

Processes of Europeanization in the Common Foreign and Security Policy

The article undertakes problems of Europeanization of the foreign common policy and the safety. For purposes of the present article is presenting of the creature and processes of Europeanization's happening in the womb of European Union. An exploratory problem is the definition of the part and the meaning of processes of Europeanization within the framework of the Foreign Common Policy and the Safety.

Particularly the author tries to show positions different to approach exploratory applied in sciences about the safety to the problem of Europeanization of this politics. The exploratory hypothesis lies in ambush on the foundation that although within the framework of the Foreign Common Policy and the Safety exists strong intergovernmentalness then this politics also is subject enough to widely conceived processes of Europeanization within the framework of first of all soft instruments of the influence

Key words; *Europeanization, Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Union, Public Policy, European Policy*

Recently, in public discourse, numerous scientific publications and also in documents published by certain Institutions of the European Union, there is a lot of references to a phenomenon of the Europeanization. Undoubtedly, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and its executive in a form of the Common Security and Defence Policy are public policies of the European Union, which are subjected to a quite wide process of Europeanization as a result of actions of different interest groups. That Europeanization uses a top-down or bottom-up approach, and also quite often an ad-extra one. The European Union tries (by means of light methods) to influence member states which consequently introduce to their actions processes of the Europeanization. It also works the other way round – member states influence processes of the Europeanization happening in the European Union. Therefore, it can be said that these actions have a nature of a voluntary isoformism.

The aim of this article is to present a matter and processes of the Europeanization that happen inside the European Union. An appearing research problem is defining a role and meaning of processes of the Europeanization in Common Foreign and Security Policy. In particular, the author endeavors to show positions of different research approaches (used in safety studies) to a problem of the Europeanization of the policy. A research hypothesis is based on an

assumption that even though there is a strong intergovernmentalism in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, this policy also comes under quite widely spread processes of the Europeanization, particularly in light instruments of influence¹.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy in scientific theories – a Europeanization attempt

In case of this area, by means of three chosen research models I tried to indicate in what way the European Union wants to ensure security, independence and influences for itself. I referred to realistic school's views, which quite skeptically relates to the project of the European integration. What is more, its representatives claim that international organizations are not essential subjects of international relations².

Therefore, a phenomenon of ignorance of the European Union as an actor of international reality can be easily observed. There are also assumptions that the European Union is a faint organization in case of its meaning for a political cooperation, because conflicts of interests between countries limit the mentioned cooperation, even despite an existence of some kind of interests' convergence³.

Realists come to a conclusion that the European Union did not achieve any significant improvement in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy. International relations are controlled by a so called security dilemma, based on a fact that actions directed at security increase of one country cause a decrease of a sense of security in other member states. In this situation remaining states, while seeing partner's actions, accept an assumption of realization of the worst possible scenario for them⁴.

A similar thesis is spread by neo-realists, who do not believe in a possibility of making significant changes and reforms by the European Union under defense policy of the European Union. A representative of the neo-realists' school is K. Waltz, who assumes that Europe is not able to emerge a sufficient safety and defense policy, because as an international organization it can only do what is allowed by member states. Consequently, that fact makes it impossible to undertake any risky and doubtful actions⁵.

Despite possessed abilities in a form of appropriate resources and also a strong economy, the European Union does not have any collective will to actualize the defense policy. K. Waltz

¹ I mean the Open Method of Coordination, etc.

² T. Łoś-Nowak, *Panadygmat realistyczny – projekcje porządku międzynarodowego w XXI wieku*, [in:] R. Kuźniar (red.), *Porządek międzynarodowy u progu XXI wieku*, Warsaw 2005, p. 21; See also: D. A. Baldwin, *Power and institutional Relations*, [in:] W. Carlsneas, T. Risse, B. A. Simmons (red.), *Handbook of International Relations*, London 2002, p. 177–178; P. D. Williams, *Studia Bezpieczeństwa*, Krakow 2012, p. 15–18

³ Compare: P. D. Williams, *Studia Bezpieczeństwa*, *op. cit.*, p. 17

⁴ J. Czuputowicz, *Bezpieczeństwo w teoriach stosunków międzynarodowych*, [in:] K. Żukrowska, M. Grącik (red.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Teoria i praktyka*, Warsaw 2006, p. 49–51

⁵ K. Waltz, *Intimations of Multipolarity*, [in:] B. Hansen, B. Heurlin (red.), *The New World Order. Contracting Theories*, Macmillan 2002, p. 3–4

claims that this situation is to some extent a result of a cold war, in which a fear from a Soviet domination did not allow it to create an efficient defense policy. It is very similar nowadays.

Therefore, it is possible to conclude that defense of the European Union will always stay in NATO's shadow, that is a main forum of taking actions of a military nature⁶.

