

## **Party and electoral indicators of cabinet stability in eastern european countries: general theoretical and empirical determination**

The article is dedicated to investigation party and electoral indicators of cabinet stability in Eastern European countries in general theoretical and empirical context. The author outlines the key tools of comparative analysis of cabinet stability based on party and electoral determinants, empirically investigates parameters of parties and elections, party and electoral systems' influence on cabinet stability in Eastern Europe, and compares general theoretical features (scientifically based on the example of Western and Central-Eastern European countries) and empirical findings on the correlation of party and electoral indicators of cabinet stability in Eastern Europe.

*Keywords: party, elections, party and electoral system, cabinet, cabinet stability, indicator, index, Eastern Europe.*

## **Партійні та виборчі індикатори стабільності урядів у країнах східної Європи: загальнотеоретична й емпірична детермінація**

Стаття присвячена дослідженню партійних та виборчих індикаторів стабільності урядів у країнах Східної Європи в загальнотеоретичному й емпіричному контексті. Автор дослідження окреслює ключові інструменти порівняльного аналізу стабільності урядів на підставі партійних і виборчих детермінант, емпірично досліджує параметри впливу партій та виборів, партійних та виборчих систем на стабільність урядів у Східній Європі, а також зіставляє загальнотеоретичні (науково обґрунтовані на прикладі країн Західної та Центрально-Східної Європи) особливості й емпіричні висновки про кореляцію партійно-виборчих індикаторів урядової стабільності в Східній Європі.

*Ключові слова: партія, вибори, партійна та виборча система, уряд, стабільність урядів, індикатор, індекс, Східна Європа.*

The regularity of political development in the majority countries of the world (including post-Soviet Eastern European countries, namely Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia,

Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) is the accumulation of power in the hands of executive government institutions. That is why, it would be logical to assume that the executive branch is a totality of state bodies and institutions, which carry out power-political and power-administrative functions. The apex of the executive authority system, depending on the constitutional systems of governments, can be represented by the head of the country unilaterally (what is not peculiar of Eastern European countries, as currently there are no classical presidential republics in the region), the government unilaterally in the person of the prime minister (native to Moldova, which is a classical parliamentary republic) or the president and the government concurrently (inherent to Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, which are formally semi-presidential republics, in other words, and depending on the formal and factual authority of the head of the country and the prime minister, realize the constructions of the dualistic executive power and the institutional roles of both the president and the prime minister). Thus, it is obvious, that the processes of formation, functioning and stability of governments, as the obligatory bodies of the executive power in Eastern European countries, fully depend on parliament (Moldova) or both on parliament and president (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine), on ways of their election and their affiliation/membership. Consequently, government stability, to a great extent, is determined by the influence of party and electoral institutions (in particular, institutions of party and electoral systems). Especially it occurs in the context of realization of the constitutionally regulated government collective responsibility to parliaments solely, what can be seen in Eastern European countries, (as of 2015 it has been peculiar of Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) or to parliaments and heads of states (as of 2015 it has been peculiar of Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia). It means that evaluation of governments and their stability in the light of party and electoral political institutions is a special task of the neo-institutional political science. It earlier has been resolved on the examples of democratic political regimes in Western and Central-Eastern European countries, but had nothing to do with authoritarian (Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia as of 2015) and hybrid (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as of 2015) political regimes in Eastern European countries.

One of the crucial reasons for the abovementioned scientific issues is a process of non-accomplished or even non-commenced institutionalization of the processes of formation, functioning and responsibility of cabinets (among Eastern European countries party governments are permanent only in Moldova, and have recently become peculiar of Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine). They directly implement party-electoral patterns inherent to the systems, where governments are liable to parliaments. However, in Eastern European countries (permanently in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia, earlier in Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine) one can often encounter non-party governments. The place of party-electoral institutions (especially incorporated into the parliaments' structure and activity) in the processes of government formation, functioning and responsibility is of secondary importance, as it is "shaded" by formal

and non-formal institutional roles of presidents. Within such systems, which are or have once been non-democratic political regimes, party-electoral determination of governments is reduced to interpretation of government parties (mainly dominant and hegemonic ones) and elections as formal and non-formal clientelistic institutional structures attached to heads of states. It means that in the context of government collective responsibility to parliaments (and governments in Eastern European countries must be "tolerated" by parliaments, or, in other words, supported by the majority of their nominal content), the institutions of parties and elections often become of secondary importance. It gives way to the simple rule of quantity/amount superiority of the parties, which form and support governments within parliaments. However, even in this case various party-electoral factors must be taken into consideration in the process of government formation, functioning and responsibility/stability, since formally and in practice, cabinets cannot dissociate themselves from parliamentary and presidential elections. Because due to their results governments are made or not made of parties and are or are not affiliated with parties. It proves that in any constitutional government system in Eastern European countries, cabinets, to a variable degree, depend on the peculiarities of party-electoral structuring of the institutions of parliaments and presidents. In particular, they depend on alignment of party and non-party forces within parliament's and presidents' party positioning, especially in the context of mutual relations with parliaments. It also means that in different Eastern European countries the institutions of parties and elections have diversified influence (especially in the light of parliament and president functioning) or almost/absolutely have no influence on government stability, and verification of this issue within the comparative context is the subject of the research.

