

## **Парламентська підтримка як індикатор стабільності урядів у країнах Східної Європи (1991–2014)**

у статті проаналізовану парламентську підтримку як індикатор стабільності урядів у країнах Східної Європи в 1991–2014 рр. Виокремлено групи країн у регіоні на основі ролі парламентів у формуванні та припиненні повноважень урядів. Проаналізовано сутність впливу партійної та персональної структуризації парламентів на стабільність урядів. Уточнено різницю понять «парламентська коаліція» і «парламентська більшість». Запропоновано розгляд базових теоретико-методологічних та емпіричних атрибутів парламентської підтримки урядів у країнах Східної Європи. Визначено різновиди парламентської підтримки урядів у країнах Східної Європи. На цій підставі зіставлено типи підтримки урядів та урядову стабільність (у формі урядової тривалості та індексу урядової стабільності).

*Ключові слова:* виконавча влада, президентська республіка, парламентська республіка, напівпрезидентська республіка, дуалістична виконавча влада, президент, уряд, урядовий кабінет, парламентська підтримка, стабільність урядів, тривалість урядів, індекс урядової стабільності, структуризація парламенту, парламентська коаліція, коаліційна більшість, парламентська більшість, голосування, Східна Європа.

## **Parliamentary support as indicator of cabinet stability in Eastern European Countries (1991–2014)**

The article is dedicated to analyzing parliamentary support as indicator of cabinet stability in Eastern European countries in 1991–2014. The author identified groups of countries in the region based on the role of parliaments in the formulation and termination of cabinets, analyzed the nature of party and personal structuring parliaments' impact on cabinet stability, differentiated concepts of "parliamentary coalition" and "parliamentary majority", proposed review of theoretical, methodological and empirical attributes of parliamentary support of cabinets in Eastern Europe, determined types of parliamentary support of cabinets in Eastern Europe, compared types of cabinet support and cabinet stability (based on cabinet duration and index of cabinet stability).

**Keywords:** *executive, presidential republic, parliamentary republic, semi-presidential republic, dual executive, president, cabinet, governmental cabinet, parliamentary support, cabinet stability, cabinet duration, index of cabinet stability, structuring of parliament, parliamentary coalition, coalition majority, parliamentary majority, voting, Eastern Europe.*

The regularity of political development of most countries of the world (including in post-Soviet and Eastern Europe – namely in Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) is the concentration of key authorities in the executive power institutes. The scholars treat this phenomena as an objective result of modern statehood evolution. Logically, executive power is a complex of state bodies and institutions conducting governmentally-political and governmentally-administrative functions. Depending upon the constitutional governmental schemes the top of executive power system may be represented solely by the *president* (which is not characteristic of the East-European Countries, as now the classical *presidential republics* are not represented in the region<sup>1</sup>), unilaterally, the government in the person of the prime-minster (characteristic of Moldova, which is a classical parliamentary republic) or simultaneously the president and the government (which is characteristic of Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Armenia, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, which are formally half-presidential republics, i.e. independent of formal and actual authorities of the president and prime-minister realize the schemes of *dualistic executive power*, with visible institutional roles of both the president and the government). In this context in the selection of the East-European countries special attention should be paid to the evaluation of governments, their stability, and dependence upon inter-institutional design. The matter is that the region is characterized by such governmental systems where the government (in the context of formation and possible early termination of authorities) directly depends *either upon the parliament* (Moldova), or upon the *parliament and the president* (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Armenia, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine). Accordingly, parliamentary support of the governments – is the guarantee of their activity, and accordingly indicator of the governments' stability.

In order to outline the interrelation between the governments stability and parliamentary support of governments among the East-European Countries during 1991–2014 it is necessary to define a set of notions and definitive analysis parameters. Namely – government, governmental cabinet, cabinet of ministers, parliamentary support, stability of governments, duration of governments, index of governmental stability. *Government* is one of the supreme state bodies whose competence is only conventionally restricted to the law-enforcement and tasks in the sphere of administration; organization exercising

<sup>1</sup> Today among the East-European countries there are no "classical" presidential republics with no position of prime-minister, and the head of state is the president. Nevertheless, such situations were characteristic of the countries of the region before – Azerbaijan (before 1995), Byelorussia (1994–1996), Georgia (1995–2003), Ukraine (1995–1996).

the administration in the whole country or its part; specified number of leading politicians and specialists, formally appointed by the head of state, though really elected by the prime-minister (or the prime-minister and the head of state)<sup>2</sup> on condition of support in the parliament who have the right to make decisions on all issues related to the competence of the executive power branch. *The governmental cabinet* is the part of government, where the prime-minister or president form the cabinet of ministers with the delegation of respective ministries to the latter. *Cabinet of ministers* is the committee formed out of number of the most important members of government, namely, prime-minister (president) and ministers<sup>3</sup>. *Parliamentary support* is a number of deputies of the parliament who, with the parliamentary government formation (in the parliamentary and half-presidential republics) provide the government with the vote of confidence/ investiture and support it in the process of fulfillment of its obligations. *Governments stability* is the ability of government to continue functioning; stable functioning of government which is characterized by the ability of long-lasting operation and preserving of essential internal and external governmental parameters. *Government duration* is the time (in days, months, or years) measured between the «beginning» and «end» of certain period of the government existence. *Index of governmental stability* is the index which reflects the part of maximum time possible – term of parliament/president cadence (depending upon the constitutional peculiarities of the government formation) – of the government operation<sup>4</sup>.

