

Технократичні/непартійні уряди в країнах Східної Європи (1991-2013): інституційні детермінанти формування та стабільності

Визначено поняття непартійний і технократичний уряд. Запропоновано розгляд базових теоретико-методологічних та емпіричних атрибутів технократичних урядів у країнах Східної Європи. Досліджено інституційні детермінанти формування і функціонування технократичних (непартійних) урядів у Східній Європі. Визначено різновиди технократичних (непартійних) урядів у регіоні. Окреслено параметри стабільності технократичних урядів у політичних режимах країн Східної Європи.

Ключові слова: виконавча влада, уряд, урядовий кабінет, технократичний/непартійний уряд, президент, президенціалізація, напівпрезиденталізм, стабільність урядів, політичний режим, Східна Європа.

Technocratic/non-party cabinets in Eastern European countries (1991-2013): institutional determinants of formation and stability

The article is dedicated to analyzing the concept of non-party and technocratic cabinets. The author offered a review of basic theoretical/methodological and empirical attributes of technocratic cabinets in Eastern Europe; investigated institutional determinants of technocratic (non-party) cabinets' formation and functioning in Eastern Europe; determined types of technocratic (non-party) cabinets in the region; outlined the parameters of technocratic cabinets stability in political regimes of Eastern Europe.

Keywords: executive, government, government cabinet, technocratic/non-party cabinet, president, presidentialisation, semi-presidentialism, cabinet stability, political regime, Eastern Europe.

Regularity of political development of most of world countries (including post-soviet in Eastern Europe) is the concentration of key authorities beyond the executive power institutes. The scientists view this phenomenon as an objective result of modern sovereignty evolution. It should be noted that *executive power* is the totality of state bodies and institutions which perform governmental and politico-governmental and administrative functions. Government is the apical point of the executive power system – it is one of the supreme power bodies, the competence of which is conditionally reduced to making the laws and fulfillment of tasks in the sphere of management. But still the political practice of post-soviet countries of Eastern Europe (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) in this respect demonstrates that their governments are disperse and constitute complex problem of their stability evaluation and the role of governmental and executive process. It is caused by several significant factors: *first of all*, almost all East-European countries, except for Moldova (which was parliamentary republic), as of 2013, were presidentially-parliamentary (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Russia and Ukraine) and parliamentary-presidential (Armenia and Georgia) half-presidential republics. Therefore, for all of them objective attribute of governmental relations was the concentration of executive power in the hands of presidents and government (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Russian and Ukraine) or only governments (МОЛДАВИЯ); secondly, the “government” phenomenon in East-European countries due to the differentiation of the government system is ambiguous – in some cases the government is actually the continuation of the president’s vertical, and in the others – it is positioned by the independent executive power institute. It is significantly reflected not only on the essence and functionality of the governments in dictatorial vertical but in the formation and positioning of different types of governments – party and nonparty/technocratic governments¹.

In the East-European countries during 1991-2013 non-party/technocratic governmental cabinets prevailed (in most cases). Moreover, these cabinets were more stable than party governments. These cabinets are methodologically inscribed into the government’s classification suggested by A. Lijphart: nonparty cabinets together with the cabinets formed by

¹ In this context, it should be understood that there are some politological delicacies of interpretation of such notions as «*executive power*». The matter is that several notions exist in the science for its designation: «*government*» – organization which conducts the administration in the country or its part; *governmental cabinet* is the form of government where the prime-minister or president form the cabinet of ministers with the consignment of correspondent ministries to the latter; *cabinet of ministers* is the committee formed out of the most important government members, particularly, prime-minister (president) and ministers. We agree (in the context of constitutional governmental systems functioning in the analyzed selection of the countries of constitutional governmental systems) with the determination of the government of M. Gallaher, M. Laver, P. Mair. This is the «totality of the older politicians formally appointed by the president, though, practically elected by the prime-minister on condition of consultations with the governmental parties». Though, we state that if it refers to the apolitical actors and formation of nonparty/technocratic governments, the demand should be added about the consultations with the parties and the necessity to support the parliamentary government composition. Therefore, the «*government*» is interpreted as the fixed composition of the leading politicians and/or specialists formally appointed by the president, but actually elected by the prime-minister (or by the prime-minister and president) who have the right to make the decisions on all the issues related to the competence of executive power branch. See more in details.: P. Collin, *Dictionary of Government and Politics*, Wyd. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, Chicago-London 1998, s. 128.; M. Gallaher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992, s. 179.

the experts constitute the technocratic governments (though, it was methodologically more justified, is the use of the term «non-party governments»)². Thus, for this reason, there arises the whole number of theoretical and methodological questions: 1) what is the difference between nonparty cabinets and the cabinets formed by experts; 2) what is the essence of technocratic mechanism in the governmental formation; 3) why the governments and the governments formed by non-party experts in the East-European countries make up most cabinets; 4) why the nonparty governments are more stable than the party governments. Primary place is occupied by the problem of correlation of technocratic governments with the institutional mechanisms of functioning of East-European countries' modern political system (political systems, party systems and electoral systems, etc.). In solving the massive of the said problems it is necessary to gradually approach the issue of what the nonparty/technocratic cabinets are and to the reason of formation and stability of nonparty or technocratic governments in Eastern Europe.