The range of problems concerning party and electoral indicators of government stability in Eastern European countries in modern comparative political science is under-investigated. Even despite the fact that many scientists have handled the investigations of parties and elections, party and electoral systems in Eastern European countries, they have been carried out without intending to be bound to the peculiarities of government formation, functioning and responsibility or stability. Nevertheless, at the level of the general theoretical research (and studies connected with other cross-national selections), the problems of party and electoral indicators of government stability (or their places within the system of cabinet formation and responsibility) have been raised in works conducted by I. Budge and H. Keman<sup>1</sup>, E. Browne and M. Franklin<sup>2</sup>, A. Ware<sup>3</sup>, M. Gallagher<sup>4</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> I. Budge, H. Keman, *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993.

<sup>2</sup> E. Browne, M. Franklin, *Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Political Science Review" 1973, vol 67, nr 2, s. 453–469.

<sup>3</sup> A. Ware, *Political parties and party systems*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1996.

<sup>4</sup> M. Gallagher, *Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities*, "British Journal of Political Science" 1992, vol 22, nr 4, s. 469–496.

H. Holosov<sup>5</sup>, R. Dalton and M. Wattenberg<sup>6</sup>, L. DeWinter<sup>7</sup>, M. Duverger<sup>8</sup>, M. Laverand and N. Schofield<sup>9</sup>, V. Lytvyn<sup>10</sup>, R. Katz<sup>11</sup>, G. King, J. Alt, N. Burns and M. Laver<sup>12</sup>, H. D. Klingemann and R. Hofferbert<sup>13</sup>, M. Laakso and R. Taagepera<sup>14</sup>, J. Molinar<sup>15</sup>, R. Moser and E. Scheiner<sup>16</sup>, W. Muller<sup>17</sup>, G. Pridham<sup>18</sup>, D. Rae<sup>19</sup>, S. Rokkan and A. Campbell<sup>20</sup>, D. Sanders, V. Herman<sup>21</sup>, G. Sartori<sup>22</sup>, A. Swaan<sup>23</sup>, A. Siaroff<sup>24</sup>, M. Taylor and V. Hermann<sup>25</sup> and others.

Most of the mentioned above researchers describe general theoretical peculiarities of party and electoral indicators' influence on cabinet stability. However, it has been mainly done on the examples of those countries, which are parliamentary democracies in Western and Central-Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the received findings cannot be applied and verified on the basis of Eastern European countries, namely Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, which are usually considered problematic/driven (minimal) democracies or competitive autocracies. Being partially (minimally/electoral) democratic and non-democratic (authoritarian) countries, they are interesting due to the extent to which they correspond with the practice and characteristics of party and electoral determinants of government stability in European democratic states.

<sup>5</sup> H. Holosov, *Formaty partyinykh sistem v novykh demokratiakh: instyutsionalnye faktory neustoiichyvosty y fribmentatsyy*, „Polys“ 1998, vol 1, s. 106–129.

<sup>6</sup> R. Dalton, M. Wattenberg, *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002.

<sup>7</sup> L. DeWinter, *Parliamentary and Party Pathways to the Cabinet*, [w:] J. Blondel, J.-L. Thiébauld (eds.), *The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1991, s. 44–69.

<sup>8</sup> M. Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, New York 1963.

<sup>9</sup> M. Laver, I. Budge, *Party Policy and the Government Coalitions*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 1992.

<sup>10</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivnialnyi analiz stabilnosti uradiiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010; V. Lytvyn, *Uriadova stabilnist kriz pryzmu partyinykh determinant krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy*, „Naukoviy visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu. – Seriya: Politolohiia, Sotsiolohiia, Filosofiia“ 2009, vol 13, s. 110–118.

<sup>11</sup> R. Katz, R. Wildenmann, *Party Government: European and American Experiences*, Wyd. Walter de Gruyter 1987.

<sup>12</sup> G. King, J. Alt, N. Burns, M. Laver, *A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies*, „American Journal of Political Science“ 1990, vol 34, nr 3, s. 846–871.

<sup>13</sup> H.-D. Klingemann, B. Wessels, *Sincere Voting in Different Electoral Systems*, Berlin 2002.

<sup>14</sup> M. Laakso, R. Taagepera, *The Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 1979, vol 12, nr 1, s. 3–27.

<sup>15</sup> J. Molinar, *Counting the Number of Parties: An Alternative Index*, „American Political Science Review“ 1991, vol 85, nr 4, s. 1383–1391.