The interrelation between the stability of governments and parliamentary support of government depends upon the activity of legislative power - *unicameral or bicameral parliaments* – and their party and personal *structuration*. This is very actual as it provides that the government stability is not unilateral and direct result of functioning of *different types* of governments. For instance, despite the fact that in the East-European countries normally non-party governments operate (this is mostly characteristic of Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Russia, Georgia, and Ukraine), their activity directly depends upon the placement of the party and non-party forces within national parliaments. Such situation becomes even more important because the parliaments structuring and parliaments as political institutes (in every country) act in the role of constitutionally provided agents of governments *formation / resignation* (it results from the fact that half-presidential and parliamentary republics, governmental cabinets collectively responsible in front of the parliaments operate in the region). That is why the comparative evaluation of influence of party and personal structuring of parliaments for the purpose of support/opposition of governmental cabinets shall be considered one of the indicators of governmental stability.

<sup>2</sup> M. Gallaher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992, s. 179.

<sup>3</sup> P. Collin, *Dictionary of Government and Politics*, Wyd. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers 1998, s. 128.

<sup>4</sup> D. Sanders, V. Herman, *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, "Acta Politica" 1977, vol 12, s. 346–377.

In this context the *parliaments* shall be treated as the voting systems, as the voting system in modern political science is defined as an organizational rule which determines the fact of approval or disapproval of the decision on the basis of voting results. This definition is directly applicable to the possibility of formation and resignation of governments in the East-European countries<sup>5</sup>.

The matter is that only on the basis of the voting procedure the deputies make all the parliamentary decisions. They are deemed made if the number of votes given for them, exceeds the *votes quota*, which is determined by certain national voting procedures. For instance, if there four and more parties in the parliament, most probably, neither of them is represented by the number of votes exceeding the determined quota, and may not make a decision on its own. Therefore the parties ally or enter into the “coalitions”. In this case the said interpretation of coalition not as «governmental», but as “*parliamentary*” – to describe such associations appearing in the parliament due to the support or no-support of political decisions, which provide or resist the realization of governmental cabinet<sup>6</sup>. With this in mind, and taking into account that the parliamentary support is often determining and primary factor of the government formation, in the determination of the type of parliamentary support to the government we should keep in mind that the category «parliamentary support» (resulting in the positive decision made in the form of the vote of confidence – in our case the fact of the new government formation) is equal to the category «*parliamentary majority*». The category “Parliamentary support” is connected with the government typology by the fact that the parliamentary majority may be the party and non-party. In its turn the party majority may be the single-party and coalitional. Besides, as it is shown by the practices of the East-European countries, majority may be mixed: mostly party, modified by the non-party mandates; mostly non-party, modified by the party mandates; simultaneously party and non-party (on condition the number of the party and non-party deputies in the parliamentary majority construction are equal). It means that in the evaluation of the government cabinets in the context of their parliamentary support, we should judge by what *parliamentary coalition* actually is – as an association which appears in the parliament as a result of support or non-support of making the political decision. Besides, we should always take into account those parliamentary coalitions, which provide for the parliamentary majority, as it is necessary in case of government formation

<sup>5</sup> Noteworthy, as of 2014 the parliament is an exceptional agent of governmental authorities termination in the following East-European states: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Instead, in Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, and Russia the parliaments are quite influential in the context of possible early termination of governments' authorities, though, the desire to fire the governments (motion of censure) may be repelled by the presidents (in these countries the governments may be fired directly by the presidents). Analogically, in case of the government formation: without decision of parliament (vote of confidence) the government may be formed in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine; in case of absence of the parliament decision (vote of confidence) the governments may be formed directly by the presidents in Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, and Russia.

<sup>6</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivniialnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy: dys. ... kand. polit. nauk: 23.00.02: zakhysbch. 09.04.2010: zatverdzhena 06.10.2010*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010, s. 132.

and provision of the support of its course – that is in the context of provision of the vote of confidence). With this in mind, obviously, parliamentary coalitions *do not necessarily constitute the cases of the party support*: they may be exclusively party or party modified non-party mandates, and may be non-party or modified non-party<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> The minority governments are formed on the basis of understanding of the category «parliamentary coalition» as association appearing in the parliament due to the support or non-support of political decision-making. The minority government in the party context consists of the parliamentary parties which cumulatively constitute minority. Though, the minority government always relies upon the mandates of these parties or non-party deputies, cumulatively constituting parliamentary majority, i.e. has the support of majority. In this case it is worthy to clarify the notion of majority. For this purpose we may use the following two notions: 1) *coalitional majority* – this is the majority which corresponds to the coalitional nature of the governmental cabinet (the same with the coalitional minority); 2) *parliamentary majority* (or *majority in the parliament*) – is the constant or situational majority in the systems of government, where the principles of the coalitional governments formation are not applicable, and majority operates only to make these or those successive solutions and provision of constitutionally determined requirement about the governmental cabinet support by the parliament.