A similar thesis is proposed by another representative of the neo-realists' school, J. D. Mearsheimer. He assumes that a military presence of the USA on the European continent holds back countries such as France or Germany from confrontation. Mearsheimer claims also that if the USA left Europe, France and Germany would start to fight for influences in Europe, what could lead to a cold war and maybe even to a conflict. According to the above, presence of the USA in Europe is some kind of an equivalent for the Old Continent⁷.

According to J. D. Mearsheimer, a principal of European Union's functioning is a policy of force and more particularly – a presence of military force of the USA on the continent. That force made it possible for the European Union to develop its economic side.

To sum up, neo-realists reject a possibility of a future development and emancipation of the Common Security and Defence Policy, because they assume that it may work as an element or a supplement of the North Atlantic Treaty⁸.

A last approach in which I've been studying processes happening in a field of defense policy was institutionalism. It is based on an assumption that member states join an international organization due to a variety of benefits⁹. Therefore, people representing institutionalism perceive European integration as a process based on a systematic growth of power, authorization and jurisdiction of transnational institutions, which is also supposed to be followed by a limitation of autonomy, as well as an decrease of exclusive member states' competence. They reject a vision of peace based on an equilibrium of forces and they believe in an assumption that institutions of collective security create some value added in relation to a totality of military potentials of its members¹⁰.

Representatives of institutionalism claim that a change in balance of power after a cold war causes a situation, when countries have to fight limitations associated with their territoriality and actively cooperate to widen a zone of influences, security and political stabilization¹¹.

What is more, they also assume that countries of the European Union will gradually spread their sovereignty (shared with the others) and *ipso facto* lead to internal tensions between members. Consequently, it would lead to a decisive paralysis and an inability of the European

⁶ *Ibidem*

⁷ J. D. Mearsheimer, *Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War*, „The Atlantic” November 1990, p. 24–49

⁸ T. Łoś-Nowak, *Paradygmat realistycznych...*, *op. cit.*, p. 24

⁹ Particularly, these benefits are: joining a cooperative system of conflicts' solving, increasing of possibilities of a force projection, decreasing of transactional costs; see: B. A. Simmons, L. L. Martin, *International Organizations and Institutions*; P. D. Williams, *Studia Bezpieczeństwa*, *op. cit.*, p. 39–40

¹⁰ R. Keohane, *Ironies of Sovereignty. The European Union and United States*, *Journal Common of Market Studies* no. 40, November 2002, p. 743-745

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 746

Union to a quick and effective action. In this situation some roles will be assigned to the USA and the European Union¹².

The USA would feel good in situations requiring quick and determined military actions, while the European Union would take care of negotiations and consensus. According to the above, to quiet down mutual animosities between the USA and the European Union, a perfect solution would be to divide certain roles on the European continent¹³.

As it can be seen, the realistic theory explains a slow development in a field of defense of the European Union and its member states. The neo-realistic approach provides knowledge about a national balance of power, which can reveal in the future and create a completely different view of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Institutionalism shows a lot of essential and also new tools that can be used in studying contemporary international security.

However, in author's opinion none of the presented theories explains the matter and the phenomenon of the Common Security and Defence Policy in a complex and complete way. It results from the fact that origins and development of the Common Security and Defence Policy are heterogenic processes, happening on many surfaces and involving multiple subjects. Their final shape is a derivative of many different factors.

However, a thesis can be risked that a development of the Common Security and Defence Policy is conditioned by dynamics of two competing trends: aspiration to protect sovereignty as well as to maximize influences from a side of certain member states and efforts made to build a collective security system based on a respect of international law. In my opinion, in spite of all the most useful theories for a description of these processes are realistic and neo-realistic ones. Moreover, I find institutionalism very helpful as well.

As history shows, an idea of common defense in a declarative layer has been already a subject of interest right after the second world war. However, a domination of the Soviet Union and a bipolar division of Europe (world) did not allow for making the idea real. Although there have been initiatives in a form of the European Defence Community or the Western European Union, but in the first case it has been rejected by France¹⁴ and the second one was perceived mostly like a lifeless idea working in more declarative aspects than specific actions¹⁵. Despite that they have given a reason for further alterations in the foreign and defense Policy field.

Essential changes were made after 1990, when the bipolar political block slowly started to disintegrate and the cold war has ended. That moment together with circumstances in Yugoslavia caused a situation, when Europe had to deal with a responsibility for an Old

¹² D. Williams, *Studia Bezpieczeństwa*, op. cit., p. 43

¹³ R. Keohane, *Ironies of Sovereignty...*, op. cit., p. 759

¹⁴ E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History*, London 1980, p. 26–28

¹⁵ C. T. Szyjko, Z. Ślusarczyk, *50-lecie EWG: studium prawnohistoryczne*, „Studia Prawnicze Ius et Praxis” 02 [03]07, *Cywilizacja. Europa. Globalizacja*, Warsaw 2007, Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki, Zarządzania i Administracji, p. 19–27

Continent's fate. Due to these situations, in 1922 the Common Foreign and Security Policy has been incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty. Despite of it all, the Common Foreign and Security Policy has remained inefficient.

