the process of government choosing and formation, as well as the rules of decision making, concerning votes of confidence/investiture in

¹⁵ A. Krouwel, J. Koedam, *The Netherlands: Investiture Behind Closed Doors*, Wyd. Vrije University Amsterdam 2014.; J. A. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. E. Rasch, *To Invest or Not to Invest? Modes of Government Selection in Parliamentary Democracies and their Origins*, Paper prepared for presentation at the workshop on "The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences", ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Salamanca, Spain, April 10-15, 2014, s. 3.

each of the chambers are of great importance in the government-forming process, and thus may influence the minority government formation frequency. Theoretical-methodological and empirical evidences of that can be found in works by D. Diermeier, H. Eraslan, A. Merlo¹⁶, J. Druckman, L. Martin, M. Thies¹⁷, J. A. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. E. Rasch¹⁸, G. Tsebelis, J. Money¹⁹, W. Heller and D. Branduse²⁰. It is possible to verify this relation on the basis of correlation between the frequency of minority government formation in the systems, where the governmental cabinets formation processes are only influenced by lower chamber of bicameral parliaments or unicameral/one-chamber parliaments and the systems where the same processes are influenced by both lower and upper chambers of the bicameral parliaments. Among the European countries lower and upper chambers of the parliaments participate in providing votes of confidence or investiture only in Italy and Romania²¹. Moreover, in these countries governments are responsible to both chambers of the parliaments. Average minority governments in the European parliamentary democracies have more often been formed namely in the systems, where votes of confidence/investiture depend on both chambers of the parliament: 46,5 % of minority governments of all governmental cabinets in such systems, in comparison with 29,5 % of minority governments in the systems, where votes of confidence/investiture depend on one-chamber parliaments or only lower chambers of two-chamber parliaments.

In conclusion we argue that in general the influence of votes of confidence/investiture on minority governments formation (as well as other types of governments) is significant. It is revealed both in a simple verification of the fact, whether constitutions and legislations of some countries institutionalize parliamentary votes of investiture of governmental cabinets, and in determination of institutional design of parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture as heterogeneous rules and procedures, which should not always be synthesized and combined into integral analytical groups. Due to this, it becomes clear that the presence or absence of votes of confidence/investiture, as well as their combinations and procedural patterns in different ways influence the frequency of various types of government formation, in particular minority governments.

Therewith, it is necessary to comprehend (and conduct further research) the fact that votes of confidence/investiture should not be just singled out as a constitutionally preconditioned

¹⁶ D. Diermeier, H. Eraslan, A. Merlo, *Bicameralism and Government Formation*, "PIER Working Paper Archive", 2007, nr 07-010.

¹⁷ J. Druckman, M. Thies, *The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration*, "American Journal of Political Science", 2002, vol 46, nr 4, s. 760-771.; J. Druckman, L. Martin, M. Thies, *Influence without Confidence: Upper Chambers and Government Formation*, "Legislative Studies Quarterly", 2005, vol 30, nr 4, s. 529-548.

¹⁸ J. A. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. E. Rasch, *To Invest or Not to Invest? Modes of Government Selection in Parliamentary Democracies and their Origins*, Paper prepared for presentation at the workshop on "The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences", ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Salamanca, Spain, April 10-15, 2014, s. 2.

¹⁹ G. Tsebelis, J. Money, *Bicameralism*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997.

²⁰ W. Heller, D. Branduse, *The Politics of Bicameralism*, [w:] S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, K. Strom (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2014.

²¹ F. Russo, *Bicameral Investiture: Parliament and Government Formation in Italy*, Wyd. University of Siena 2014.; I. Apahideanu, *Unicameralism versus Bicameralism Revisited: The Case of Romania*, "Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review", 2014, vol 14, nr 1, s. 47-88.; M. A. Apostolache, *Considerations on the bicameral parliamentary system in Romania*, "Juridical Tribune (Tribuna Juridica)", 2014, vol 4, nr 2, s. 61-68.

instrument, but there is a need for analyzing their normative structure and political consequences, i.e. one should pay attention to structuring of vote of confidence/investiture. It means that in the context of government formation, in particular minority governments, it is necessary to speak both of votes of confidence/investiture in their “pure/ideal” form, and of procedural attributes of votes of confidence/investiture, what can be a subject to further investigation. A general reason for such approach is that empirically/practically requirements towards votes of confidence/investiture are changing from country to country and may be either harsh, or weak. Therefore, they are differently determined in their institutional design and consequences, and thus, hypothetically in different ways influence the process, peculiarities and statistics of minority governments formation (as well as other types of governmental cabinets) in the European parliamentary democracies.

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Conceptualization of political identity as a practical category

The author considers the theoretical aspects of political identity as a practical category that is reflected in the identity politics. It was found that the modern states, regional communities, social and cultural groups implement the identity politics as a necessary element of the public policy aimed primarily at mobilizing and consolidating a group or society. It was determined that identity politics are a result of liberal state development, the functioning of which was based on the conception of interests groups and supporting group differentiation of the citizens. Its elements are the politics of differences and the politics of recognition that ensures the particular identities institutionalization. It was substantiated that the identity politics is implemented not only by group actors, but also by the state in order to integrate social and regional groups, manage the sociocultural diversity, developing and maintaining macro-level identity.

Keywords: political identity, identity politics, politics of differences, politics of recognition, multiculturalism, macro-level identity, particular identity, globalization.

КОНЦЕПТУАЛІЗАЦІЯ ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ ІДЕНТИЧНОСТІ ЯК КАТЕГОРІЇ ПРАКТИКИ

Розглянуто теоретичні аспекти політичної ідентичності як категорії практики, що знаходять відображення у політиці (політиках) ідентичності. З'ясовано, що сучасні держави, регіональні спільноти, соціальні та культурні групи реалізують політику ідентичності як необхідний елемент публічної політики, спрямований передусім на мобілізацію і консолідацію групи чи суспільства. Визначено, що політика ідентичності стала результатом розвитку ліберальної держави, функціонування якої засновувалось на концепції груп інтересів та сприянню груповій диференціації громадян. Її елементами є політика відмінностей і політика визнання, що забезпечує інституалізацію партикулярних ідентичностей. Обґрунтовано, що політику ідентичності реалізують не лише групові суб'єкти, а й держави з метою інтеграції соціальних та регіональних груп, управління соціокультурною різноманітністю, формування та підтримання макрорівневої ідентичності.