**Table 1.** Governmental stability in the countries of Eastern Europe in the light of their parliamentary support (1991–2014)<sup>8</sup>

Prime Minister	Terms of cabinet stay in power	Party of Prime Minister	Type of cabinet	Parliamentary support for cabinet	Parties/MPs of parliamentary support for cabinet	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
<b>Azerbaijan</b>								
H. Hasanov	18.10.1991–04.04.1992	n/p	T	SPMN+	AKC+n/p	166	0.45	0.72
R. Huseynov	16.06.1992–30.01.1993	n/p	T	SPMN+	AKC+n/p	224	0.61	0.47
P. Huseynov	28.04.1993–30.06.1993	AKC	T	SPMN+	AKC+n/p	62	0.17	0.13
S. Huseynov	30.06.1993–07.10.1994	n/p	T	AS	–	457	1.25	0.20
F. Guliyev	07.10.1994–20.07.1996	YAP	T	AS	–	643	1.76	0.36
A. Raszade 1	26.11.1996–11.10.1998	YAP	T	GMN+	YAP+p+n/p	675	1.86	0.37
A. Raszade 2	11.10.1998–04.08.2003	YAP	T	GMN+	YAP+p+n/p	1733	4.75	0.96
I. Aliyev	04.08.2003–04.11.2003	YAP	T	SPMJ+	YAP+n/p	90	0.25	0.05
A. Raszade 3	04.11.2003–29.10.2008	YAP	T	SPMJ+	YAP+n/p	1795	4.92	1.00
A. Raszade 4	29.10.2008–22.10.2013	YAP	T	GMJ+	YAP+p+n/p	1793	4.91	1.00

<sup>8</sup> The indexes of the governmental stability which operated/operate in 2014, were measured for the following governmental cabinets: 1) not operating (terminated their authorities in 2014); 2) operate in 2014, though appeared not earlier than July 31, 2013. Governmental cabinets which appeared after July 31, 2013 or in 2014 and for the moment of analysis were operating, were not subject to the counting of the governmental stability indexes. The governmental stability indexes were counted as of July 31, 2014. In the table all governmental cabinets which were recorded but not analyzed are marked in grey. Among them the governments headed by the following prime-ministers: A. Raszade (starting from 22.10.2013) in Azerbaijan, H. Abrahamyan (starting from 13.04.2014) in Armenia, I. Garibashvili (starting from 20.11.2013) in Georgia, A. Yatsenyuk (starting from 27.02.2014) in Ukraine. Up till July 31, 2014 the governments were analyzed headed by the following prime-ministers: M. Myasnikovich in Byelorussia (analyzed period 28.12.2010–31.07.2014), I. Leancă in Moldova (analyzed period 31.05.2013–31.07.2014), D. Medvedev in Russia (analyzed period 08.05.2012–31.07.2014). Conventional signs: CD, d. – cabinet duration (in days); CD, y. – cabinet duration (in years); ICS – index of cabinet stability; p – affiliation to the party (party membership); n/p – non-affiliation to the party (non-party membership); T – technocratic (non-party) cabinet; P – party cabinet; SPMJ – single-party majority; SPMJ+ – single-party majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; SPMN+ – single-party minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMJ – coalition majority; CMJ+ – coalition majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMN+ – coalition minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; NPMJ – non-party majority; NPMJ+ – non-party majority, supplemented by party MPs; NPMN+ – non-party minority, supplemented by party MPs; AS – absence of support; AXC – Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, YAP – New Azerbaijan Party, ASB – Agrarian Party of Belarus, KPB – Communist Party of Belarus, LDPB – Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus, AzhM – National Democratic Union, PANM – Pan-Armenian National Movement, H – Republic, M – National Unity, HHHT – Armenian Revolutionary Federation, HHK – Republican Party of Armenia, OEK – Rule of Law, BHK – Prosperous Armenia, RT-FG – „Round Table- Free Georgia”, BM – Block of peace, 11.10 – Block, 11 October”, SMP – Green Party, UCG – Citizens’ Union of Georgia, EDA – National Democratic Party, DAP – Democratic Union for Revival, NMD – National Movement – Democrats, ENM – United National Movement, KO – Georgian Dream, FPM – Popular Front of Moldova, PCM – Party of Communists of Moldova, PDAM – Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova, BTI – Election alliance „Block of peasants and intellectuals”, FPCCD – Christian Democratic Popular Front, CDM – Democratic Convention of Moldova alliance, PDM – Democratic Party of Moldova, DEP – Party of Democratic Force, PCR – Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova, PLDM – Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova, PL – Liberal Party, AMN – Party Alliance Our Moldova, DPR – Democratic Party of Russia, YR – Russia’s Choice, APR – Agrarian Party of Russia, PRES – Party of Russian Unity and Harmony, NDR – Our Home – Russia, Yabloko – Russian United Democratic Party „Yabloko”, DVR – Democratic Choice of Russia, Y – Interregional movement „Unity”, OVR – Fatherland – All Russia, ER – United Russia, KPU – Communist Party of Ukraine, NRU – The People’s Movement of Ukraine, SelPU – The Peasant Party of Ukraine, SPU – The Socialist Party of Ukraine, VOH – All-Ukrainian Association „Community”, NDPU – The People’s Democratic Party, SPU+SB – Electoral bloc of the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Peasant Party of Ukraine, PPPU – The Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine, SDPU(o) – The Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united), PR – The Party of Regions, ZYU – For United Ukraine, BYT – The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, NU – The Our Ukraine, NU-NS – The Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense Bloc, BL – The Lytvyn Bloc, B – All-Ukrainian Union „Fatherland”, UDAR – The Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform of Vitali Klitschko, SEU – the group of MPs „Sovereign European Ukraine”, S – The All-Ukrainian Union „Svoboda”.

