

## **Уряди меншості в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи: причини формування, політичні наслідки, параметри стабільності (1990-2013)**

Запропоновано теоретико-методологічний та емпіричний аналіз урядів меншості у країнах Центрально-Східної Європи. Виокремлено принципи та атрибути формування урядів меншості в парламентських демократіях на прикладів країн Центрально-Східної Європи. Визначено причини формування, політичні наслідки й параметри стабільності урядів меншості у країнах Центрально-Східної Європи впродовж 1990-2013 рр.

*Ключові слова:* уряд, урядовий кабінет, уряд меншості, однапартійний та коаліційний уряд меншості, парламентська демократія, Центрально-Східна Європа.

## **Minority governments in Central-Eastern European countries: causes of formation, political consequences, parameters of stability (1990-2013)**

The article is dedicated to theoretical, methodological and empirical analysis of minority governments in Central-Eastern European countries. The author singled out principles and attributes of minority governments' formation in Central-Eastern European parliamentary democracies; determined basic causes of minority governments' formation, political consequences and stability in Central and Eastern Europe in 1990-2013.

*Keywords:* government, government cabinet, minority government, coalition and single-party minority government, parliamentary democracy, Central and Eastern Europe.

Parliamentary and semi-presidential republics<sup>1</sup> exist in all countries of Central and Eastern Europe (this region includes Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,

<sup>1</sup> R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime types: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, nr 33, s. 219-238.

Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic). All of them are *parliamentary democracies*. This stipulates that parliaments (in parliamentary republics) or presidents and parliaments (in semi-presidential republics) have a dominant impact on the formation of *governments*. It goes without saying that “*a chain of delegating*” the power may be traced, which is directed (through different “veto actors”) for the submission of governments to the parliaments (or to heads of state and parliaments). Consequently we can observe an initial impact on the framework of the governments of the following composition: parliaments of party and non-party composition. In view of the fact that almost all negotiations on the formation of governments and their composition take place particularly in the parliaments, and also taking into account the priority of political parties in forming the governments we can assert that the composition of parliament in particular (although in various degrees) is succeeded as part of the government.

That is why it is necessary to single out different types of governments depending on the *party composition* of the parliaments and their extrapolation to the composition of governments in different parliamentary democracies of the countries in a region. According to P. Hogwood, four *types of party governments* are usually singled out in a political science: single-party majority governments and single-party minority governments, coalition majority governments and coalition minority governments<sup>2</sup>. The majority governments are traditionally formed. They represent the scenarios, where a party or a coalition/bloc of parties has a majority in parliament, which is enough for the expression of confidence in any government. Nevertheless, the scenario of a party and interparty consensus is not always inherent: sometimes we can observe difficulties in the accommodation of interests and positions of the potential subjects of parliamentary/coalition majority. And as a result there emerges a possibility (provided that it is not prohibited by law) of the *minority cabinets* formation under conditions of distinctions in the parliamentary parties. Formation of minority governments is an acceptable recovery from a parliamentary political crisis for a country and its main political actors in case of failure to form majority governments. At the same time in some countries the formation of minority governments is a traditional mechanism for procuring “a chain for delegating” the powers of authority. Taking this into account it is obvious that the minority governments by their nature of formation constitute exclusive and/or institutionalized scenarios of the delegation of power from a legislative branch of power to the executive branch. As a result the object of this research is presented by the governments in parliamentary democracies of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the subject of this research is presented by minority governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the context of their formation causes, political consequences and stability, and the purpose of research is presented

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<sup>2</sup> P. Hogwood, G. Roberts, *European Politics Today*, Wyd. Manchester University Press 2003, s. 145-146.

by elaboration of a clear idea of what the minority governments basically are in Central and Eastern Europe countries in the context of specifying the reasons for their formation, political consequences and parameters of stability.

In the course of elaborating the issue of minority governments in Central and Eastern Europe countries and analysis of the reasons for their formation, political consequences and parameters of stability we handle the theoretical, methodological and empirical data, obtained from the western scientific sources. Among the scientists, who are engaged in the assessment and interpretation of the analyzed terms of reference, we can distinguish the works of the following authors: V. Herman i J. Pope<sup>3</sup>, K. Strom<sup>4</sup>, G. Luebbert<sup>5</sup>, M. Laver, N. Schofield<sup>6</sup>, M. Gallaher, M. Laver i P. Mair<sup>7</sup>, C. Crombez<sup>8</sup>, T. Bergman<sup>9</sup>, W. Muller i K. Strom<sup>10</sup>, G-E. Isaaksson<sup>11</sup>, M. Ireland i S. Gartner<sup>12</sup>, C. Green-Pedersen<sup>13</sup>, F. Muller-Rommel, K. Fettelschloss ra P. Harfst<sup>14</sup>, F. Müller-Rommel<sup>15</sup>, C. Conrad ra S. Golder<sup>16</sup>, B. Rasch<sup>17</sup>, M. Mattila i T. Raunio<sup>18</sup>, A. Skjæveland<sup>19</sup>, Z. Maoz i B. Russett<sup>20</sup>, B. Prins ra C. Sprecher<sup>21</sup> and etc.