<sup>16</sup> R. Moser, E. Scheiner, *Mixed electoral systems and electoral system effects: controlled comparison and cross-national analysis*, „Electoral Studies“ 2004, vol 23, s. 575–599.

<sup>17</sup> W. Muller, *Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 2000, vol 37, nr 3, s. 309–333.

<sup>18</sup> G. Pridham, *Coalitional Behavior in Theory and Practice: An Inductive Model for Western Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1986.

<sup>19</sup> D. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, Wyd. Yale University 1967.

<sup>20</sup> S. Rokkan, A. Campbell, *Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of Political Development*, Wyd. Universitetsforlaget 1970.

<sup>21</sup> D. Sanders, V. Herman, *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, „Acta Politica“ 1977, vol 12, nr 3, s. 346–377.

<sup>22</sup> G. Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

<sup>23</sup> A. Swaan, *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: a study of formal theories of coalition formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company 1973.

<sup>24</sup> A. Siaroff, *Comparative European Party Systems: an analysis of parliamentary elections since 1945*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2000.

<sup>25</sup> M. Taylor, V. Hermann, *Party Systems and Government Stability*, „American Political Science Review“ 1971, vol 65, nr 1, s. 28–37.

Theoreticians of parties and elections and party-electoral systems have proved that parties and especially parliamentary parties (including Eastern European countries) play structuring role within parliaments/leading chambers, since they are involved into the processes of both party and non-party cabinet formation, functioning and responsibility. That is why, the role of political parties in the process of government formation and resignation is of crucial importance, while evaluating cabinet stability<sup>26</sup>. It proves that due to political (parliamentary) parties the operationalization of government activity in format of political (parliamentary) support of party and non-party cabinets usually takes place. In addition to that, party participation in the process of government formation and assurance of government responsibility/stability is determined by the category of elections, as one must always keep in mind, what kind of elections – parliamentary or presidential – is principal in the light of cabinet formation/resignation. That is why, despite the type of government within constitutional systems, where governments always bear collective responsibility to parliaments (or to parliaments and heads of states), one should always pay attention to party-electoral structuring of the political system of a country or to party-electoral dynamics in the process of cabinet formation and responsibility. It should be done within the context of the roles and functions, carried out by the leading political institutions – parliaments or presidents. As the theory proves, it is of great importance for those countries, whose constitutional systems are parliamentary or semi-presidential (and it concerns all analyzed Eastern European countries). Governments in these countries are mainly formed due to parliamentary vote of confidence/non-confidence and are often terminated due to parliaments' vote of non-confidence or refusal to give them a vote of confidence. That is why, they rely on party/non-party alignment of forces in higher bodies of the legislative power (it is referred to the modern context, except Belarus, which requires specification, as its parliaments are permanently non-party or almost non-party ones). To a less degree party-electoral determination of government stability is peculiar of the constitutional systems, where the "single role" in cabinet formation and resignation is played by heads of states (unilaterally – in presidential republics and absolute monarchies; or in parallel with parliaments – in presidential-parliamentary republics).

It gives an opportunity to conclude that the role of political parties in the processes of cabinet formation and responsibility increases, when the constitutional systems of government in various countries tend to the institutional schemes, according to which the executive branch, to a variable degree, is liable to the legislative power<sup>27</sup>. In this regard E. Browne and F. Mark<sup>28</sup>, I.

<sup>26</sup> I. Budge, H. Keman, *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993; M. Laver, I. Budge, *Party Policy and the Government Coalitions*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 1992.

<sup>27</sup> M. Laver, I. Budge, *Party Policy and the Government Coalitions*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 1992.; G. Pridham, *Coalitional Behavior in Theory and Practice: An Inductive Model for Western Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1986.; A. Swaan, *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: a study of formal theories of coalition formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company 1973.

<sup>28</sup> E. Browne, M. Franklin, *Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Political Science Review" 1973, vol 67, nr 2, s. 453–469.

Budge and H. Keman<sup>29</sup>, H. D. Klingemann and R. Hofferbert<sup>30</sup> state that the role of parliaments (their leading chambers) in the process of government formation and/or functioning (including maintenance of stability) must be determined from the scientific point of view. It must stipulate the analysis of those parliamentary parties (factions), which participate in operationalization of government activity in format of political (parliamentary) support of party and non-party governments. That is why, theoreticians of parties and elections and party electoral systems have proved that parties are immanent institutions of democratic and non-democratic political regimes<sup>31</sup>. On this subject R. Katz points out that the synonym for the representative democracy is the phenomenon of “party governments”, which includes such characteristics as: competitive party system, freedom of political choice, right of opposition to propose alternative variants of development, efficiency of the rule, according to which, the party that wins the competition gets full or adjoining control over the process of governing<sup>32</sup>. However, Z. Bialoblotskyi states that the synonym for the problematic democracy and competitive autocracy is formation of mainly non-party governments, where the role of parties is reduced only to support, but not to separation of power and places in governments. Thus, in such systems (Eastern European countries belong here) parties often play the role of typical clientelistic groups, and the actors of any governmental group must negotiate with them (nowadays it is peculiar of Moldova and Ukraine, and earlier it was inherent to Russia and Armenia). Besides, there are cases when a party in competitive autocracies or hybrid political regimes enacts as a kind of political support to a president, who is the main actor in the process of government policy determination and is the political “axis/role”, the center of a cabinet. Nonetheless, in different political regimes parties usually take place in the processes of direct (in particular in Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia) or indirect (in particular in Russia and Azerbaijan) government formation or resignation. One distinctive case is Belarus, where one can observe gradual reduction/“shading” of the role of parliamentary parties in government formation and resignation processes, and consequently in ensuring their “survival” and stability<sup>33</sup>.