A. Raszdade 5	22.10.2013 – Incumbent	YAP	T	SPMU+	YAP + n/p	Not analyzed
<b>Belarus</b>						
V. Kebich	19.09.1991 – 21.07.1994	n/p	T	NPMU	n/p	1022
M. Chieir	21.07.1994 – 18.11.1996	n/p	T	AS	–	837
S. Ling	19.02.1997 – 18.02.2000	n/p	T	NPMU+	n/p + ASB	1079
V. Yermoshin	14.03.2000 – 01.10.2001	n/p	T	NPMU+	n/p + KPБ + ASB + LDPB	557
G. Novitsky	10.10.2001 – 10.07.2003	n/p	T	NPMU+	n/p + KPБ + ASB + LDPB	630
S. Sidorsky 1	19.12.2003 – 08.04.2006	n/p	T	NPMU+	n/p + KPБ + ASB + LDPB	829
S. Sidorsky 2	10.04.2006 – 27.12.2010	n/p	T	NPMU+	n/p + KPБ + ASB + LDPB	1697
M. Myasnikovich	28.12.2010 – Incumbent	n/p	T	NPMU+	n/p + KPБ + ASB	1293
<b>Armenia</b>						
V. Manukyan	13.08.1990 – 22.11.1991	AZHM	T	SPMN+	AzHM + n/p	459
G. Hanutyunyan	22.11.1991 – 30.07.1992	n/p	T	SPMN+	PANM + n/p	248
K. Hanutyunyan	30.07.1992 – 02.02.1993	n/p	T	SPMN+	PANM + n/p	182
H. Bagratyan 1	03.02.1993 – 29.07.1995	PANM	T	SPMN+	PANM + n/p	896
H. Bagratyan 2	29.07.1995 – 04.11.1996	H	T	SPMN+	H + n/p	455
A. Sargsyan	04.11.1996 – 19.03.1997	n/p	T	SPMN+	H + n/p	135
R. Kocharyan	20.03.1997 – 03.02.1998	n/p	T	SPMN+	H + n/p	313
A. Darbinjan	10.04.1998 – 11.06.1999	n/p	T	SPMN+	H + n/p	421
V. Sargsyan	11.06.1999 – 27.10.1999	M	P	CMU	M + HHT	136
A. Sargsyan	03.11.1999 – 02.05.2000	M	P	CMU	M + HHT	179
A. Manganyan 1	12.05.2000 – 05.03.2003	M	P	CMU	M + HHT	1013
A. Manganyan 2	05.03.2003 – 25.03.2007	HHK	P	CMN+	HHK + OEK + HHT + n/p	1460
S. Sargsyan 1	25.03.2007 – 12.05.2007	HHK	P	CMN+	HHK + OEK + HHT + n/p	47
S. Sargsyan 2	12.05.2007 – 19.02.2008	HHK	P	CMU	HHK + BHK + HHT + p	277
T. Sargsyan 1	09.04.2008 – 27.04.2009	HHK	P	CMU	HHK + BHK + HHT + p	378
T. Sargsyan 2	27.04.2009 – 06.05.2012	HHK	P	CMU	HHK + BHK + OEK	1089
T. Sargsyan 3	06.05.2012 – 13.04.2014	HHK	P	SPMU	HHK	697
H. Abrahamyan	13.04.2014 – Incumbent	HHK	P	SPMU	HHK	Not analyzed
<b>Georgia</b>						
Z. Gamsakhurdia	09.04.1991 – 26.05.1991	RT-FG	P	SPMU	RT-FG	47
B. Gugushvili	23.08.1991 – 06.01.1992	RT-FG	P	SPMU	RT-FG	133
T. Sigua 1	06.01.1992 – 11.10.1992	n/p	T	AS	–	275
T. Sigua 2	11.10.1992 – 05.08.1993	n/p	T	CMN+	BM + 11.10 + SMP + p + n/p	294
O. Patsatsia	20.08.1993 – 05.10.1995	n/p	T	CMN+	BM + 11.10 + SMP + p + n/p	765
N. Lekshvili	08.12.1995 – 26.07.1998	UCG	T	CMU	UCG + EDA + DAP	948
						2,60
						0,59