- <sup>3</sup> V. Herman, J. Pope, *Minority Governments in Western Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 1973, nr 3, s. 191-212.
- <sup>4</sup> K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, "Comparative political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 199-227.; K. Strøm, *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1986, nr 11, s. 583-605.
- <sup>5</sup> G. Luebbert, *Comparative Democracy: policy Making and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1986.
- <sup>6</sup> M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford 1990.
- <sup>7</sup> M. Gallaher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill 1992.
- <sup>8</sup> C. Crombez, *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, nr 29, s. 1-29.
- <sup>9</sup> T. Bergman, *When minority cabinets are the rule and majority coalitions the exception*, [w:] W. Müller, K. Strøm, *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 193-225.
- <sup>10</sup> W. Muller, K. Strom, *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.
- <sup>11</sup> G-E. Isaaksson, *Parliamentary government in different shapes*, "West European Politics" 2001, nr 24, s. 40-54.
- <sup>12</sup> M. Ireland, S.S. Gartner, *Time to Fight. Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems*, "Journal of Conflict Resolution" 2001, nr 45, s. 547-568.
- <sup>13</sup> C. Green-Pedersen, *Minority Governments and Party Politics: The Political and Institutional Background to the 'Danish Miracle'*, "Journal of Public Policy" 2002, nr 21, s. 63-80.
- <sup>14</sup> F. Muller-Rommel, K. Fettelschloss, P. Harfst, *Party Government in Central European Democracies: A Data Collection (1990-2003)*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2004, nr 43, s. 869-893.
- <sup>15</sup> F. Müller-Rommel, *Parteienregierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Empirische Befunde im Ländervergleich 1990 bis 2008*, "Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen" 2008, vol 39, nr 4, s. 810-831.
- <sup>16</sup> C. Conrad, S. Golder, *Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2010, vol 49, nr 1, s. 119-150.
- <sup>17</sup> B.E. Rasch, *Why Minority Governments? Executive-Legislative Relations in the Nordic Countries* [w:] T. Persson, M. Wiberg, *Parliamentary Government in the Nordic Countries at a Crossroads: Coping with Challenges from Europeanization and Presidentialisation*, Wyd. Santérus Academic Press 2011, s. 41-62.
- <sup>18</sup> M. Mattila, T. Raunio, *Government Formation in the Nordic Countries: The Electoral Connection*, "Scandinavian Political Studies" 2002, nr 25, s. 259-280.; M. Mattila, T. Raunio, *Does winning pay? Electoral success and government formation in 15 West European countries*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2004, nr 43, s. 270-271.
- <sup>19</sup> A. Skjæveland, *Modeling Government Formation in Denmark and Beyond*, "Party Politics" 2009, nr 15, s. 715-735.
- <sup>20</sup> Z. Maoz, B. Russett, *Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946-1986*, "American Political Science Review" 1993, nr 87, s. 626.
- <sup>21</sup> B. Prins, C. Sprecher, *Institutional constraints, political opposition, and interstate dispute escalation: Evidence from parliamentary systems, 1946-1989*, "Journal of Peace Research" 1999, nr 36, s. 271-287.

In order to understand the reasons for formation, political consequences and parameters of stability of the minority governments we'll consider the peculiarities of their functioning by an example of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe within 1990-2013 (analysis carried out with regard to ten countries of the region from the time of their receipt/restoration of independence or collapse of "real socialism" regimes before December of 2013). But we will first make some general theoretical and methodological remarks. *The first remark* pertains to the definition of the category of "minority governments."

We understand the "minority governments" as the term, which under the conditions of multi-party system represents the government cabinets, the party or parties of which (that is, those parties, which form part of the governments, and thus receive portfolios) do not represent a vast majority of seats/mandates in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament. It means that the *minority government* is the case where a parliamentary party individually or in coalition with other parliamentary parties, the share of the mandates of which amounts to less than half of complete composition of the parliament /main chamber of the parliament, forms the government. Accordingly, the share of parliamentary parties, which do not form part of the minority government, amounts to more than fifty percent of the total number of deputies from the parliament/main chamber of the parliament. But confidence (support/investiture) in the majority (vast or relative) of the composition of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament (the format of confidence provision to the governments in parliamentary democracies has been constitutionally specified – in its own way in each country).