Overall, the general theoretical principle, proposed by W. Muller<sup>34</sup> is activated. It concerns the fact that the leading function of parties (parliamentary parties) is to ensure functioning of parliaments and governments. But in this regard and as a result of its verification, on the example of Eastern European countries, we divide the elements of the regional selection into

<sup>29</sup> I. Budge, H. Keman, *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993.

<sup>30</sup> H.-D. Klingemann, B. Wessels, *Sincere Voting in Different Electoral Systems*, Berlin 2002.

<sup>31</sup> R. Katz, R. Wildenmann, *Party Government: European and American Experiences*, Wyd. Walter de Gruyter 1987, s. 12.; W. Muller, *Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2000, vol 37, nr 3, s. 309–333.

<sup>32</sup> R. Katz, R. Wildenmann, *Party Government: European and American Experiences*, Wyd. Walter de Gruyter 1987, s. 12.

<sup>33</sup> Z. Bialoblotskyi, *Stabilnist ta efektyvnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2013, s. 241–242.

<sup>34</sup> W. Muller, *Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2000, vol 37, nr 3, s. 312.

those, where parliamentary parties directly (as of 2015 these are Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) or indirectly (as of 2015 these are Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia, where parties just support the political regimes) participate in the processes of government formation and responsibility<sup>35</sup>. This phenomenon shows the extent to which a party system of a certain country is a “multiparty” one. Therefore, R. Dahl remarks that multiparty systems with permanent rotation of single-party and coalitional governments of majority and minority makes the rule, when the surroundings correspond to the model of “collegial governing”<sup>36</sup> and principles of political democracy. We can supplement this thesis with the fact that influence on political systems of the governments, which are under control or are supported by one party only on condition of their constant rejection of oppositional organizations, can be regarded as the sample of “political role”, which is played by parties in Eastern European countries. However, this is not the pattern of political democracy. The situation in Eastern European countries is complicated by the fact that most governments in the region are typically formed on the non-party basis, and therefore the analysis of cabinet stability in the light of party-electoral indicators is compounded. On the one hand, the analysis presupposes the existence of party governments, and on the other it must evaluate party characteristics of party and non-party governments, since it can help concluding the activity of the former and the latter ones, as well as the party systems, which exist in Eastern European countries. Along with that, the role, which is described by the party indicators of cabinet stability in case of non-party governments, should not be exaggerated. The simplest attempts to explain governmental stability on the grounds of size and complexity of party systems concern the correlation between the party complement of governments and governmental stability. Moreover, within this context all parties, which support a government despite the fact whether these parties are represented in the government or not, must be involved into the analysis<sup>37</sup>.

To circumscribe the influence of party indicators on government stability in Eastern European countries over the period of 1991–2015 (on the basis of actualization of the previous conclusions as of 1991–2011<sup>38</sup>) one can single out several preconditions: 1) to analyze government stability we use such analytical tools as the government durability (in days, months or years) and the index of government stability; 2) to analyze party (party-electoral) determination of government stability we apply such mechanisms/tools of analysis as: size and number (absolute and effective) of political parties, which form governments; factionalism/fragmentation of party systems; electoral changeability/volatility; ideological differences between parties;

<sup>35</sup> Z. Bialoblotskyi, *Stabilnist ta efektyvnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2013, s. 242.

<sup>36</sup> R. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven-London 1971.

<sup>37</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivniálny analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyy universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010, s. 115–116.; A. Swaan, *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: a study of formal theories of coalition formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company 1973.

<sup>38</sup> Former findings have been actualized in the scientific. See in detail: Z. Bialoblotskyi, *Stabilnist ta efektyvnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2013, s. 240–262.

party-stipulated preconditions of cabinet (first of all coalitional) formation (in the countries, where the latter exists). Irrespective of the fact that the abovementioned mechanisms/tools of analysis mainly concern party governments, we appealed to the present theoretical and methodological base as to the leading one, though sometimes modifying it and applying it towards Eastern European countries. Therewith, one should note that it is impossible to achieve commensurable results of the comparative analysis, concerning party determination of party and non-party government stability in the regional perspective of Eastern Europe solely. The reason is that in the sample of the countries during 1991–2015, as it has been mentioned above, the non-party governments were mainly formed (firstly, it is distinctive of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, to a less degree of Georgia and Ukraine). Speaking about such governments it is rather difficult to achieve commensurable results, which can be commensurate in case of party governments. Thus, in one case (when the question is about party composition of cabinets) the conclusions are made exclusively as to party governments, and in other case (when the question is about parliamentary support to the cabinets) – as to party and non-party governments.