V. Lortkipanidze	07.08.1998 – 11.05.2000	UGG	T	GMJ	UGG + EDA + DAP	634	1,74	0,40	
G. Arsenishvili	11.05.2000 – 21.12.2001	UGG	T	SPMU	UGG	580	1,59	0,43	
A. Jobavadze	21.12.2001 – 27.11.2003	UGG	T	SPMU	UGG	696	1,91	0,52	
Z. Zhvania 1	27.11.2003 – 28.03.2004	NM-D	T	AS	–	121	0,33	0,05	
Z. Zhvania 2	28.03.2004 – 03.02.2005	NM-D	P	SPMU+	NM-D + n/p	305	0,84	0,21	
Z. Noghideli	17.02.2005 – 16.11.2007	n/p	T	SPMU+	NM-D + n/p	989	2,71	0,69	
L. Gurgeniძე 1	22.11.2007 – 20.01.2008	n/p	T	SPMU+	NM-D + n/p	58	0,16	0,04	
L. Gurgeniძე 2	20.01.2008 – 01.11.2008	n/p	T	SPMU+	NM-D + n/p	281	0,77	0,13	
G. Mgoblishvili	01.11.2008 – 30.01.2009	n/p	T	SPMU	ENM	89	0,24	0,04	
N. Gilauri	06.02.2009 – 04.07.2012	n/p	T	SPMU	ENM	1228	3,36	0,56	
V. Meabishvili	04.07.2012 – 25.10.2012	ENM	T	SPMU	ENM	111	0,30	0,05	
B. Ivanishvili	25.10.2012 – 20.11.2013	KO	P	SPMU	KO	385	1,05	0,18	
I. Garibashvili	20.11.2013 – Incumbent	KO	P	SPMU	KO		Not analyzed		
<b>Moldova</b>									
V. Muravtschi	27.08.1991 – 01.07.1992	FPM	P	GMJ+	FPM + PCM + n/p	304	0,83	0,21	
A. Sangheli1	01.07.1992 – 27.02.1994	PDAM	P	SPMU+	PDAM + n/p	596	1,63	0,42	
A. Sangheli2	27.02.1994 – 24.01.1997	PDAM	P	GMJ	PDAM + BTI + FKCD	1047	2,87	0,70	
I. Ciubuc1	24.01.1997 – 22.05.1998	PDAM	P	GMJ	PDAM + BTI + FKCD	478	1,31	0,30	
I. Ciubuc2	22.05.1998 – 01.02.1999	CDM	P	GMJ	CDM + PDM + DPP	249	0,68	0,24	
I. Sturza	19.02.1999 – 01.12.1999	CDM	P	GMJ	CDM + PDM + DPP	282	0,77	0,27	
D. Băghiş	21.12.1999 – 25.02.2001	n/p	T	GMJ	CDM + PDM + DPP	424	1,16	0,40	
V. Tarlev 1	19.04.2001 – 06.03.2005	PCRM	P	SPMU	PCRM	1397	3,83	0,96	
V. Tarlev 2	19.04.2005 – 20.03.2008	PCRM	P	SPMU	PCRM	1051	2,88	0,71	
Z. Greceanii 1	31.03.2008 – 10.06.2009	PCRM	P	SPMU	PCRM	430	1,18	0,29	
Z. Greceanii 2	10.06.2009 – 09.09.2009	PCRM	P	SPMU	PCRM	89	0,24	0,08	
V. Filat 1	25.09.2009 – 28.11.2010	PLDM	P	GMJ	PLDM + PL + PDM + AMIN	423	1,16	0,88	
V. Filat 2	14.01.2011 – 25.04.2013	PLDM	P	GMJ	PLDM + PDM + PL	821	2,25	0,56	
I. Leancă	31.05.2013 – Incumbent	PLDM	P	GMJ	PLDM + PDM + PL	420	1,15	0,44	
<b>Russia</b>									
B. Yeltsin	25.12.1991 – 15.06.1992	n/p	T	SPMN+	DPR + n/p	170	0,47	0,13	
Y. Gaidar	15.06.1992 – 14.12.1992	n/p	T	SPMN+	DPR + n/p	179	0,49	0,13	
V. Chernomyrdin 1	15.12.1992 – 23.12.1993	n/p	T	SPMN+	DPR + n/p	368	1,01	0,27	
V. Chernomyrdin 2	20.01.1994 – 09.08.1996	n/p	T	GMN+	VR + APR + PRES + n/p	919	2,52	0,51	
V. Chernomyrdin 3	10.08.1996 – 23.03.1998	NDR	T	NPMN+	NDR + Yabloko + DVR + n/p	583	1,60	0,43	
S. Kiriyenko	24.04.1998 – 23.08.1998	n/p	T	NPMN+	NDR + Yabloko + DVR + n/p	119	0,33	0,09	
Y. Primakov	11.09.1998 – 12.05.1999	n/p	T	NPMN+	NDR + Yabloko + DVR + n/p	241	0,66	0,18	