First of all it should be noted that *technocratic government* – is a conventional category as it combines the two types of cabinets: nonparty, and governments formed by experts (not obligatorily nonparty). Based on the fact that technocratic cabinets are not an instantaneous phenomena but paly a significant role in many other world countries, two temporal sets of countries should be singled out where such cabinets acquire their implementation: 1) *the countries* where nonparty governments and governments formed by experts have their permanent implementation; 2) *the countries* where formation of technocratic cabinets is an exclusion from the practice of party governments formation (these are usually the countries where the parliamentary model of government formation is employed). In this case the technocratic governments permanence also has its *initial mobility*: very frequently, the formation of such governments is caused by constitutional attributes of political systems (this refers to non-parliamentary way of cabinets formation), political regimes (as it was noticed that nonparty governments are more often formed in the authoritarian and transitional or hybrid regimes), political traditions, aspiration of implementation of social and economic reforms, etc.

In political literature different notions are used for technocratic governments determination: actually nonparty, technical, official, transitional, bureaucratic, expert, ect. On the one hand, there is no sense in defining this or that categorical name – but this applies usually to the countries where technocratic governments are considered the exception. In the East-European countries where, as it was said before, technocratic governments are considered traditional or constant practice (because they constitute relative or absolute majority of governments formation in most countries of the region), determination of their

² A. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999, s. 90-115.

derived attributes (and varieties within technocratic cabinets) is considered the primary objective as it can differently testify to their stability.

In the technocratic governments determination we proceed from the notion that immanent meaning has the factor that the governments include the professionals who may or may not belong (and usually do not belong) to this or that party, but *their party identification does not matter*. Though, in more detailed context, evaluation of ministerial composition of technocratic cabinets has the additional meaning and can imply the unexpected reasons of prolongation of these or those cabinets operation. Generally, obvious *hypothesis*: existence of technocratic governments in a number of countries for which they are not basic, is usually short-lived (until the party-based government is formed or to resolve the social and economic/political crisis); existence of technocratic governments in the countries for which these cabinets are traditionally dominant, is more long-lasting, because these cabinets are formed for realization of basic political courses.

Technocratic nature in East-European countries has become leading through the prism of formation of consistent executive structures during 1991-2013. In this case let us stress that among the East-European countries the practice of technocratic cabinets formation looks as follows: 1) in Armenia, nonparty cabinets found their implementation at the dawn of independence and actually ceased to exist as basic ones in 1999 when the first party-based government was formed – generally, 50 percent of Armenian governments during analyzed period were technocratic; 2) in *Azerbaijan* the part of nonparty cabinets in the governmental structure is considered absolute (only technocratic governments are formed here); 3) in *Byelorussia* the situation is similar to the previous – nonparty cabinets only; 4) in *Georgia* nonparty cabinets are basic – over 80 percent of the government existing during 1991-2013; 5) in *Moldova* technocratic cabinets are considered the exception from the party construction of governments – only one nonparty government was formed; 6) in *Russia* only nonparty governments are formed, which, in their today's activity are oriented towards the single-party majority, and previously were formed on the basis of situational majority in the parliament; 7) in *Ukraine*, like in Georgia, the technocratic cabinets are dominant, and they are formed different ways through the influence of these or those electoral systems. Generally, it is obvious that only nonparty governments are commonly found in Azerbaijan, Byelorussia and Russia; more nonparty governments (than the party governments) – for Georgia and Ukraine; and formation of nonparty governments is an exception only for Armenia and (especially) Moldova.

Formation of technocratic cabinets in the East-European countries takes place according to the two scenarios: parliamentary and non-parliamentary /presidential. In the course of *parliamentary governmental formation* nonparty governments and expert governments occur most frequently when the politicians (representing different political directions or pragmatic /populist political parties) can not reach a common ground as to the cabinet

formation on traditional party basis (this refers to the single-party or coalitional governments of majority or minority), but the parliament dissolution (second scenario possible) is considered undesirable. Besides, very often non-party cabinets (particularly expert governments) occur when a country undergoes the political and socio-economic crises (when it becomes impossible to form great coalitions and governments of the national unity as an additional scenario of crisis recovery)³. The similar situation was for example in Moldova, when, during 1999-2001 the nonparty government was operating headed by D. Bragish (in this case nonparty government must have political support). Besides, such types of technocratic governments (although on the basis of the other reasons of formation) were popular in Armenia in 1990-1999.