The comparative analyses of the empirical data of party-electoral determination of government stability in Eastern European countries let us make a number of conclusions, which to a variable degree (either positively or negatively) correlate with general theoretical knowledge, proposed by western political science. In particular, M. Taylor and V. Hermann's<sup>39</sup> and D. Sanders and V. Hermann's<sup>40</sup> hypotheses, concerning the fact that the amount of government parties negatively correlate with government stability, do not work in case of Eastern European countries. The point is that in Eastern Europe the most stable, as to their timing performances (in category of government durability), are two-party or three party cabinets. According to the indices of government stability the latter increases only together with the raise of the amount of parties in governments. It argues that stability of minimal-victorious coalitions (represent most of party governments in Eastern Europe) is the highest among all party cabinets.

As a result of appealing to the so-called two-party index (proposed by D. Rae)<sup>41</sup>, which shows the number of votes, polled by two largest parliamentary parties, interpreted as a quota index of support to two largest parliamentary parties, we can conclude that none of Eastern European countries does not approach a two-party system. However, in some of them (in competitive autocracies) the average quota index of two largest parties support is rather high (because of authority/government parties' influence). Yet, in case of the countries, where party governments exist (or have recently existed), one should speak about lower quota indices of two largest parliamentary parties. In fact, in these countries it is possible to observe establishing of "limited/temperate pluralism", which is mainly inherent to Ukraine and Moldova. Within the context of the research, it is rather interesting to state, that in the countries, where party

<sup>39</sup> M. Taylor, V. Hermann, *Party Systems and Government Stability*, „American Political Science Review“ 1971, vol 65, nr 1, s. 28–37.

<sup>40</sup> D. Sanders, V. Herman, *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, „Acta Politica“ 1977, vol 12, nr 3, s. 346–377.

<sup>41</sup> D. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, Wyd. Yale University 1967.

governments exist, the reduction of quota support to two largest parliamentary parties leads to lowering of government stability/durability indices. At the same time, the general theoretical scientific hypothesis, that the reduction in number of parliamentary parties is a positive catalyst for government stability increase, has been conformed: the less the number of parties in a parliament is, the higher are the chances of a government to stay in power. Besides, the theoretical conclusion concerning the fact that government stability does not directly depend on “government power” (the correlation between the amount of parties in every party cabinet and number of the parties in parliaments, which form the cabinet; i.e. a peculiar degree of governing complexity, caused by government structure, which shows the reflection ability of governments to resist parliaments) has not been proved. The point is that the consequences of the transitional period slowed down the rate of strong party systems formation. The most obviously it is seen in Armenia and Moldova. Thus, the former has a multiparty system, but, to a large extent, it is determined by the “dominating status” of the Republican Party (NNK), which, together with its satellites, has been constantly forming all party governments since 2003 (till that time “Unity” Block had been a leading one). In Moldova, the Communist Party (PCRM) had great influence during 2001-2009. In Ukraine, we can observe quite an opposite situation – the transition from the “atomized party system” to the “system of temperate pluralism” has been occurring (since 2006). It should be noted, that in the countries, where one party had earlier dominated, the raise of “government power” index leads to government stability. In Ukraine, the situation is quite contrary.

The analysis of various functional (or combined) party systems indices, in particular factionalization or fragmentation of party systems<sup>42</sup>, electoral changeability and effectiveness of the amount of parties<sup>43</sup> in case of government stability determination in Eastern European countries provides equivocal findings. Thus, due to M. Taylor and V. Hermann’s general theoretical conclusions<sup>44</sup> it becomes clear that the increase of party systems factionalization negatively correlates with government stability. However, the empirical experience of Eastern Europe shows, that the effective number of parties (which methodically correlate with party systems factionalization) has no direct impact on government stability, though influences the government stability index (as in case of reduction of the effective number of parties, the government stability index raises<sup>45</sup>). This characteristic has been verified only in cases of party cabinets, as the index of the effective number of parties shows the process of parliament structuring, that

<sup>42</sup> D. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, Wyd. Yale University 1967.; H. Holosov, *Formaty partyinykh system v novykh demokratyakh: instytsionalnye faktory neustoiyivosti y frahmentatsyy*, „Polys” 1998, vol 1, s. 106–129.; G. King, J. Alt, N. Burns, M. Laver, *A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies*, “American Journal of Political Science” 1990, vol 34, nr 3, s. 846–871.