*The second remark* pertains to differentiation of the separate *types of minority governments* – single-party and coalition governments. *Single-party minority government* is the government cabinet, the party of which (which forms part of the government and thus receives the portfolios) does contain the vast majority of mandates in the parliament, that is, it individually has less support than 50 percent of the deputies from complete composition of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament (formal and informal or implicit confidence in the government is additionally guaranteed by another/other party/parties of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament or non-party deputies in general). *Minority coalition government* is the government cabinet, the parties of which (which form part of the government, and thus receive the portfolios) do not constitute the vast majority of seats in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament, that is, they individually have support of less than 50 percent of the deputies from complete composition of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament (formal and informal or implicit confidence in the government is additionally guaranteed by another/other party/parties of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament or non-party deputies in general).

*The third remark* relates to the *powers of minority governments*. In their activity the single-party and minority coalition governments carry out the same functions as the majority

cabinets. The distinction consists in the fact that the head of government should focus more on the threat of possible early resignation of the cabinet.

This points to the fact that the head of the government must pay much attention to interrelations with a parliamentary party (with government parties, non-government parties, which provide support to the minority government, and opposition parties) and non-party deputies (if present in composition of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament), which is less common for the majority governments (especially the single-party ones). The fact is that an inadequate attention on the part of the head of the cabinet, for example, to non-government parties and non-party deputies of the parliament, which procure formal and informal/tacit support to the minority government (in the context of determining their election promises), may lead to a refusal in the vote of confidence in such government.

Taking this into account it is clear that the minority governments (both single-party and coalition governments) have more institutional flexibility in executing their line of policy, and are also more open in the context of considering the interests of the main political (particularly parliamentary) groups, than the majority governments.

*54 minority governments* have been formed in ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe within 1990-2013, which amounts to more than one third of all party government cabinets in the region. Out of the minority governments the coalition cabinets, 38 of which have been formed (more than 26 percent of all party governments and more than 70 percent of all minority governments in the region), traditionally prevail in amount. Such trend of the minority governments formation and interrelation of their types is characteristic for most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, except Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Hungary. In Bulgaria and Estonia the number of single-party minority governments is above/equal to the number of the minority coalition governments.

Single-party governments were exclusively formed among the minority governments in Hungary, and the coalition cabinets were exclusively formed in Lithuania and Slovenia. Most minority governments in Central and Eastern Europe were created in parliamentary republics (Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, and also the Czech Republic before 2013). Latvia is an absolute record holder, in which 9 minority governments were formed within 1993-2013. Instead, in semi-presidential republics the minority cabinets are not formed so often. Romania is an exception, in which 12 minority governments were formed within 1990-2013, which amounts to almost 60 percent of all party governments in this country (that is, in Romania the minority governments are formed more often than the majority cabinets). The minority cabinets constitute more than one third of the cases in the context of all party governments in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia; one third or less in Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia. In each country of the region the minority governments were not approved within 1990-2013 in less than twenty percent of cases.

**Table 1.** Minority governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (1990–2013)<sup>22</sup>

Country	Number (percent) of minority governments	Number (percent) of single-party minority governments	Number (percent) of minority coalition governments	Number of party governments
Bułgaria (from 1990)	3 (33,3)	2 (22,2)	1 (11,1)	9
Czechy (from 1990)	5 (41,7)	2 (16,7)	3 (25,0)	12
Estonia (from 1992)	4 (30,8)	2 (15,4)	2 (15,4)	13
Litwa (from 1992)	3 (21,4)	-	3 (21,4)	14
Łotwa (from 1993)	9 (45,0)	1 (5,00)	8 (40,0)	20
Polska (from 1991)	5 (31,3)	2 (12,5)	3 (18,8)	16
Rumunia (from 1990)	12 (57,1)	3 (14,3)	9 (42,8)	21
Slovenia (from 1990)	5 (33,3)	-	5 (33,3)	15
Słowacja (from 1990)	6 (40,0)	2 (13,3)	4 (26,7)	15
Węgry (from 1990)	2 (20,0)	2 (20,0)	-	10
Total	54 (25,6)	16 (9,7)	38 (15,9)	145

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 01.02.2014]