Although, the process of technocratic governments formation by the sample of Moldova in Eastern Europe is an exception, because in most cases non-party cabinets are considered as basic for the rest of the countries of this region – Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and mostly Ukraine (except for 2006-2010). In the latter the nonparty cabinets formation have different reasons: 1) peculiarities of party-electoral systems; 2) peculiarities of political regimes; 3) peculiarities of governmental systems. All the stated requirements and indexes are generally reduced to the determination of a special role of *president* in the process of government formation. Therefore, very frequently, nonparty governments are simultaneously the governments formed (*or headed*) by *presidents* – Byelorussia (from 1994), Azerbaijan (from 1994), Georgia (in 1995-2004), sometimes Russia (six cabinets during 1991-2013) and Ukraine (1995-1996). In this respect on the basis of comparative calculations conducted as based on the example of East-European countries it becomes obvious that the technocratic governments in the parliamentary models of cabinet formation last generally 1,37 years. (index of governmental stability– 0,34), in presidential (or non-parliamentary) models of cabinets formation – 1,62 years (governmental stability index – 0,41).

In this case it should be noted that the peculiarity of nonparty governments formation (as main type of technocratic governments) in most East-European countries is determined by the fact that this is the type of governments which allows an informal increase of presidential authorities which are anyway very strong. Generally, the following tendency can be noticed: technocratic cabinets dominate in those countries, constitutional systems of which are half-presidential or presidentially-parliamentary and as “purely” presidential. By forming nonparty /technocratic cabinets, the presidents obtain an additional influence on political process determination – it happens on the basis of direct /indirect influence on the choice (appointment) of ministers. It means that prevailing of nonparty ministers (ministers-experts) becomes justified when the president wishes to save his/her authorities. Besides, this is positively reflected in the hypothetical character of the acting president reelection, therewith

³ J. Linz, *Introduction: Some Thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist Europe*, [w:] R. Taras, *Postcommunist Presidents*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997, s. 11.

limiting the chances for obtaining the president's position by the prime-minister (or by the other agent in the plane of power authorization distribution). Thus, informal "authorization" of political regimes takes place and becomes stronger. Therefore, very frequently the researchers relate technocratic (nonparty) governments to the existence of *authoritarian and hybrid (or transitional) political regimes*⁴.

The said attribute of appointment /role of nonparty governments is actualized in those authoritarian regimes where the prime-minister does not have the perspectives for obtaining the president's authorities as a consequence of election win (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia). Weakening of the so-called "*personalism*" (on the basis of nonparty governments formation by the presidents) of the head of the state is characteristic of transitional and some authoritarian regimes, when the prime-minister is the member of «forceful» group (the group of «security forces») of the executive vertical (Russia and Ukraine). The matter is that in these regimes prime-minister sometimes is encouraged to increase his political significance from the point of view of electoral preferences over the presidential elections. To sum up, it should be noted that in most East-European countries (especially in those with the authoritarian political regime) nonparty governments are the instrument of transformation of representational democracy ideas into the idea of «*delegational or personal dictatorship*»⁵. The problem is that the delegation contact characteristic of the representational democracy on the basis of systemic unification of political parties does not survive. The best example of parliamentary democracy is the case when the electorate delegates its own preferences to some members of the parliament (certain parties), the members of the parliament (party) – parliamentary majority, parliamentary majority – to the prime-minister, the latter – to the politicians (or ministers) in the cabinets, and only ministers – to the public (nonpolitical) officials. It means that the electorate forms several agents (and not only one). In contrast to this, nonparty governments do not stick to the formula – interestingly, the representativity formula is violated not only in presidential republics (often it is justified and is considered as the sample of such political systems), but also in half-presidential. As to the latter, it should be noted that half-presidentialism can follow different models of party/nonparty governments formation – parliamentary and presidential.

From logical point of view, the assumption is obvious that nonparty (or technocratic) governments in the Eastern Europe are positioned as an *example of presidential cabinets*. Controversial is the conclusion that party governments are parliamentary in their initial composition. This is related to the system of government where party and nonparty cabinets are formed: the first are characteristic to the parliamentary systems (Moldova since 2001) or

⁴ O. Amorim Neto, K. Strøm, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 2006, vol 36, s. 619-643.

⁵ K. Strøm, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2010.; K. Strøm, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.

half-presidential premier-presidential systems (Moldova till 2000, Armenia since 2007, Georgia since 2012, Ukraine in 2006–2010) the others are peculiar for the presidential systems (in particular, during some time in East-European countries) and half-presidential presidential-parliamentary systems (the other countries of the region during the other periods and mostly Armenia and Ukraine). It is also empirically obvious that formation of nonparty cabinets or party governments more frequently takes place in *half-presidential* systems. The matter is that the president elected through the procedure of national elections has immanently more influence on the cabinets formation than the president elected within the parliamentary procedures. Besides, it is intuitively understandable that the president's influence on the appointment of new nonparty ministers is determined by the electoral preferences and electoral power of political actors.