<sup>43</sup> M. Laakso, R. Taagepera, *The Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe*, “Comparative Political Studies” 1979, vol 12, nr 1, s. 3–27.; J. Molinar, *Counting the Number of Parties: An Alternative Index*, “American Political Science Review” 1991, vol 85, nr 4, s. 1383–1391.

<sup>44</sup> M. Taylor, V. Hermann, *Party Systems and Government Stability*, „American Political Science Review” 1971, vol 65, nr 1, s. 28–37.

<sup>45</sup> Z. Bialoblotskiy, *Stabilnist ta efektyvnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh kraїн Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2013, s. 240–262.

is why the latter must be crucial in matters of government formation and stability. Therefore, the index of the effective number of parties has a systematic and determinative role, primarily, in evaluation party governments and their stability. Overall, this conclusion correlates with the situation in Eastern European homologous – firstly, in Central and Eastern European countries, where party cabinets are usually formed and where transformational processes are of great importance.

Within the frames of party systems' factionalization/fragmentation influence on government stability one should note that in Eastern European countries this influence is determined by the fact that increase in stability indices of different types of governments is stipulated in case of lowering factionalization only within government parties. Other indices of party factionalization do not matter. What refers to party cabinets, their stability can rise in the event of: reduction of factionalization of party governments, oppositional or all parliamentary parties, what completely correlates with the stable scientific principles. That is why, in case of party governments it presupposes that the effective number of parties and party factionalization of the parliament are based on the parameters, which should always be considered as crucial ones, as to matters of government coalition formation and stability. This proves the scientific ground due to which parties, represented in parliaments, but not only coalition partners, must become the subjects of government stability investigation, since more factionalized parliaments create more factionalized coalitions. It must be pointed out, that we refer to a large effective number of parliament parties, which at any time can create several different viable variants of coalition (if it is possible within the ideological frames). Thus, the existence of a large number of alternatives can make any government more "fragile" in the light of polling votes of no confidence. It becomes true to life due to the threat of the "government partners" to stop supporting and start participating in other possible variants of government coalitions (only when one can benefit from it with a glance at parties' ideological and pragmatic purposes). It is notable, that in Eastern European countries the following comparative characteristic works out: government durability and government stability index are higher in those countries, where the result of the effective number of parties and factionalization index are lower: this conclusion correlates with the outcomes, concerning Central and Eastern European countries<sup>46</sup>.

Clarification of electoral determination of government stability in Eastern European countries refers to proportionality/disproportionality of electoral systems<sup>47</sup>, and to electoral changeability<sup>48</sup>. On the basis of the comparative analysis of the empirical data, it becomes clear that in Eastern European countries there is no great correspondence between the indices of

<sup>46</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivniialnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Lvivskiyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010, s. 126–127.

<sup>47</sup> M. Gallagher, *Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems*, „Electoral Studies“ 1991, vol 10, nr 1, s. 33–51.

<sup>48</sup> M. Pedersen, *Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948-1977: Explorations in Explanation*, [w:] H. Daalder, P. Mair, *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change*, Beverly Hills 1983, s. 29–66.; M. Tavits, *Party Systems in the Making: The Emergence and Success of New Parties in New Democracies*, „British Journal of Political Science“ 2008, vol 38, nr 1, s. 113–133.; P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Cambridge 1994.

government stability and index of disproportion. At the same time, electoral determination of government stability in the region is described in detail. The point is, the question, concerning the importance of elections in the process of government stability evaluation is more methodologically diverse and versatile, since: in various countries and over different periods, governments in their initial (hypothetical) stability/durability depend on diverse “political actors”: in some countries – on parliaments, in other – on presidents. Besides temporal credentials of various actors change the processes of government formation/resignation, and due to this the indices of government stability can be “shifted”; also in different countries, there are changes due to the development of regimes and evaluating system of electoral importance. The main actor of government formation/resignation in Eastern European countries is the president (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia) or parliament (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – at least of 2015)<sup>49</sup>. However, over different periods such initial actors have been changing due to often alterations of constitutions. This, in the context of elections, causes the necessity (not obligatory accomplishment) of synchronous reformation of various sectors of social, political and economic life, and influenced the way, how elections and types of electoral systems determine government stability<sup>50</sup>.

The question is rather obvious as the explanation for government stability in Eastern European countries must be searched in the peculiarities of the transitional period: in any country the process of political transformation has ended in formation of consolidated democracy; besides, it is not even a matter of half-consolidated democratic regimes. As it has been mentioned above, some countries of the region faced the overload of problems, concerning synchronous reforms. Other countries determined by the important problems in developing civil rights and freedoms

<sup>49</sup> In Azerbaijan over different periods there have been various leading actors of government formation and resignation: president (since 1991); in Belarus – parliament (1991–1994) and president (since 1994); in Armenia – president (1991–2008) and parliament (since 2008); in Georgia – parliament (1991–1995) or president (1995–2012); in Moldova – parliament (since 1991); in Russia – parliament (1991–1993) and president (since 1993); in Ukraine – president (1991–2006, and since 2010) and parliament (2006–2010).