With respect to the frequency of the minority governments formation it should be noted that you may trace an interrelation between the number of minority governments and peculiarities of such governments receiving the votes of confidence/investiture in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Any government (party or non-party, majority or minority, single-party or coalition government) may formally commence its activity only after it (prime minister and/or government program) receives the government support – so-called *vote of confidence* or *investiture*. This requirement is one of the basic principles in the “chain of delegating” the powers/liability in parliamentary democracies of the countries in the region, and is defined by the fact that the procedure of formation and and/or functioning of the governments is determined by the features of so-called “*positive parliamentarism*”<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Temporary and non-party governments are not to be analyzed. Percent of the minority governments should be analyzed only with respect to the amount of party governments. The list of the minority governments prime ministers and their years in office: *Bułgaria* – F. Dimitrov (1991-1992), S. Saksoburggotski (2004-2005), B. Borisov (2009-2013); *Czechy* – V. Klaus (1996-1997), M. Zeman (1998-2002), S. Gross (2005), M. Topolánek (2006), M. Topolánek (2007-2009); *Estonia* – T. Vahi (1996-1997), M. Siimann (1997-1999), S. Kallas (2002-2003), A. Ansip (2009-2011); *Litwa* – P. Paksas (2000-2001), A. Brazauskas (2006), G. Kirkilas (2006-2008); *Łotwa* – V. Birkavs (1993-1994), M. Gailis (1994-1995), G. Krasts (1997-1998), G. Krasts (1998), V. Kristopans (1998-1999), I. Emsis (2004), A. Kalvītis (2006), V. Dombrovskis (2010), V. Dombrovskis (2011-2013/чинний); *Polska* – J. Olszewski (1991-1992), H. Suchocka (1993), J. Buzek (2000-2001), L. Miller (2003-2004), K. Marcinkiewicz (2005-2006); *Rumunia* – N. Vacaroiu (1992-1994), N. Vacaroiu (1994-1996), N. Vacaroiu (1996), V. Ciorbea (1998), A. Nastase (2000-2004), K. Popescu-Tariceanu (2004-2006), K. Popescu-Tariceanu (2006-2007), K. Popescu-Tariceanu (2007-2008), E. Boc (2009-2010), E. Boc (2010-2012), M. Ungureanu (2012), V. Ponta (2012); *Słowacja* – V. Meciar (1993), V. Meciar (1993-1994), J. Moravcik (1994), M. Dzurinda (2003-2005), M. Dzurinda (2005-2006), M. Dzurinda (2006); *Slovenia* – J. Drnovsek (1992), J. Drnovsek (1996), A. Bajuk (2000), B. Pahor (2011), B. Pahor (2011); *Węgry* – F. Gyúresany (2008-2009), G. Bajnai (2009-2010).

<sup>23</sup> The vote of confidence in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is a formal regulatory legal act and a specific political action of the parliament/its main chamber, which expresses or does not express (checks in general) support of the program and/or composition of any theoretically new government or status of this program execution, that is, of the line of policy and activity of currently existing government. For more details, see: K. Strøm, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2000, vol 37, nr 3, s. 261-289.; K. Strøm, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.; W. Müller, *Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2000,

– institutional and constitutional scenario, pursuant to which the fact of formation and functioning of any government is based on the confidence in parliament or the main chamber of the parliament. The fact is that the minority governments are formed more often in those countries, which provide for more simple procedures for their receipt of the votes of confidence on the constitutional level. It means that the minority governments are encountered more often in those countries, where a permit from the relative majority of the composition of the parliaments/main chambers of the parliaments (format of relative majority in different countries of the region is determined in different way – for more details see the texts of national constitutions) is needed in order to provide the investiture to the governments on the part of those parliaments/main chambers of the parliaments. Out of such countries in Central and Eastern Europe we can point out Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, where the average of six minority governments (minimum – three, maximum – twenty) were formed within 1990-2013. Instead, the minority governments are rarely encountered in those countries, where in order to provide the investiture to the governments on the part of parliaments or main chambers of the parliaments a permit from the vast majority of the composition of the latter is required. Out of such countries in Central and Eastern Europe we may single out Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary, where less than four minority governments were formed within 1990-2013.

In general it is obvious that *the phenomenon of the minority governments is rather approved* in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in most cases it is believed to be an institutionalized mechanism of the delegation of authorities from legislative to executive body. In most countries of the region the minority governments have been institutionalized immediately or shortly after the receipt/restoration of independence of the countries or after a collapse of the “real socialism” regimes – that is, when post-communistic constitutions were adopted but the party and election systems in the countries of the region have not yet been established. Hungary represents a specific case where up to 2008 only the majority coalition governments have functioned. That is why the formation of two single-party minority governments represented a critical case in the development of Hungarian parliamentarism, which fact contributed to the reversibility of the development of Hungarian political mode after resignation of the minority governments (the deal is that since 2010, according to most scientists, Hungary began to somewhat move away from the values of the liberal parliamentary democracy). That is why it is obvious that in the context of Hungary the minority governments should rather be construed as an exception than an institutionalized practice, which will further be used by the country. In addition, the experience of minority governments formation in Lithuania, which began only in 2006, did not lead to a withdrawal from democratic

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vol 34, nr 3, s. 309-333.; D. Diermeier, T. Feddersen, *Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure*, “American Political Science Review” 1998, vol 92, nr 3, s. 611-621.; J. Huber, *The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies*, “American Political Science Review” 1996, vol 90, nr 2, s. 269-282.

values. Hungary demonstrates a similar conclusion, where the formation of minority cabinets is a permanent phenomenon. This was caused by the attributes of Romanian semi-presidential system, to which the actually commensurable authorities of two executive power centers (the president and prime-minister) are institutionally and constitutionally common. Periodical imposition of these peculiarities on often fragmented composition of Romanian parliament is a reason for more frequent formation of the minority governments that in other countries of the region, and also speaks for the influence of semi-presidential variety of democracies on the dynamics of the minority governments functioning. It proves directly that the minority governments under conditions of parliamentarism and semi-presidential system (in terms of parliamentary democracies in general) have impact on a political process in different way, which is implemented in one or other country.