A forthcoming meeting of the European Council in Amsterdam was supposed to solve a problem of ineffective European politics in a field of security and defense. Finally, on the 15th and the 16th of June 1997 heads of states and member states' governments have reached an agreement concerning a novelization of the Maastricht Treaty and problem solving of security policy¹⁶.

In the Amsterdam Treaty it is emphasized that the European Union will create tighter connections with the Western European Union¹⁷. Moreover, it has been assumed that the WEU is not only an integral element together with the European Union and supports the Common Foreign and Security Policy, but it will also have an operational ability that is essential for fulfilling Petersburg missions¹⁸. In exactly this way the Petersburg missions have been included in the Amsterdam Treaty, which meant that the Union will be patronizing their realizations.

During an unofficial meeting on a top of the European Union in Pörtschach on the 24th and the 25th of October 1998, Tony Blair declared that the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union cannot be held in a present shape anymore¹⁹. He claimed that there should be created a European military capacity, which will make it possible for member states of the European Union to jointly lead peacekeeping operations, especially military ones which aim to maintain the peace²⁰.

Finally, in autumn 1998, on the European Union's forum functionally associated with the Western European Union, a new episode started – the episode of a discussion on the European military capacity's development, aiming to secure strategic interests of Europe by equipping it in such military capacity, that would enable more independent actions, especially in situations when the USA will not be able to or for some reason will not want to interfere²¹.

Slowly, a climate of consensus in defense policy of the European Union has started to appear²². Three biggest and most significant European countries: Great Britain, France and Germany agreed to strengthening of the CFSP. However, France and Germany still preferred implementing the European Union into their own operational capacity by incorporating the WEU to the EU, while Great Britain was more willing to create a separate pillar in the North Atlantic Treaty, from which the European Union could draw. A culmination

¹⁶ K. Miszczyk, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa a rozwój Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony*, „Polska w Europie” 2003, no. 2 (44), p. 12–13

¹⁷ A. Capik, B. Kuźniak, *Traktat Amsterdamski – Komentarz*, Krakow 2001, p. 7 and subsequent

¹⁸ *Ibidem*

¹⁹ R. Zięba, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony. Geneza i założenia*, „Przegląd Europejski” 2003, no. 1, p. 32–33

²⁰ R. Zięba, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony*, Warsaw 2005, p. 38

²¹ J. Starzyk, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*, Warsaw 2003, p. 164

²² R. Zięba, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony. Geneza i założenia*, ed. cit., p. 33

of disputes happened at a meeting that took place in Cologne on the 3rd and the 4th of June 1999²³, which also ended German presidency. It introduced a new subject: “European policy in a field of security and defense”²⁴.

What is more, in Cologne there has also been accepted the Declaration of the European Council on strengthening of the common European policy in a field of security and defense. The declaration included intentions to transfer to the Union’s Council a task of decision making in a range of conflicts’ prevention and crisis management operations, meaning the Petersburg’s tasks²⁵.

Therefore, the General Affairs Council has been obliged to prepare appropriate decisions and resources (including a conditions’ specification of accepting operational functions of the WEU by the European Union) indispensable for leading Petersburg’s tasks. For a purpose of a practical implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy, a creation of the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff Committee has been announced²⁶. The WEU transferred its competences and institutions to the European Union. These were the Satellite Centre in Torrejon and the Institute for Security Studies in Paris²⁷.

An official proclamation of the Common Security and Defence Policy happened six months later on a top in Helsinki on the 10th and the 11th of December 1999²⁸. The Helsinki Headline Goal²⁹ has been specified there – it implied a creation (until the end of year 2003) of military forces in size of 50-60 thousand of soldiers, being able to collocate in 60 days and to lead any operations like Petersburg’s missions within at least one year. These forces were also supposed to have aviation and navy components. It has also been decided to develop common command, control, intelligence and strategic transport systems, as well as a cooperation in a range of armament and supplying the army with military equipment³⁰. Moreover, it has been agreed to use existing procedures of defense planning, including procedures NATO and the Partnership for Peace.