Generally, it is hypothetically right to think that *increase of nonparty ministers and accordingly nonparty cabinets takes place*: as a result of implementation of half-presidential (and, especially, presidential-parliamentary) and presidential systems; as a consequence of prevailing of the separated majority and minority systems (but not in the systems of unified majority, at least on condition of premier-presidential variants of half-presidentialism); through electoral changeability increase; through the increase of the number of agents in the process of cabinets formation; through aggravation of the procedure of parliamentary majority acquisition to support this or that government (from the point of view of parliamentary way of governments formation is transformed in the situation of minority governments); on the basis of increasing the fractionalization of the parliament (because the number of political actors is increased who can influence the formation of the single-party majority government and nonparty government endowed with the support of single-party majority); under conditions of socially-economic crises or the periods when socially-economic development was low; in the context of the elements of authoritative and hybrid regimes prevailing where the ministers' non-partism facilitates the presidents' authorities augmentation; in the context of the presidents' legislative authorities increase⁶.

On the basis of complex evaluation of determinants of technocratic cabinets formation the following conclusions were made: 1) such governments are dominating in presidential and half-presidential president-parliamentary systems – number of technocratic governments is decreased in premier-presidential systems, and it is the lowest under conditions of parliamentarism; 2) majority election systems most of all support the formation of non-party / technocratic governments; mixed electoral systems facilitate less the nonparty governments formation; proportional electoral systems least of all implement nonparty governments; 3) the number of technocratic governments and nonparty governments increases from

⁶ O. Amorim Neto, K. Strøm, *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies*, Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion“, convened by Hanne Marthe Narud, Ola Listhaug, at the Joint Sessions of the Nordic Political Science Association, Aalborg, Denmark, August 15-17, 2002.

democratic regimes to hybrid/transitional regimes, and the greatest – in the authoritarian political regimes. In this case the stability of technocratic governments increases in authoritarian regimes (over 2 years) which is an indirect evidence of the role of nonparty governments as the structures facilitating the personalization /presidentialization of political regimes (despite the hybrid political regimes where nonparty cabinets operate only 1,23 years). Generally, technocratic cabinets in Eastern Europe operate longer than the party cabinets (as above). It takes place simultaneously with the increase of nonparty governments and nonparty ministers (although, not in all countries).

Table 1. Political preconditions of formation and stability of nonparty /technocratic governments in the East-European countries (1991–2011)⁷

Country	Political systems	Electoral system	Political regime	nonparty/all governments, №	Stability of non-party governments
Azerbaijan (1991–1995)	ПП	Mixed	Authoritarian	5/5	0,85 p.
Azerbaijan (1995–2011)	НП1	Majority	Authoritarian	5/5	2,96 p.
Byelorussia (1991–1994)	ПАР	Majority	Hybrid	1/1	2,80 p.
Byelorussia (1994–1996)	ПП	Majority	Authoritarian	1/1	2,29 p.
Byelorussia (1996–2011)	НП1	Majority	Authoritarian	6/6	2,34 p.
Armenia (1991–2007)	НП1	Mixed	Hybrid	8/12	1,07 p.
Armenia (2007–2011)	НП2	Mixed	Hybrid	0/4	-
Georgia (1991–1995)	НП2	Mixed	Hybrid	3/4	1,22 p.
Georgia (1995–2003)	ПП	Mixed	Hybrid	5/5	1,63 p.
Georgia (2004–2011)	НП1	Mixed	Hybrid	6/6	1,25 p.
Moldova (1991–2001)	НП2	Proportional	Hybrid	1/7	1,16 p.
Moldova (2001–2011)	ПАР	Proportional	Hybrid	0/6	-
Russia (1991–1993)	НП2	Mixed	Hybrid	3/3	0,66 p.
Russia (1993–2011)	НП1	Mixed	Authoritarian	11/11	1,57 p.
Ukraine (1991–1995)	НП1	Majority	Hybrid	4/4	0,88 p.
Ukraine (1995–1996)	ПП	Majority	Hybrid	2/2	0,53 p.
Ukraine (1996–2006)	НП1	Mixed	Hybrid	7/7	1,32 p.
Ukraine (2006–2010)	НП2	Proportional	Democratic	0/4	-
Ukraine (2010–2011)	НП1	Mixed	Hybrid	1/1	0,96 p.

It is additionally evidenced (as exemplified by the Eastern Europe) by the following political and institutional *determinants*: 1) society segmentation (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Ukraine); 2)

⁷ Conventional symbols: ПАР – parliamentary system; ПП – presidential system; НП1 – president-parliamentary half-presidential system; НП2 – premier-presidential half-presidential system. When evaluating the influence of electoral system on formation of party/nonparty governments the stress is made on the temporal component i.e. on what electoral system was prevailing in the said period of time. And therefore the divergences are possible in the current determination of the election system type, as well as the dominating type of the electoral system in its temporal determination. For instance, in Russia the proportional system of lists has been operating since 2007, although, in 1993–2011 parallel mixed electoral system was dominating.

aspiration to provide for the clannish interests (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia at the beginning of 1990-s, Georgia, at the intersection of 1990-s – beginning of 2000-s); 3) providing for the political regime support (especially authoritarian – Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Russia); 4) idea of governmental efficiency increase (Georgia and Russia); 5) provision of the neutralizing position in the systems of divided minority, when the government actor does not have the expressive influence on the political process (different times Armenia, Russia and Ukraine); 6) separation of party systems (Russia before 2003, Ukraine before 2006, Byelorussia, etc.); 7) presidentialization/personalization of political systems (all world countries, except for Moldova); 8) peculiarities of electoral systems, especially majority or minority (Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia before 2007 and Ukraine before 2006 and since 2010); 9) formal and actual «weakness» of prime-ministers (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Ukraine); 10) incompetence of procedures of governmental cabinets responsibility in front of the parliaments (all countries, except for Moldova and Armenia). Consequentially, very frequently “party cabinets” (according to the principles of their formation) in practice can not be defined as such. Along with this, they can not be characterized as technocratic (these cabinets should be considered separately)⁸.