With regard to the *reasons for the minority governments formation* in the region, most often we may point out the following ones: 1) arguments in the majority or minority single-party or coalition governments, which within the boundaries of one term of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament preceded the minority single-party or coalition governments (as a result of such arguments the governments terminated their powers voluntarily, parties or their parts left the governments, as a result of which the composition of governments was changed, and the votes of no confidence/no reliance were proclaimed to the governments, but what turned out to be undesirable/irrational or impossible was the idea to form new majority governments, non-party governments or the idea of feasibility to carry out the early parliamentary elections); 2) desire to expand the size of the minority government by virtue of engaging other participants in it and to guarantee more reliable conditions of functioning to the government (this refers to the cases of transformation of the minority single-party and coalition governments into the minority coalition governments with larger amount of government parties); 3) results of parliamentary elections, on the basis of which due to a difficulty or impossibility to reconcile the interests of the parties there is no possibility to form the majority single-party/coalition government, and formation of the government on a non-party basis or early elections of the parliament or main chamber of the parliament are undesirable<sup>24</sup>. In general in a cause-and-effect aspect it is obvious that the minority governments naturally use the option of exiting the state of ideological opposition between the parties in the parliament<sup>25</sup>. It means that

<sup>24</sup> L. Brokl, Z. Mansfeldova, *Czech Republic*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1997, nr 32, s. 339-350.; L. Linek, *Czech Republic*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2006, nr 45, s. 1078-1083.; V. Pettai, *Estonia*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2008, nr 46, s. 943-948.; J. Ikstens, *Latvia*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2005, nr 44, s. 1077-1085.; G. Ilonszki, S. Kurtán, *Hungary*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2007, nr 46, s. 966-973.; Z. Enyedi, *The Survival of the Fittest: Party System Concentration in Hungary*, [w:] S. Jungerstam-Mulders, *Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems*, Wyd. Ashgate 2006, s. 177-202.; F. Müller-Rommel, K. Fettelschloss, P. Harfst, *Party Government in Central European Democracies: A Data Collection (1990-2003)*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2004, nr 43, s. 869-893.; F. Müller-Rommel, *Parteienregierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Empirische Befunde im Ländervergleich 1990 bis 2008*, "Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen" 2008, nr 39 (4), s. 810-831.

<sup>25</sup> M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

the minority government cabinets should be considered as a normal result of political rivalry<sup>26</sup>: they perform the same functions as the majority governments.

Instead, the basic institutional *reasons for termination of powers* (termination at a fixed date in case of expiration or reduction of the term for the parliament/main chamber of the parliament, or early termination) of the minority governments are: 1) early resignations of the governments on the basis of a change in composition of the governments and coalition arguments between the government coalition partners (in case of functioning of the minority coalition governments); 2) discrepancies in implementation of the government policy between the parties, which are governmental, and the parties, which provide the minority governments with the vote of confidence in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament – on the basis of these facts they may declare the vote of no confidence or deny the vote of confidence to the government cabinets (single-party or coalition); 3) regular and special/early parliamentary elections (in parliamentary democracies the parliament elections are generally the basis for forming the new government cabinets); 4) early resignations of the minority governments by virtue of voluntary termination of powers by them or the government heads or voluntary change in the compositions of government cabinets (in case of this scenario the new government should receive the votes of confidence in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament)<sup>27</sup>; 5) inability to form a complete composition of the government cabinet due to the absence of the vote of confidence/investiture from the parliament to the appointed head of government cabinet (in cases when the vote of confidence provides support to the composition and program of the government, rather than the prime minister)<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>26</sup> K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, "Comparative political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 199-227.

