

Феномен, історія становлення та ресурси «східного» регіоналізму й сепаратизму в контексті політизації російської ідентичності в українському донбасі (1991–2014)

У дослідженні розкрито суть «східного» регіоналізму (у форматі федералізму і сепаратизму) в структурі інституціоналізації російської ідентичності в українському Донбасі. Означено ознаки «східного» регіоналізму, федералізму та сепаратизму в процесі становлення російської етнічності в Україні. Запропоновано теоретико-методологічні уточнення з приводу політизації етнічності на основі регіонального поділу. Розглянуто індикатори регіоналізму в структурі інституціоналізації російської ідентичності в Україні. Оцінено ознаки та виокремлено етапи розвитку «східного» регіоналізму. Проаналізовано діяльність громадських організацій та партій у структурі «східного регіоналізму». Визначено ресурси «східного регіоналізму».

Ключові слова: регіоналізм, сепаратизм, федералізація, ірідентизм, політизація етнічності, автономія, державний устрій, національно-регіональна ідентичність, російська меншіна, «східний регіон», Донбас, Україна.

The phenomenon, history of formation and resources “eastern” regionalism and separatism in the context of politicization of russian identity in ukrainian donbas (1991–2014)

The article is dedicated to revealing the essence of “Eastern” regionalism (in the form of federalism and separatism) in the structure of institutionalization of Russian identity in Ukrainian Donbas. The author outlined the features of “Eastern” regionalism, federalism and separatism in the process of Russian ethnicity incipience in Ukraine, suggested theoretical-methodological clarifications about the politicization of ethnicity from the regional division, considered the indicators of regionalism in the structure of Russian identity institutionalization in Ukraine, appreciated features and singled out stages of “Eastern” regionalism, analyzed the activities of civil society organizations and political parties in the structure of the “eastern regionalism”, determined resources of “Eastern” regionalism.

Keywords: regionalism, separatism, federalization, irredentism, politicization of ethnicity, autonomy, government/polity, national-regional identity, Russian minority, "Eastern region", Donbas, Ukraine.

The events that took place in 2014 in two eastern regions of Ukraine – Donetsk and Luhansk regions – and were related with formation of so-called self-proclaimed "Donets People's Republic" and "Luhansk People's Republic" are interpreted in different ways by politics, experts, scientists and journalists: antiterrorist operation, war, terrorism, struggle for federalization or decentralization of power, but the most often as *separatism/irredentism* and *regionalism*. Certainly those event should be considered in complex, since they have both internal (inside Ukraine) and external (from outside of Ukraine) grounds. The problem of "internal" (on the territory of Ukraine) and "external" (outside the borders of Ukraine, and first of all on the part of Russia) *politicization of Russian national/ethnic minority* in Ukraine has a very important perspective in the context of reasons for regionalism and separatist/irredentism tendencies in Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. Consequently, phenomenon, history of emergence and resources of so-called "*eastern regionalism and separatism*" in section of the Russian minority politicization in Ukrainian Donbas will be the subject of the presented research. We call it "*Eastern*", since Donetsk and Luhansk regions ethno-politically form so-called "*eastern region*": those two regions directly border Russia and they are more industrialized, urbanized and russified than other regions of Ukraine¹. The language russification of in Donetsk and Luhansk regions is combined with very high share of ethnic Russians, which creates "strong majority of Russian-speaking population"² in the "eastern region", which, starting from 1991 (the Ukraine's Independence Act), the forces hostile to the idea of Ukrainian statehood use (whether effectively or not) as the main resource in the context of aspirations to regionalization or federalization, as well as irredentism or separatism. It requires scientific consideration, which we propose to perform as follows: *at first* to outline in theory and methodology the essence of regionalism and separatism phenomena, *then* to denote empirically the sources of "eastern" regionalism and separatism in section of the Russian minority politicization in Ukrainian Donbas, and *at conclusion* to forecast the ways of weakening and solving the problem of regionalism and separatism in "eastern region".