The conclusion can also be drawn that the increase of the amount of nonparty ministers (in a wider context technocratic cabinets) depends upon such *determinants*: 1) increase of party systems fractionalization (especially noticeable in case of presidential and president-parliamental political systems when the impossibility of government formation on the basis of the presidential party leads to the result that the president uses direct (unilateral) instruments of influence on political process/place of governmental cabinet in it⁹; though, in parliamentary and most of half-presidential systems, and particularly, premier-presidential systems, strong parliament fragmentation leads to the temporary and nonparty cabinets formation¹⁰) –according to the party activity index efficiency¹¹; 2) decrease of bureaucratic apparatus professionalization (as the head of the government / president have to be less concerned about the necessity of political inspection of the cabinet decisions¹²);

⁸ Along with this, judging by the fact that the involvement of nonparty ministers takes place not only into the technocratic cabinets, but also into some party governments, it should be assumed that from methodological point of view the formation of governmental nonparty/technocratic cabinets or involvement of nonparty (expert) ministers into the party governments takes place not only in the authoritarian or transitional and hybrid countries but also in democratic. For example, it is particularly stressed by O. Amorim Neto, D. Samuels, see.: O. Amorim Neto, D. Samuels, *Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: a Global Perspective*, “Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies” 2010, vol 1, nr 1.

⁹ O. Amorim Neto, *The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas*, “Comparative Political Studies” 2006, vol 39, nr 4, s. 415-440.; P. Schleiter, E. Morgan-Jones, *Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2009, vol 48, nr 5, s. 665-693.

¹⁰ J. Linz, *Introduction: Some Thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist Europe*, [w:] R. Taras, *Postcommunist Presidents*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997, s. 11.

¹¹ M. Laakso, R. Taagepera, *The Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe*, “Comparative Political Studies” 1979, vol 12, s. 3-27.

¹² L. Graham, *Transients and Careerists in Latin America*, [w:] A. Farazmand, *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997.; G. Peters, *Bureaucrats and Political Appointees in European Democracies: Who's Who and Does It Make Any Difference?*, [w:] A. Farazmand, *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997.

3) aggravation (or negative character) of economic situation in Ukraine¹³; 4) weakening of the country democratization level or the country development in authoritarian direction (through the party system weakening).

Formation of most nonparty governmental cabinets in Eastern Europe, according to O. Protsyk are connected with the fact that in the countries where they are implemented, operating party systems are weak (this in temporal respect applies to all countries of the sample analyzed, majority systems or mixed parallel electoral systems, as mentioned above). And in the countries with more institutionalized party systems and democratized political regimes, usually party governmental cabinets operate – nowadays this is Moldova, Armenia and Ukraine (during 2006-2010), Georgia (from 2012). And vice versa, in the countries with the low party mobilization level (and party systems mobilization) in case of political regimes authoritarianization technocratic (nonparty) governments dominate¹⁴.

According to O. Protsyk, besides nonparty specification of the government members, one of the technocratic governments peculiarities is the factor that main criterion for this or that minister appointment is *technical specialization* in a certain sphere of governmental activity. This does not mean that party official is not taken into account but it means that the party component is always secondary, as party contacts diminish the chances of candidates to the ministers' positions, especially to the positions of the ministers in key economic and «forceful» ministries. With regard to this, logical inclusion of nonparty cabinets and the cabinets consisting of experts into the category of technocratic governments is justified. *The difference between these types of technocratic governments* is in the following comparison: 1) *governments formed out of experts*, can be formed according to the partially party components (i.e. the expert can simultaneously reflect certain party and ideological motives), but still paramount importance in this case is able to efficiently solve the tasks set for the cabinet or ministry; 2) *nonparty cabinets* in the process of their initiation and formation are determined by the primary direction towards exclusion of any (or all) party and ideological components, but here the ability to efficiently solve the problems set in front of the government is determined on the basis of its nonparty composition. It means that the government made out of experts can be a logical project of the party cabinet, but here the positions are acquired not by the politicians as the party functionaries but the experts from the parties who form the government in proportional representation according to the quotas of different parties or party (depending upon the mechanism of how the majority is provided – by coalition or on one-party basis).

Elites and government (usually the presidents, as it refers to the half-presidential president-parliamentary systems where the nonparty cabinets dominate now) in the East-European countries

¹³ O. Amorim Neto, D. Samuels, *Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: a Global Perspective*, "Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies" 2010, vol 1, nr 1.