<sup>27</sup> E. Giatzidis, *An Introduction to post-Communist Bulgaria: Political, economic and social transformation*, Wyd. Manchester University Press 2002, s. 67.; F. Millard, *Polish Politics and Society*, Wyd. Routledge 1999.; A. Banks, T. Muller, W. Overstreet, *Political Handbook of the World: 2005-2006*, Wyd. CQ Press 2006.; F. Müller-Rommel, *Parteienregierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Empirische Befunde im Ländervergleich 1990 bis 2008*, „Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen“ 2008, nr 39 (4), s. 810-831.; C. Conrad, S. Golder, *Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2010, nr 49 (1), s. 119-150.; J. Krzysztof, A. Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, *Poland*, «European Journal of Political Research» 2006, vol 45, nr 7-8, s. 1231-1246.; J. Krzysztof, A. Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, *Poland*, «European Journal of Political Research» 2007, vol 47, nr 7-8, s. 1068-1079.; A. Krupavicius, *Lithuania*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2007, nr 46, s. 1019-1031.; J. Fitzmaurice, *The Slovenian parliamentary elections of 10 November 1996*, "Electoral Studies" 1997, nr 16, s. 403-497.; P. Kopecký, *Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics: Party competition and parliamentary institutionalization*, Wyd. Ashgate 2001.; M. Rybář, *Old Parties and New: Changing Patterns of Party Politics in Slovakia*, [w:] S. Jungerstam-Mulders, *Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems*, Wyd. Ashgate 2006, s. 147-176.; D. Malová, P. Učeň, *Slovakia*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2007, nr 46, s. 1096-1106.; M. Popescu, *The parliamentary and presidential elections in Romania, November 2000*, "Electoral Studies" 2003, nr 22, s. 325-335.; W. Downs, R. Miller, *The 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections in Romania*, "Electoral Studies" 2006, nr 25, s. 409-415.; L. Stan, R. Zaharia, *Romania*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2007, nr 46, s. 1082-1095.

<sup>28</sup> Such actual reason of termination of the minority government powers was declared, for example, to the cabinet of W. Pawlak in Poland in 1992. At that time the prime minister failed to draw support of the government parties (this was demanded by the president in office Lech Wałęsa and the constitution) and create a comprehensive government cabinet. Nevertheless, the formal reason for termination of the government powers was presented by a voluntary resignation of the prime-minister, which was supported by the parliament.

The reasons for formation and termination of the minority governments powers pose a problem of assessing their *stability*. Stability of the government is its ability to remain in discharge of official duties; steady state of the government cabinet functioning, which is characterized by an ability of continuous existence, preservation of key internal and external parameters of the government<sup>29</sup>. The most approved categories of the governments stability assessment are presented by an endurance of the government and the index of government stability. *Endurance of the government* is the time, measured between the “beginning” and the “end” of functioning of a specific government. *The index of government stability* is a percentage-based index, which reflects the work of the government taken as a part of the maximum possible time of the powers validity (in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe – depending on the term of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament pursuant to the constitution or in fact). Empirical experience of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe testifies to the fact that the minority single-party/coalition governments are less stable than the majority single-party/coalition governments and party governments in general. Nevertheless, the minority governments are more longstanding than the majority governments in Romania and the Czech Republic: in the first country the minority coalition governments are the most longstanding in the structure of party governments, and the minority single-party governments in the second country. The most longstanding minority coalition governments in the region are presented by the cabinets led by the following prime ministers: A. Ansip – in Estonia, V. Dombrovskis – in Latvia, G. Kirkilas – in Lithuania, N. Vacaroiu, K. Popescu-Tariceanu and A. Nastase – in Romania, M. Dzurinda – in Slovakia, M. Topolane – in the Czech Republic. Instead, the most longstanding single-party minority governments in the region are presented by the cabinets led by the following prime ministers: B. Borisov – in Bulgaria, M. Siimann – in Estonia, M. Zeman – in the Czech Republic.

It should be noted that the minority governments last longer in those countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which provide for regular, rather than constructive (positive) *votes of no confidence* in the government cabinets (regular votes of no confidence are provided for in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and the positive and constructive ones – in Poland, Slovenia and Ukraine). Instead, no difference has been established in the stability of minority governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe depending on which majority in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament (relative or vast majority) is required for implementing the votes of no confidence

<sup>29</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Kontseptualne vyznachennya ponyattya „uryadova stabilnist”*, «Naukovyy visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu», Seriya: Politolohiya, Sotsiolohiya, Filosofiya 2008, nr 10, s. 38-39.; Z. Bialoblocki, *Stabilnist ta efektyvnist uryadiv u politychnykh systemakh krayin Skhidnoyi Yevropy*, Wyd. Wydavnychyy tsentr LNU imeni I. Franka 2013, s. 15.; E. Zimmerman, *Government Stability in Six European Countries During the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations*, „European Journal of Political Research” 1987, vol 15, nr 1, s. 23–52.; M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Events, Equilibria and Government Survival*, „American Journal of Political Science” 1998, nr 42, s. 28.

in the governments (relative majority is regulated in the instances of Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia and Hungary, and the vast majority – in the instances of Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the Czech Republic). It also has not been noticed that the minority governments are less long-lasting in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where in the course of the governments functioning a *question of confidence* (receipt of the vote of confidence in the functioning government is no different from the procedure of receiving a vote of investiture in the head, composition or program of the government in the course of its formation) may be put to them. Among such countries in the region we can point out Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

**Table 2.** Stability of the minority governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (1990–2013)<sup>30</sup>