S. Stepašin	19.05.1999 – 09.08.1999	n/p	T	NPMM+	NDR + Yabloko + DVR + n/p	80	0,22	0,06	
V. Putin 1	16.08.1999 – 26.03.2000	NDR	T	NPMM+	NDR + Yabloko + DVR + n/p	220	0,60	0,16	
M. Kasjanov	17.05.2000 – 24.02.2004	n/p	T	GMN+	Y + OVR + n/p	1357	3,72	0,95	
M. Fradkov 1	05.03.2004 – 07.05.2004	n/p	T	SPM+	ER+ n/p	62	0,17	0,05	
M. Fradkov 2	12.05.2004 – 12.09.2007	n/p	T	SPM+	ER+ n/p	1200	3,29	0,84	
V. Zubkov	14.09.2007 – 07.05.2008	n/p	T	SPM+	ER+ n/p	233	0,64	0,16	
V. Putin 2	08.05.2008 – 07.05.2012	ER	T	SPM+	ER	1439	4,00	1,00	
D. Medvedev	08.05.2012 – Incumbent	ER	T	SPM+	ER	803	2,20	0,37	
<b>Ukraine</b>									
V. Fokin	24.08.1991 – 01.10.1992	n/p	T	SPM+	KPU	397	1,09	0,27	
L. Kuchma	13.10.1992 – 21.09.1993	n/p	T	SPM+	KPU	338	0,93	0,23	
Y. Zvyahitsky	27.09.1993 – 16.06.1994	n/p	T	SPM+	KPU	259	0,71	0,18	
V. Masol	16.06.1994 – 04.04.1995	n/p	T	NPMM+	NRU + SePU + SPU + p + n/p	288	0,79	0,20	
Y. Marchuk	08.06.1995 – 27.05.1996	n/p	T	NPMM+	NRU + SePU + SPU + p + n/p	349	0,96	0,18	
P. Lazarenko 1	28.05.1996 – 05.07.1996	VOH	T	NPMM+	NRU + SePU + SPU + p + n/p	37	0,10	0,01	
P. Lazarenko 2	11.07.1996 – 02.07.1997	VOH	T	NPMM+	NRU + SePU + SPU + p + n/p	351	0,96	0,18	
V. Pustovitenko	16.07.1997 – 30.11.1999	NDPU	T	NPMM+	NRU + SePU + SPU + p + n/p	854	2,34	0,44	
V. Yushchenko	22.12.1999 – 28.04.2001	n/p	T	GMN+	NRU + SPU+SB + NDPU + p + n/p	486	1,33	0,26	
A. Krahch	29.05.2001 – 16.11.2002	PPPU	T	GMN+	SDPU(o) + SPU+SB + NDPU + p + n/p	527	1,44	0,29	
V. Yanukovich 1	21.11.2002 – 05.01.2005	PR	T	GMN+	ZVU + SDPU(o) + p + n/p	764	2,09	0,41	
Y. Tymoshenko 1	04.02.2005 – 08.09.2005	BYT	T	GMN+	NU + BYT + SPU + p + n/p	214	0,59	0,12	
Y. Yekhanurov	22.09.2005 – 26.03.2006	NU	T	GMN+	NU + SPU + p + n/p	184	0,50	0,10	
V. Yanukovich 2	04.08.2006 – 17.10.2006	PR	P	GMJ	PR + NU + SPU + KPU	73	0,20	0,13	
V. Yanukovich 3	17.10.2006 – 18.12.2007	PR	P	GMJ	PR + SPU + KPU + p	421	1,15	0,77	
Y. Tymoshenko 2	18.12.2007 – 03.03.2010	BYT	P	GMJ	BYT + NU+NS	795	2,18	0,43	
M. Azarov 1	11.03.2010 – 09.12.2010	PR	P	GMN+	PR + KPU + BL + n/p	268	0,73	0,14	
M. Azarov 2	09.12.2010 – 03.12.2012	PR	T	GMJ+	PR + KPU + BL + n/p	714	1,96	0,39	
M. Azarov 3	13.12.2012 – 28.01.2014	PR	T	GMJ+	PR + KPU + n/p	405	1,11	0,22	
A. Yatsenyuk	27.02.2014 – Incumbent	B	T	GMN+	B + UDAR + SEU + S + n/p		Not analyzed		

Źródło: <http://zanate.eu/countries.htm> [odczyt: 01.09.2014]; <http://en.wikipedia.org> [odczyt: 01.09.2014]; Z. Bialoblotskiy, *Stabilnist ta efektywnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Shtidnoi Yevropy. Monohrafiya*, Wyd. Wydawniczyi tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2013.

Having determined the *parliamentary parties statuses* (in the context of their mandates to the parliament complete composition – i.e. majority or minority: fixed amount of mandates in the table 1 was not provided with regard to the fact that it changes each year due to some objective and subjective reasons) in the East-European countries we differentiate between several types of parliamentary support: single-party majority, coalitional majority, single-party majority with the influence of non-party mandates (or complemented by non-party deputies), coalitional majority with the impact of non-party mandates (complemented by non-party deputies), single-party minority with the impact of non-party mandates (complemented by non-party deputies), coalitional minority with the influence of non-party mandates (complemented by non-party deputies), non-party majority with the support of party mandates (or complemented by the party deputies), non-party minority with the support of party mandates (complemented by the party deputies), absence of parliamentary support. The result of almost each type of parliamentary support is *parliamentary majority* obtainment. This in the constitutional systems of government serves as inter-institutional reason for the beginning of its authorities (vote of confidence/investiture). Sometimes the scenarios are possible, when the governmental cabinet does not have the support of parliamentary majority). Appealing to the experience of the governments formation in the East-European countries on the basis of parliamentary support assessment (for details see table 1) the following results were obtained:

**Table 2.** Types of parliamentary support of governments in East-European countries (1990–2014)<sup>9</sup>

Country	SPMJ	SPMJ+	CMJ	CMJ+	SPMN+	CMN+	NPMJ	NPMJ+	NPMN+	AS	Total
Azerbaijan	–	2	–	1	3	2	–	–	–	2	10
Belarus	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	6	–	1	8
Armenia	1	–	6	–	8	2	–	–	–	–	17
Georgia	8	4	2	–	–	2	–	–	–	2	18
Moldova	4	1	8	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	14
Russia	2	3	–	–	3	2	–	–	5	–	15
Ukraine	–	3	3	2	–	6	–	–	5	–	19
<b>Total</b>	15	13	19	4	14	14	1	6	10	5	101
<b>Share, %</b>	14,9	12,9	18,8	4,0	13,85	13,85	1,0	5,9	9,9	4,9	100,0