¹⁴ O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in the Western CIS countries: Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority in Ukraine*, "Practice" 2005.; O. Protsyk, *Institutionalizing Cabinet Government in the Western CIS Countries*, Paper Prepared at NISPAcee Conference, Kyiv, Ukraine, May 16-18, 2007.

the technocratic governments are considered as the factor facilitating the *professionalism* of the government operation. Ministers-technocrats (experts or nonparty), as a rule, have good knowledge and enough professional experience in the spheres they are responsible for. Consequently, it is expected that in their decision-making they will be governed by the economic efficiency factor, and not by the specific political interests. It is believed that the ministers of technocratic cabinet are more able to resist the pressure of lobbying groups, and are more ready to introduce the unpopular economic and social reforms. Empirical research shows the contradictory character of the similar expectations. Thus, the examples of more successful activity of technocratic governments as compared to the party governments can be found only in the reforms initiation, but not as to their introduction or provision of irreversibility of such reforms¹⁵.

Technocratic governmental cabinets can introduce the whole number of problems for *their efficient activity* (in the internal and external respect). This is mostly reflected in the following decision-making respects of nonparty cabinets: 1) changing of the state policy and governmental orientation; 2) fragmentation of decision-making process in democratic/transitional regimes, and one-sidedness of the decision in authoritarian/transitional regimes; 3) the idea of ministerial interests limitation. This allows making the following conclusion: specific orientation of certain ministers prevents collegial production of state governmental policy¹⁶.

This is again mainly due to low political role of the party system. Main way out of the situation, as it was clearly demonstrated by the practice of East-European countries where party governments operated or still operate, is the introduction of more proportional varieties of electoral systems (in Moldova proportional system of lists operates; in Ukraine it also operated for the time of party governments formation; in Armenia, where party cabinets are popular, the system of additional membership is used where the proportional representation dominates¹⁷). And this will allow to increase the deputies' responsibility for the cabinets' activity and decrease the variability of deputies' position in operating the parliamentary majority. The common conclusion as to all East-European countries is that technocratic cabinets are the reason of the party and electoral systems weaknesses and the absence of the incentives of institutional consolidation of the latter: in most countries

¹⁵ S. Haggard, R. Kaufman, *The Political economy of democratic transitions*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1995.

¹⁶ O. Protsyk, *Process of decision-making on the central level of governmental authorities: analysis of the problems and suggestions as to their solving*, «Parliament» 2001, nr 2, 17 s.; O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in Ukraine: The Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority*, [w:] A. Rosenbaum, J. Nemeč, *Democratic Governance in CEE Countries: Challenges and Responses for the XXI Century*, Wyd. NISPAcee 2006, s. 15-26.; E. Morgan-Jones, P. Schleiter, *Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia 1994-2003*, "Post-Soviet Affairs" 2004, vol 20, nr 2, s. 132-163.; N. Parison, *Russia: Public Administration Reform in Russia: Issues and Options*, "ECSPE": Conference on Post-Election Strategy, Moscow, April 5-7, 2000.; O. Protsyk, *Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine*, "Europa-Asia Studies" 2003, vol 55, nr 7, s. 1077-1095.; K. Wolczuk, *The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation*, Wyd. Central European University Press 2002.

¹⁷ The conditions for strengthening the political component of governmental cabinets technically (formally) exist in the other countries as well (except for Byelorussia). But in their cases (it is especially noticeable in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia) the role of parties in governmental cabinets is decreased on the basis of single-party dominating and implementation of traditional model of nonparty governments. Therefore, dominating parties only provide for the support of cabinets, to be more exact – the regimes. It is most obvious in case of proportional system of Russia: today only the party "Yedinaya Rossiya" («United Russia») (ER) gains more than the half of State Duma, and therefore its influence is enough for conserving the technocraticity of governmental cabinets and regime in the country.

the formation of the party and electoral systems takes place usually through the implementation of clientalist and not ideological lines¹⁸ (it is less related to Moldova, of which the technocratic cabinets are not characteristic). Domination of horizontal/vertical clientalist relations due to this is a main reason of the fact that political parties become especially «vulnerable» depending upon the pressure of the governmental process and provision of the requirements of divergent groups of interests: one group of countries is characterized by the combination of a significant fragmentation of political systems, as well as by the clientalism of the latter in providing it or the other governmental cabinet with the majority (Armenia and Ukraine); in the other group of countries party systems are not significantly fragmented, therefore the said process takes place usually around the clientalist procedures (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Russia).