Country	Endurance of governments (years)/ Index of government stability: single-party minority governments	Endurance of governments (years)/ Index of government stability: minority coalition governments	Endurance of governments (years)/ Index of government stability: single-party majority governments	Endurance of governments (years)/ Index of government stability: majority coalition governments	Endurance of governments (years)/ Index of government stability: party governments
Bułgaria	2,32/0,65	0,93/0,24	3,01/0,91	1,95/0,60	2,15/0,64
Czechy	1,97/0,50	1,21/0,42	–	1,49/0,40	1,50/0,42
Estonia	1,09/0,28	1,51/0,39	–	1,56/0,44	1,48/0,40
Litwa	–	1,00/0,25	1,27/0,33	1,73/0,44	1,46/0,37
Łotwa	1,25/0,54	0,57/0,18	–	1,11/0,37	0,92/0,31
Polska	0,92/0,29	0,56/0,19	–	1,48/0,43	1,22/0,36
Rumunia	1,14/0,29	1,15/0,32	0,64/0,28	0,93/0,26	1,03/0,29
Slovenia	–	0,33/0,11	–	1,90/0,54	1,34/0,39
Słowacja	0,48/0,21	0,78/0,23	–	1,86/0,56	1,35/0,41
Węgry	0,96/0,24	–	–	2,44/0,62	2,11/0,53
Total	1,26/0,36	0,85/0,25	1,59/0,48	1,62/0,46	1,37/0,39

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 01.02.2014]

The key problem of prolongation of the minority governments endurance consists in the amount of possible scenarios of declaring the votes of no confidence or refusal to provide the votes of confidence to the minority governments. That particular theoretical and methodological attribute of correlation between the government and opposition parties leads to the search of possible options to form not the minority governments, but the majority governments. The point is that we have a stereotyped rule, under which the absence of guaranteed support of the majority in parliament (by way of membership of the majority participants or

<sup>30</sup> Temporary and non-party governments are not to be analyzed.

their representatives in the government cabinets) causes instability of the government cabinets, political instability or inefficiency of governance. The minority governments usually do not have strong power, and that is why they quickly alternate with each other and this leads to the crisis of governance legitimacy. But in some countries the minority governments function in successful and stable way. Z. Maoz and B. Russett believe that “the minority governments are less constrained than the majority governments”<sup>31</sup>, and that is why as a result they can be less conflict than the rest. In their turn B. Prins and C. Sprecher<sup>32</sup> prove that some resistance will be maintained to the tasks and objectives, which are governed by coalitions, in case of an increase in pressure on the government cabinet. In the course of studying the initiation of system conflicts and analyzing these competitive aspects of government activity, they offered to define the majority coalition governments as more dangerous in the issues of institutional conflicts escalation than the minority governments<sup>33</sup>.

On the basis of the conducted theoretical and methodological and empirical analysis of the minority governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the following conclusions on the attributes of their formation, political consequences and stability parameters have been *drawn*: 1) formation of the minority (single-party or coalition) governments should usually be construed as tactics of behaviour of the political parties, which have been chosen to the parliament, under condition where they can not form the majority government (gain support of the vast or relative majority (depending on the law) in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament in order to form the government)<sup>34</sup>; 2) formation of the minority governments and their stability depends on the nature of interrelations between the parliamentary parties: the minority governments are possible and more stable when special competitive and ideological interrelations exist between the parties, which can theoretically build up the majority<sup>35</sup>; 3) the minority government extends the topical field of political awareness,

<sup>31</sup> Z. Maoz, B. Russett, *Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946-1986*, “American Political Science Review” 1993, nr 87, s. 626.

<sup>32</sup> B. Prins, C. Sprecher, *Institutional constraints, political opposition, and interstate dispute escalation: Evidence from parliamentary systems, 1946-1989*, “Journal of Peace Research” 1999, nr 36, s. 271-287.

<sup>33</sup> M. Ireland, S.S. Gartner, *Time to Fight. Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems*, “Journal of Conflict Resolution” 2001, nr 45, s. 547-568.

<sup>34</sup> What constitutes a natural sequence to the elections is the formation in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament of the majority, which reflects a relevant support of the majority of voters, provided to the parties or blocs. When the parliament fails to form the majority, an alternative arises to political actors: a minority government, non-party government or early elections. Since the last two options anticipate a lot of unknown politics and risks, and may also be used after a failure related to the formation of minority government, the scenario of formation of the minority governments in particular is more acceptable. For more details, see: G-E. Isaaksson, *Parliamentary government in different shapes*, “West European Politics” 2001, nr 24, s. 45.; W. Muller, K. Strom, *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, s. 560-561.; K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, “Comparative political Studies” 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 212-215.