A supplement of these preparations for the EU to perform Petersburg’s tasks was creating the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management³¹. It was done on a top

²³ More: K. Miszczak, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa...*, op. cit., p. 13

²⁴ R. Zięba, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony; Geneza i założenia*, ed. cit., p. 37

²⁵ R. Zięba, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*, Warsaw 2007, p. 86

²⁶ *Idem*, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony*, Warsaw 2005, p. 49

²⁷ J. Czaputowicz, *Instytucjonalizacja Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*, „Polska w Europie” 2003, no. 2 (44), p. 57

²⁸ R. Zięba, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*, ed. cit., p. 87

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 88

³⁰ R. Zięba, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony; Geneza i założenia*, ed. cit., p. 40

³¹ R. Zięba, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony*, Warszawa 2005, p. 49

of the European Council in Feira in June 2000. Police and state's administrative staff were included in civilian structures³².

An autonomy of the European Union in a range of the Common Security and Defence Policy has been confirmed in the Treaty of Nice signed on the 15th of February 2001.

During ratification processes of the Treaty of Nice, another aims of security and defense policy of the European Union have been accepted. It has been decided to create a group of about 200 experts for a widely understood lawful system, a group of civilian experts in a field of administration and unit in a force of 2000 people dealing with protection from any kinds of cataclysms. Works on procedures of proceedings have also started. It needs to be emphasized that a consolidation process of the Common Security and Defence Policy did not proceed without its disruptions. The EU's position was strongly criticized by Turkey, which was going to participate in building the European safety's structure, however thanks to mediation of the Great Britain the conflict has been resolved³³.

The Treaty of Nice from the 1st of February 2003 has both strengthened and developed operative components of the Common Security and Defense Policy as a practically independent project of the European Union. Since then the European Union could independently define all fields in a range of security and foreign politics. Unfortunately, some discrepancies concerning defense policy appeared. They "smeared" the military component of the common protection's concept, while not defining its final form. The Common Security and Defence Policy was a subject of disputes of the appointed Convent and their records were included in the Project of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe. Due to its rejection and coming to existence the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, regulations concerning the policy can be found in this document.

As a result, the Common Foreign and Security Policy has been strengthened by creating the European policy of security and defense, which has been renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy due to regulations in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. What is more, it's pillar structure has been liquidated and new institutions have been appointed for the purpose of improving functioning of the security and defense policy of the European Union.

The Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union introduced institutions of a solidarity clause, common defense, a rule of constructive abstaining from voting. Quite a significant emphasis was put on solutions promoting a convergence of member politics in the CFSP field³⁴.

³² K. Miszczak, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa...*, op. cit., p. 15

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 17

³⁴ It was about establishing a strengthened cooperation in a field of foreign policy and a constant structural cooperation in defense, activity of the European Defence Agency, a duty of a mutual consultation

What is more, the Treaty of Lisbon also standardized a system of lawful acts, introduced a “double-hat” of a high representative, standardized and simplified a decision process and strengthened a representation of the European Union thanks to institutions’ establishments of the lasting president of the European Council and high representative of the Union for foreign and security policy. It also introduced the External Action Service of the European Union.

Summary – conclusions for Poland

The European Union is contemporarily immersed in an economical crisis, which basically met all its states. Thus, an issue of the Common Security and Defence Policy³⁵ is not explored in literature or discourse. These problems were pushed into the side and are not presently in the interest field of the European Union.

Leaders of member states, especially these quarterback ones (France, Germany), wonder how to resolve a problem of the crisis and they do not deal with a defense policy, although in my opinion it is very important. It is even evidenced by a fact of placing it in Priorities of Polish Foreign Policy for years 2012-2016³⁶.

Despite it all, in my opinion the Europeanization, the CFSP and the CSDP have lead to a situation, when the Republic of Poland as a member of the European Union takes an active part in forming them and administers a significant voice co-deciding about their further shape. If processes of Europeanization have failed, Poland would have never had any influence on security and defense policy.

A participation in the CFSP and the CSDP makes Poland bear financial, human and political costs of Polish army soldiers taking part in chosen missions lead by the European Union. It seems that a perspective of achieving a real independence of European Union’s defense policy is quite far away, especially while using an institutional or realistic approach. It is still unknown if it will ever come true.

If it was sure that the European Union achieves a technical operational ability via creating strong European intervention forces, the rule of solidarity would not work here.

Member states will not want to use them. It is caused by a lack of effective political leadership in the European Union, geographically diverse preferences and common priorities of certain member states. Besides, institutionalists claim the Union is characterized by deep pacifism, what can significantly decrease chances for using created intervention forces. According to that, the most possible scenario of the further development of the CSDP will be a tight cooperation and also acting together with the USA or a gradual empowerment of the CSDP,

³⁵ The Common Foreign and Security Policy

³⁶ *Priorytety Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2012–2016*, Warsaw 2012, p. 15–16

because autonomic defense policy lead by the European Union will be characterized with higher political legitimization than North Atlantic Treaty.

Nonetheless, it should be noticed that the empowerment will proceed very slowly. According to the above, at present and in future years NATO will be a fundamental tool of collective defense of member states, including Poland.

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