The other peculiarity of nonparty (technocratic) governments in Eastern Europe is the determination of their *subordination and responsibility*. In the countries where the party systems are weak and technocratic cabinets are formed exclusively due to the clientalist conditions (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia before 2012, and Russia since 2003¹⁹), the presidents are awarded strong powers. In such states the party and electoral features of responsibility of cabinets acquire minimum meaning. Therefore, technocratic cabinets in these systems are subordinate to and responsible only in front of the president (though, formally, in front of the parliament as well). In the countries with the weak party systems resulting in technocratic governments formation (Ukraine, especially, before 2006, Russia, especially before 2003 and Armenia before 1999), the latter bear double responsibility and subordination. This is clearly testified by the practice of technocratic cabinets resignation in Ukraine: the part of them ceased their authorities on the initiative of the president, and the other part – on the parliaments' initiative. In these systems only the formal procedures are used in correlations between the government, president and parliament (it is related to the unilateral control of governments resignation procedures). In these cases symmetric authorities on the government operation termination in many respects differentiates and “confuses” the activity of the members of latter. This is especially obvious in the situations where the president and the parliament are not considered the representatives of one sphere of political development but are the competing actors of the government resignation procedures. In these cases the efficiency of governmental cabinets

¹⁸ H. Kitschelt, *The Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies*, “Party Politics” 1995, vol 1, nr 4, s. 447-472.; O. Protsyk, *Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine*, “Europa-Asia Studies” 2003, vol 55, nr 7, s. 1077-1095.

¹⁹ K. Gërkhani, A. Schram, *Clan-based Polarized Voting: Empirical Evidence*, “Journal of Democracy” 2005, vol 14.; K. Gërkhani, A. Schram, *Clientelism and polarized voting: empirical evidence*, “Public Choice” 2009, vol 141, nr 3-4, s. 305-317.; M. Johnston, *Corruption and Democratic Consolidation*, Princeton University: Conference on Democracy and Corruption, Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies, March 12 1999.; B. Sidikov, *New or Traditional? “Clans”, Regional Groupings, and State in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan*, “Berliner Osteuropa” 2004, vol 21, s. 68-74.; S. Stokes, *Political Clientelism*, [w:] C. Boix, S. Stokes, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Wyd. Oxford Handbooks Online 2007, s. 604-627.; J. Wedel, *Clans, Cliques and Captured States: Rethinking “Transition” in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, “Journal of International Development” 2003, vol 15, s. 427-440.

is immanently aggravated: the latter face the necessity of conducting the controversial or competitive courses of initial actors²⁰.

Therefore, technocratic governments are positioned as the ones contradicting to the idea of «*governmental cabinets*» (to be more exact, the idea of «cabinet administration»). The essence of the latter is that the political and governmental platform is formed, where the prime-minister is usually «the first out of equal», and the cabinet meeting is the arena where all the important governmental decisions are made on the basis of participation of all ministers. In its pure form this model of government is considered ideal but not always practical²¹. Therefore, today some works exist proving that the governments can be more or less collegial²². But collegiality have the double meaning: 1) collective ratification of governmental decisions; 2) collective responsibility of the members of cabinet for governmental decisions. In this respect the technocratic (nonparty and expert) nature of government is positioned as the most significant challenge to the *government collegiality*. Therefore, East-European nonparty cabinets face great amount of problems in the course of consolidated governmental decision -making. The most interesting is the fact that in most of the region countries the idea and practice of technocratic cabinets was becoming popular during first years of their post-soviet development²³. Though, in the course of time and deeper understanding of democracy and democratization (and their practical dimensions) the East-European countries were divided as to the formation and non-formation of technocratic governments: 1) Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Byelorussia and mostly Ukraine still keep to the principles of technocratic governments (in 2012 Georgia refused from this practice but its is too early to speak about the stability of this tendency); 2) Moldova and mostly Armenia focused on the formation of the party governments. In the *first groups* of countries the prime-ministers are positioned as the executive managers in the process of presidential initiatives realization²⁴; in the *second group* the presidents' positions are weakened (it is less characteristic of Armenia as the party of prime-ministers and presidents in this country is equal and the president is actually the “leader of nation”). As to the formation of technocratic governments in the first group of countries it is noteworthy that the role of the ministers there is determined by the presidential position and the strategy (by the sample of purely presidential systems²⁵ and in half-presidential president-parliamentary systems).

²⁰ O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in the Western CIS countries: Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority in Ukraine*, “Practice” 2005.

²¹ P. Weller, *Cabinet Government: An Elusive Ideal?*, “Public Administration” 2003, vol 81, s. 701

²² J. Blondel, N. Manning, *Do Ministers Do What They Say? Ministerial Unreliability, Collegial and Hierarchical Governments*, “Political Studies” 2002, vol 50, s. 455.

²³ O. Protsyk, *Institutionalizing Cabinet Government in the Western CIS Countries*, Paper Prepared at NISPAcee Conference, Kyiv, Ukraine, May 16-18, 2007.; O. Protsyk, *The Presidency and the Political Roles of Cabinets in the Western CIS Countries*, [w:] B. Connaughton, G. Sootla, G. Peters, *Politico-Administrative Relations at the Centre: Actors, Structures, and Processes Supporting the Core Executive*, Wyd. NISPAcee 2008, s. 113-128.

²⁴ O. Protsyk, *Domestic political institutions in Ukraine and Russia and their responses to EU enlargement*, “Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 2003, vol 25, nr 4, s. 427-442.

²⁵ O. Amorim Neto, *The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas*, “Comparative Political Studies” 2006, vol 39, nr 4, s. 415-440.