<sup>35</sup> That is why the provision of one party with the right to form the minority government for the remaining parties is the “evil of the lesser kind”, since they will be interested in preservation of the existing balance of the operating parties political weight. Under these conditions the minority government may be stable. The indicated position is particularly logical, when the right to form the minority government is provided to a centre party, and the majority in parliament is held by the parties, which belong to different parts of the left and right ideological spectrum. That is, formation of the minority government is a regular way out of confrontation between the parties of different ideological positions in the parliament. In this situation the government may receive sharp criticism of its activity, but the ideological confrontation will be a constraining factor

creates foundations for a comprehensive interpretation of such phenomenon as a “majority in opposition”<sup>36</sup>; 4) out of advantages of the minority governments functioning we can single out an institutional sensitivity, accountability (liability) and transparency<sup>37</sup>, and out of disadvantages – instability, variability and inefficiency<sup>38</sup>.

*In summary*, as for today the phenomenon of minority governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, even in spite of different cause-and-effect patterns of their formation, is a traditional and institutionalized variety of party governments. Existence of the governments of this type is related to understanding the politics as a sphere of activity, directed to the achievement and protection of group interests and the implementation of election program. Formation and existence of the governments of such type causes the availability of an adequate political culture of the main political actor. In each country of Central and Eastern Europe the minority governments are not limited by law. Nevertheless, the frequency of their formation points to the fact that in one group of the countries (Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia) the minority governments are more approved, and in the second group of the countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia) they are less approved, and in the third group of the countries (Lithuania and Hungary) they became a frequent practice and gained experience and are believed to be exclusively the emergency scenarios. Formation of the minority government cabinets, causes for creation and termination of the powers of the minority government cabinets, and, accordingly, for the minority governments stability depends largely on institutional parameters of provision and implementation of the procedures for providing the votes of confidence and no confidence in the countries of the region.

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against unification of the representatives of non-governmental parties for early termination (vote of no confidence) of the agreement. For more details, see: M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990; M. Gallaher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill 1992, s. 192.

<sup>36</sup> Parliamentary parties often implement programs not only from the government cabinet, but also from opposition chairs (this immanently is a result of the vote of confidence/investiture as grounds for formation of the minority governments and the governments as such). The fact is that the consent of parliamentary parties and non-party deputies to the minority government formation may be based on the existence of powerful capabilities of parliamentary committees and commissions to have effect on the internal and international life of the country. Under these conditions it is allowable for the parties, which have party fractions in the parliament, to concentrate their impact on the activity of committees and commissions. For more details, see: M. Mattila, T. Raunio, *Does winning pay? Electoral success and government formation in 15 West European countries*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2004, nr 43, s. 270-271.

<sup>37</sup> Minority governments are sensitive to the opinions of the deputies from the parliaments/main chambers of the parliaments, since the government policy is not determined independently/directly by the prime ministers or cabinet members, but by the prime ministers, government members, and also the governmental and opposition parties of the parliaments/main chambers of the parliaments. In addition, the opposition parties in particular, which formally constitute a majority of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament, may efficiently raise a question on the vote of no confidence in the minority government, making it work more responsibly. The minority governments accountability to the parliamentary parties consists in the fact that government bills should be brought to the notice of opposition parties, since an adoption or a failure to adopt the latter depends on them. That is why the policy of minority governments is more public and transparent.

<sup>38</sup> The minority cabinets can not implement the measures (especially social and economic), provided for by their programs, to the full extent. This is caused by discrepancies in support of these governments in the parliaments/main chambers of the parliaments, and also by the time, spent for the search of support among opposition parties. Making important, particularly budget and reformist decisions is also problematic in the context of minority governments.

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## **Партійна система України: виклики національної консолідації та європейської інтеграції (деякі методологічні аспекти)**

Розглядаються теоретико-методологічні проблеми партійної системи України в умовах національної консолідації та європейської інтеграції. Аналізуються специфічні проблеми формування та взаємодії громадянського суспільства та процесу демократизації, чинники та проблеми національної консолідації, вплив євроінтеграції на внутрішньополітичну ситуацію в Україні.

*Ключові слова:* партологія, громадянське суспільство, політичне суспільство, представницька демократія, демократизація, рівень демократії, консолідація демократії, неконсолідований авторитаризм, державний корпоративізм, європейська інтеграція, сноуболізм.

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## **System partyjny Ukrainy: wyzwania konsolidacji narodowej oraz integracji europejskiej (niektóre aspekty metodologiczne)**

Reprezentowane są teoretyczno-metodologiczne problemy systemu partyjnego Ukrainy w warunkach konsolidacji narodowej oraz integracji europejskiej. Analizie zostały poddane kwestie kształtowania się i współdziałania społeczeństwa obywatelskiego i procesu demokratyzacji, czynniki i problemy konsolidacji narodowej oraz wpływ eurointegracji na wewnętrzną sytuację polityczną na Ukrainie.

*Słowa kluczowe:* Partologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie, społeczeństwo polityczne, demokracja przedstawicielska, demokratyzacja, poziom demokracji, konsolidacja demokratyczna, niekonsolidowany autorytaryzm, korporatyzm państwowy, integracja europejska, snoubollizm.