In Azerbaijan the following governmental cabinets prevail complemented with the

<sup>9</sup> Conventional signs: SPMJ – single-party majority; SPMJ+ – single-party majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; SPMN+ – single-party minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMJ – coalition majority; CMJ+ – coalition majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMN+ – coalition minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; NPMJ – non-party majority; NPMJ+ – non-party majority, supplemented by party MPs; NPMN+ – non-party minority, supplemented by party MPs; AS – absence of support. Out of governments which operated /still operate in 2014 the following ones were taken into account: 1) not operating (terminated their authorities in 2014); 2) operate in 2014, though, appeared not earlier than July 31, 2013. Governmental cabinets which appeared after July 31, 2013 or in 2014 and as of the moment of analysis were operating, were not subject to counting.

modifying influence of non-party parliamentary mandates: up till 2003 – single-party and coalitional governments, where the minority parties were complemented by non-party mandates; since 2003 – single-party and coalitional governments, where the majority parties were also modified by the non-party mandates. In Byelorussia, is characterized by the governmental formats of parliamentary majority formed by the non-party mandates, but is modified by the party deputies. Exception is only the governmental cabinet which in 1994-1996 was headed by the prime-minister M. Chigir: the government was formed in the constitutional format of presidentialism (presidential republic), therefore it should not have relied upon the support of parliamentary majority. Besides, during this period the Byelorussian development was characterized by the inter-institutional conflict of the head of the state (and as a head of executive power) and the parliament. In Armenia at the first stage of development of its governmental cabinets (before 1999) the single-party parliamentary support modified by the non-party mandates was dominating. After this the coalitional support of the governmental cabinets was institutionalized – on the basis of the majority or minority of the party mandates in the parliament (in the latter case through modifying influence of non-party mandates). In 2012 the governmental cabinet was formed whose prime-minister T. Sargsyan relies upon the support of the single-party majority of Armenian Republican Party. In Georgia since 2000 the single-party parliamentary support of the governmental cabinets has been dominating, but in 2004–2008 it was additionally modified by the non-party mandates. Instead, within 1991-2000 Georgia was characterized by the variability of the formats of parliamentary support of governmental cabinets. First of all, the cabinets were functioning which relied upon the support of the single-party majority (1991–1992), then – on the support of the coalitional minority complemented by the non-party mandates (1992–1995), still later – on the support of coalitional majority (1995–2000). Moldova is the only country of region where starting from 1994 the party support of governmental cabinets has been prevailing (without involvement of the nonparty mandates): in 2001–2009 the single-party and in 1994–2001 and 2009–2014 coalitional. In Russia up till 2004 the mixed party and non-party support based on different configurations of latter was dominating, though there was a determining situation here when the party or non-party minority was complemented by non-party or party mandates. However, since 2004 the parliamentary support of governmental cabinets shifted to the single-party, but up till 2008 was also modified by the nonparty mandates. In Ukraine the situation was similar: the minority formats (party/non-party), modified by the party or non-party deputies were prevailing in 1994–2006. In 2006–2010 and 2012–2014 the configurations of the party support on the basis of the parliamentary coalitions were operating. In 2010 the cabinet was functioning whose prime-minister M.

Azarov relied upon the support of the coalitional minority, complemented by the non-party mandates. In 2014 with the similar pattern of the cabinet support was provided, headed by A. Yatsenyuk.

Generally, in Eastern Europe in 1991–2014 : 1) the party and the party-modified constructions of the parliamentary support of governmental cabinets are dominating; 2) out of the pure party support the coalitional is prevailing; 3) in the party-modified support the single-party is dominating; 4) out of the party and party-modified support the support prevails based on the party majority; 5) out of the party and non-party support the support based on the majority is dominating; 6) in the non-party support the support is dominating based on the non-party minority, modified by the party mandates; 7) out of the party and non-party support the modified type of the governmental support is prevailing (through involvement of additional party/non-party mandates). In the context of the interrelation of governments duration (as one of the government stability indexes) and the type of parliamentary support in Eastern Europe within 1991–2014 the situation is s follows:

**Table 3.** The governments duration (in the years), formed according to different types of parliamentary support, in the countries of Eastern Europe (1990–2014)<sup>10</sup>

Country	SPMJ	SPMJ+	CMJ	CMJ+	SPMN+	CMN+	NPMJ	NPMJ+	NPMN+	AS	Total
Azerbaijan	–	2,59	–	4,91	0,41	3,31	–	–	–	1,51	2,09
Belarus	–	–	–	–	–	–	2,80	2,78	–	2,29	2,72
Armenia	1,91	–	1,40	–	1,07	2,07	–	–	–	–	1,35
Georgia	1,12	1,12	2,17	–	–	1,46	–	–	–	0,54	1,21
Moldova	2,03	1,63	1,42	0,83	–	–	–	–	–	–	1,57
Russia	3,10	1,37	–	–	0,66	3,12	–	–	0,68	–	1,46
Ukraine	–	0,91	1,18	1,54	–	1,11	–	–	1,03	–	1,11
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,04</b>	<b>1,52</b>	<b>1,54</b>	<b>2,43</b>	<b>0,71</b>	<b>2,21</b>	<b>2,80</b>	<b>2,78</b>	<b>0,89</b>	<b>1,45</b>	<b>1,64</b>