Generally, it is obvious that there are *two types of technocratic governments initiation* in the Eastern Europe: 1) the agreement between the president and politically non-structured and unstable parliamentary majority (characteristic of Ukraine before 2006, Russia before 2003); 2) reflection of presidentialization of political systems in the countries where the president is considered a main actor in the process of governmental appointments and resignations, and the parliament plays the role of the accompanying actor of the process (it occurs in all presidential and parliamentary systems of the Eastern Europe, when the president gains the support from pro-presidential party which has the majority in the parliament only except for Armenia during 1999–2007 and less for Ukraine since 2010). In this or that case the formation of technocratic governments is the consequence of existence of clientelist and structured parties and party systems. Subordination and internal-party weakness are the main factors of quantitative domination of technocratic governments in Eastern Europe. And the absence of ideological obligations and/or obligatory party principles of activity makes the institutional loyalty of technocratic cabinets especially dependent on the sanctions or rules stated in the constitutions. Therefore, in the president-parliamentary systems the nonparty governments are more presidential (especially in case of East-European countries), and in the premier-presidential systems – more parliamentary.

On the other hand, the president-parliamentary systems in the Eastern Europe are rather *authoritarian* (than transitional/hybrid) than premier-presidential or parliamentary. Therefore, among the East-European countries the cabinets usually have the strong support in the parliaments such as Russia, since 2003, Byelorussia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan (this is explained by the specificity of political regimes). Usually weak support is characteristic of Armenia before 1999, Ukraine before 2006, Russia before 2003., Moldova during 1999–2001. Though, in these and other countries through formation of technocratic governments the presidentialization(personalization) of the president's authorities takes (took) place as well as the prime-ministers' elimination as the competitor for «superiority».

All this means that the combination of models of half-presidentialism (or presidentialism) with the elements of majority or mixed election system in East-European countries causes formation of the very technocratic governments. In the countries not characterized by the pluralism tradition, the formation of party governments is also aggravated. This analogically influences the increase of the amount of non-party ministers who gain the positions in the cabinets which are formally considered party cabinets (as exemplified by the party governments in Moldova, Armenia and Ukraine). It means that the political systems where regimes are not institutionalized on the basis of political parties, are most likely to be characterized by formation of nonparty cabinets or party cabinets with the significant amount of nonparty ministers.

On the basis of appeal to different types of political systems (in particularly to the East-European countries) in the context of evaluating the determinants of technocratic cabinets, it should be stressed that the *stability* (or rather «surviving» of the latter) depends on *several factors*: 1) in parliamentary

and premier-presidential half-presidential systems – on the fact that the members of technocratic cabinet can not be governed by the logic of electoral preferences maximization; 2) in the president-parliamentary systems of half-presidentialism (as well in presidential systems) – from the logics of reserving the proactive presidents' authorities through which such governments are formed. In this last case (as exemplified by the East-European countries) *two scenarios* are possible: a) existing (and formation) of nonparty governments based on the logic of one-party majority – is the traditional variant of authoritarian or transitional regimes (or the systems of competitive authoritarianism) appealing for support of the party which is considered pro-presidential (Azerbaijan, Russia, and Georgia), or the support of nonparty agents to provide for the formal support of the government in the parliament (like in Byelorussia); 6) existing (and formation) of nonparty governments according to the system of divided majority or minority (majority requirement formally exists) – is the traditional variant of transitional /hybrid political regimes (before 1999 in Armenia, before 2006 and since 2010 in Ukraine before 2003 in Russia, etc.)²⁶.

Consequently, we can make the following conclusion: 1) technocratic/nonparty governments in Eastern Europe do not integrally incorporate the idea of technocratism as such; 2) technocratic/nonparty governments in Eastern Europe are traditional sample of government; 3) technocratic/nonparty governments in Eastern Europe prolong and enforce the parameters of presidentialization /personalization of presidents' power; 4) formation of technocratic/nonparty governments in Eastern Europe takes place on the basis of political delegation, transfer of rights and authorities – this does not obligatory provide for the efficiency of governments but only the executive power stability.

²⁶ Besides, in different political systems the technocratic (nonparty) cabinets provide for the *diverse articulation of political interests*: 1) in parliamentary or premier-parliamentary systems the articulation of vested interests is weak, except for the cases of economic and political crises; 2) in presidential and parliamentary models (especially those which operate under the presidentialism scheme) articulation of political interests becomes practically invisible or impossible, as in such systems the cabinet in its survival depends only upon the president's position. Besides, such factors of coexistence of the positions of prime-minister and president in the half-presidential systems, as cohabitation, turns out to be impossible for two reasons – formal or actual. *Formal* – those which are not motivated in the texts of constitutions: in case of direct opposition of the president and cabinet, the first has the right to dismiss the cabinet. *Actual* are about the fact that nonparty cabinet in conditions of opposition to the president does not have the articulated and consolidated political support in the parliament which is the cohabitation basis. In this sense, the previous conclusion about the combination of the roles of technocratic cabinets and authoritarian (hybrid) political regime has a special sounding.