<sup>50</sup> Thus, we can make the conclusions concerning evaluation and evolution of the electoral systems in Eastern European countries (within the context of parliament formation). In Azerbaijan the elections of 1995–1996, 2000–2001 were characterized by the mixed electoral system (100 deputies were elected on the basis of the plurality voting system, and 25 – on the basis of the proportional representation system). Since the elections of 2005, the plurality voting system of relative majority has been used. In Belarus the elections take place in accordance with the plurality voting system of absolute majority. In Armenia since 1995 several types of the mixed electoral systems have been used. Their characteristic feature was that the parallel mixed system has not been used a time, in every case certain type of the mixed electoral system has been prevailing. In Georgia in 1992 the mixed additional member system was applied, and in 1995, 1999, 2003/2004 the analogical system (the number of representatives within the plurality voting system was enlarged to 85 deputies) was used. In 2008 the parallel mixed system was practiced (up to 75 deputies within the voting system of proportional representation and plurality system of relative majority). In 2012 the system was slightly modified in favor of the number of deputies, who were elected in accordance with the proportional representation system. In Moldova the party-list proportional representation system operates nowadays (with different electoral thresholds for parties and blocks). In Russia until 2003 the mixed parallel voting system had been used (within the frames of the plurality voting system acted the system of relative majority). Since 2007 the party-list proportional representation system has been applied. In Ukraine in 1994 the plurality system of absolute majority had been in use. During the elections of 1998 and 2002 operated the mixed voting system (within the frames of the plurality voting system acted the system of absolute majority). In 2006 and 2007 the parliament was formed on the basis of the party-list proportional representation system. Since 2012 the parallel mixed voting system has been applied (within the frames of the plurality voting system acted the system of relative majority, FPTP). In the systems, where proportional representation is used, or at least when it concerns the mixed system, there are electoral thresholds. They vary from country to country: Armenia – 5 percent; Georgia – 1996–1999 – 5 percent, 1999–2008 – 7 percent, since 2008 – 5 percent; Moldova – till 2009 – 4 percent (it had been higher earlier), since 2009 – 3 percent; Russia – till 2003 – 5 percent, since 2007 – 7 percent; Ukraine – till 2006 – 4 percent, since 2006 – 3 percent, since 2012 – 5 percent. The D’Hondt method and the closed-list system have been used in mandate division.

nowadays are considered authoritarian. That is why, in accordance with the institutional and contextual dimensions, governments face various obstacles/stimuli, which reduce/rise time limits of their stability. Due to the correlation we can conclude: 1) during the first transitional years of political development, after receiving/regaining independence, government stability is on the lowest level; 2) government stability rises due to the increase of political regimes stability (authoritarian and democratic/hybrid<sup>51</sup>); 3) authoritarian government stability is higher than democratic or hybrid governments stability; 4) government stability rises from elections to elections due to the actors, who are initial in the processes of cabinet formation/resignation (it is the lowest during the first transitional years of political development after receiving/regaining independence, and then rises from elections to elections).

The additional index, which proves the correlation between the elections and electoral systems and government stability, is evaluation of the number of pre-term elections in Eastern European countries (based on the elections of the initial actors, participating in government formation/resignation). The empirical data analysis shows, that the frequency of pre-term elections in hybrid/democratic regimes is higher than in authoritarian political regimes. It demonstrates the following conclusion: government stability tends to rise in authoritarian (non-democratic) countries; however, government stability is low in transitional countries, which are close to democratic regimes, but currently are believed to be hybrid. Elections and electoral systems evaluation is of greater importance in those democratic regimes, where party government formation occurs (occurred). The procedure of elections to the legislative bodies is naturally more complicated than the presidential elections. Moreover, the parliament itself is determinant in the processes of cabinet formation/resignation. Both this and types of electoral systems, which are used or have been applied to parliamentary or leading chambers elections in democratic/hybrid regimes of Eastern European countries, argue that party government formation is inherent to proportional representation systems. However, non-party governments implement plurality and mixed voting systems. Systems of proportional representation bring to power less stable governments, than it happens in case of plurality voting systems. Describing the attributes of electoral systems within the context of government stability, it should be mentioned, that Central Europe is empirically characterized by such correlations as: the less the electoral district is, the higher level of stability governments have; or the less the number of electoral districts is, the lower level of stability governments have. On the other hand, these findings should not be interpreted as those, which can fundamentally mark the prospects or explain the matter of government stability. Moreover, as it has been mentioned above, the

<sup>51</sup> In Eastern Europe the situation is the following (as of 2015): Armenia – hybrid regime (1992–2015), Azerbaijan – hybrid (1992–1996) and authoritarian regime (1996–2015), Belarus – hybrid (1992–1996) and authoritarian regime (1996–2015), Georgia – hybrid regime (1992–2015), Moldova – hybrid regime (1992–2015), Russia – hybrid regime (1992–2004) and authoritarian regime (2004–2015), Ukraine – hybrid regime (1992–2015). In more detail see: J. Linde, J. Ekman, *Patterns of Stability and Performance in Post-Communist Hybrid Regimes*, [w:] E. Bakke, P. Ingo (eds.), *20 Years since the fall of the Berlin Wall: Transitions, State-Breakup and Democratic Politics in Central Europe and Germany*, Wyd. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 2011, s. 97–120.

conclusions, concerning party-electoral determination of government stability are rather relative, and they must be apprehended as contextual and changeable.