In Azerbaijan the most long-lasting governmental cabinets are those formed with the support of coalitional majority, modified by the non-party mandates, and the least long-lasting are the governmental cabinets formed with the support of the single-party minority, modified by the non-party mandates. In Byelorussia the most long-lasting governments are the ones formed on the basis of simple non-party majority modified by the non-party mandates. In Armenia the most long-lasting governmental cabinets are the ones formed on the basis of coalitional minority support, complemented by the non-party mandates, as well as on the basis of the single-party majority support. However, the least

<sup>10</sup> Designations: SPMJ – single-party majority; SPMJ+ – single-party majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; SPMN+ – single-party minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMJ – coalition majority; CMJ+ – coalition majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMN+ – coalition minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; NPMJ – non-party majority; NPMJ+ – non-party majority, supplemented by party MPs; NPMN+ – non-party minority, supplemented by party MPs; AS – absence of support.

long-lasting governmental cabinets are the ones formed on the basis of the single-party minority support, complemented by the non-party mandates. In Georgia the most long-lasting governmental cabinets are those formed on the basis of coalitional majority, and the least long-lasting are the ones which do not rely upon the parliamentary support. In Moldova the most long-lasting governments rely upon the support of the single-party majority. However, the less long-lasting governments rely upon the support of the coalitional majority, complemented by the non-party mandates. In Russia the governments which rely upon the support of the single-party majority and support of coalitional minority complemented by the non-party mandates are equally stable. However, the unstable governmental cabinets rely upon the support of the single-party minority complemented by non-party mandates and on the support of non-party minority complemented by the party deputies' mandates. In Ukraine which is characterized by less stable governments in the region in general, the most long-lasting are the governments relying upon the support of coalitional majority complemented by the non-party mandates, and the least stable are the ones relying upon the support of the single-party majority complemented by the non-party mandates. Generally, the most long-lasting governmental cabinets in Eastern Europe are formed on the basis of the support of simple non-party majority or on the basis of the support of non-party majority modified by the party mandates. The non-party support (namely, modified) is more stable than the party (namely modified). However, the least long-lasting governments in the region are the ones based on the support of the single-party minority complemented by the non-party mandates and on the support of the non-party minority complemented by the non-party mandates and on the support of non-party minority complemented by the party mandates. In the context of the party support of governments, more long-lasting governments make the following constructions: 1) coalitional majorities and coalitional minorities complemented by the non-party mandates; 2) out of single-party and coalitional – coalitional; 3) out of party and party with the non-party mandates – party (without modifications by the non-party mandates); 4) out of majority and minority governments (including with the modification by the non-party mandates) – majority governments. Some specifications in the course of the governmental stability and the nature of parliamentary support of governments in the Eastern Europe should be made on the basis of accounting of the governmental stability index:

**Table 4.** Indexes of the governments formed according to the different types of parliamentary support in the countries of Eastern Europe (1990–2014)<sup>11</sup>

Country	SPMJ	SPMJ+	CMJ	CMJ+	SPMN+	CMN+	NPMJ	NPMJ+	NPMN+	AS	Total
Azerbaijan	–	0,53	–	1,00	0,44	0,67	–	–	–	0,28	0,53
Belarus	–	–	–	–	–	–	0,56	0,54	–	0,32	0,52
Armenia	0,38	–	0,29	–	0,29	0,43	–	–	–	–	0,31
Georgia	0,26	0,27	0,50	–	–	0,48	–	–	–	0,22	0,31
Moldova	0,69	0,42	0,47	0,21	–	–	–	–	–	–	0,51
Russia	0,69	0,35	–	–	0,18	0,73	–	–	0,18	–	0,36
Ukraine	–	0,23	0,44	0,31	–	0,22	–	–	0,20	–	0,26
Total	0,51	0,36	0,43	0,51	0,30	0,51	0,56	0,54	0,19	0,27	0,40

The specifications are about the following: 1) governments based on the party and non-party support, are almost equally stable; 2) in the context of the single-party or coalitional variants of the support coalitional governments are the most stable; 3) in the context of simple or modified constructions of the governmental support simple ones are more stable; 4) in the context of majority (including modified) or minority (just modified) less stable are the governments formed with the support of parties/coalitions of majority; 5) among constructions of the party support of governments the less stable are the governments relying upon the support of the single-party majority, complemented by the non-party mandates, and the single-party minority complemented by the non-party mandates. The party model of the governmental support by its governmental stability is similar to the non-party model of the governments' support.

<sup>11</sup> Designations: SPMJ – single-party majority; SPMJ+ – single-party majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; SPMN+ – single-party minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMJ – coalition majority; CMJ+ – coalition majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMN+ – coalition minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; NPMJ – non-party majority; NPMJ+ – non-party majority, supplemented by party MPs; NPMN+ – non-party minority, supplemented by party MPs; AS – absence of support.