Therefore, we argue that party and electoral indices of government stability in different Eastern European countries do not fully correspond to the general theoretical conclusions on this range of problems. It is largely stipulated by the fact that Eastern European countries are young political bodies, which do not meet the requirements of democracy, and their governments are not traditionally/mainly determined by inter-party relations. On the other hand, one can notice gradual approaching of institutional correlation patterns of government stability and party-electoral determinants to the general theoretical ones in the countries, which are democratizing and institutionalizing practices of party government formation.

## References

1. Bialoblotskyi Z., *Stabilnist ta efektyvnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2013.
2. Browne E., Franklin M., *Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Political Science Review" 1973, vol 67, nr 2, s. 453–469.
3. Budge I., Keman H., *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993.
4. Dahl R., *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven-London 1971.
5. Dalton R., Wattenberg M., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002.
6. DeWinter L., *Parliamentary and Party Pathways to the Cabinet*, [w:] Blondel J., Thiébaud J.-L. (eds.), *The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1991, s. 44–69.
7. Duverger M., *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, New York 1963.
8. Gallagher M., *Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities*, "British Journal of Political Science" 1992, vol 22, nr 4, s. 469–496.
9. Gallagher M., *Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems*, "Electoral Studies" 1991, vol 10, nr 1, s. 33–51.
10. Holosov H., *Formaty partyinykh system v novykh demokratiakh: instyutsyonalnye faktory neustoichyvosti y fragmentatsyy*, „Polys“ 1998, vol 1, s. 106–129.
11. Katz R., Wildenmann R., *Party Government: European and American Experiences*, Wyd. Walter de Gruyter 1987.
12. King G., Alt J., Burns N., Laver M., *A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Journal of Political Science" 1990, vol 34, nr 3, s. 846–871.
13. Klingemann H.-D., Wessels B., *Sincere Voting in Different Electoral Systems*, Berlin 2002.
14. Laakso M., Taagepera R., *The Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe*, "Comparative Political Studies" 1979, vol 12, nr 1, s. 3–27.
15. Laver M., Budge I., *Party Policy and the Government Coalitions*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 1992.

16. Linde J., Ekman J., *Patterns of Stability and Performance in Post-Communist Hybrid Regimes*, [w:] Bakke E., Ingo P. (eds.), *20 Years since the fall of the Berlin Wall: Transitions, State-Breakup and Democratic Politics in Central Europe and Germany*, Wyd. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 2011, s. 97–120.
17. Lytvyn V., *Porivnialnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010.
18. Lytvyn V., *Uriadova stabilnist kriz pryzmu partiinykh determinant krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy*, „Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu. – Serii: Politolohiia, Sotsiolohiia, Filosofiia“ 2009, vol 13, s. 110–118.
19. Molinar J., *Counting the Number of Parties: An Alternative Index*, “American Political Science Review” 1991, vol 85, nr 4, s. 1383–1391.
20. Moser R., Scheiner E., *Mixed electoral systems and electoral system effects: controlled comparison and cross-national analysis*, “Electoral Studies” 2004, vol 23, s. 575–599.
21. Muller W., *Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2000, vol 37, nr 3, s. 309–333.
22. Pedersen M., *Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948-1977: Explorations in Explanation*, [w:] Daalder H., Mair P., *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change*, Beverly Hills 1983, s. 29–66.
23. Pridham G., *Coalitional Behavior in Theory and Practice: An Inductive Model for Western Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1986.
24. Rae D., *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, Wyd. Yale University 1967.
25. Rokkan S., Campbell A., *Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of Political Development*, Wyd. Universitetsforlaget 1970.
26. Sanders D., Herman V., *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, „Acta Politica“ 1977, vol 12, nr 3, s. 346–377.
27. Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.
28. Siaroff A., *Comparative European Party Systems: an analysis of parliamentary elections since 1945*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2000.
29. Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: a study of formal theories of coalition formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company 1973.
30. Tavits M., *Party Systems in the Making: The Emergence and Success of New Parties in New Democracies*, „British Journal of Political Science“ 2008, vol 38, nr 1, s. 113–133.
31. Taylor M., Hermann V., *Party Systems and Government Stability*, „American Political Science Review“ 1971, vol 65, nr 1, s. 28–37.
32. Ware A., *Political parties and party systems*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1996.
33. Warwick P., *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.