Regionalism and separatism/irredentism – on condition of their politicization with ethnic problem (i.e. when those phenomena are strategic goals of ethnic/national minorities' political activity) – are two mutually related concepts. At the same time, taken separately the category "regionalism" is much more complicated than categories "regionalism" and "irredentism". *Separatism* is aspiration of certain groups of population or organizations to separate themselves; it's

¹ V. Hesli, *Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns*, „Europe-Asia Studies” 1995, vol 47, nr 1, s. 19–21.

² D. Arel, *Federalism and the Language Factor in Ukraine*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Phoenix, 19–22 November 1992, s. 13.

a movement for complete separation of a part of the state and creation of a new state. *Irredentism* is the movement for other state's territory annexation on the basis of ethnic origin and/or prior owning it; it is a movement to annex territory of another state under slogans of ethnocultural unity of population. At the same time, *regionalism* is a complex concept, since the science has very many definitions and approaches to it. Without going deep into the essence of all of them (it isn't the scope of our research), we present the most popular definitions for regionalism: philosophical and historical concept that provides for possibility of integration processes within a 'region' as a certain group of countries, which are united by neighboring geographical situation and common features of culture, as the result of which the relevant groups of countries acquire status of actors of historical and political process³; state and process of a country's division into separate part and formation of several countries combination that act as one; form of state system, which is an intermediary type between federalism and unitarianism, i.e. is a unitary decentralized system⁴; mass political movement for self-government of the territories, which based on peculiarities of their historical development and cultural inheritance differ from other parts of the country; the way, by which certain political parties and other organizations promote the idea of the region's specificity and detachment⁵; ideology and strategy that are used with the purpose to ensure advantages for the region; totality of sociocultural and political movements that speak against unification, as well as centralization tendencies in many spheres of people's and state's life⁶; difference of regions in the nature of public relations, which lead to spread on the relevant territories of specific orientations and models of conduct, as well as regional identity⁷. P. Ukarainen believes that the term "regionalism" can cover miscellaneous processes, in particular movement for ethnic rights, separatism, decentralization of state system, transnational cooperation of administrative-territorial entities, regional network integration, etc.⁸ A. Harrel defines such categories of regionalism: social unity of ethnic, racial and language groups that reside in the same area; complementarity of business and industrial entities operating within the territory; commonality of general values related with culture, religion, historical traditions; and political solidarity⁹. Due to that regionalism should be understood sociologically and politically: what sociologists consider as regionalism, political science deems as totality of prerequisites for regionalism emergence.

³ A. Muradian, *Rebyonalyzm kak problema polytolohyy*, „Vestnyk Moskovskoho gosudarstvennogo unyversyteta“, Seryia 18: „Sotsyolohyia y polytolohyia“ 1995, vol 3, s. 83–89.

⁴ M. Koter, *Region polityczny – geneza, ewolucja i morfologia*, [w:] *Region, regionalizm – pojęcia i rzeczywistość*, Wyd. SOW 1993, s. 73.

⁵ E. Tompson, *Rebiony, rebionalizatsiia ta rebionalizm u suchasni Yevropi*, [w:] *Hlobalizatsiia. Rebionalizatsiia. Rebionalna polityka*, Wyd. Alma-mater 2002, s. 95–110.

⁶ A. Smyrnov, *Rebyonalyzm*, [w:] H. Semyhyn, *Polytycheskaia entsyklopedyia: V 2–kh t.*, Wyd. Mysl 2000, t. 2, s. 333.

⁷ O. Stehni, M. Churylov, *Rebionalizm v Ukraini yak ob'iekt sotsiologichnogo doslidzhennia*, Kiev 1998.

⁸ P. Jukarainen, *Any Space for the Postmodern Identity?*, [w:] *International Conference: „Border Regions in Transition“*, 14–18 June 1997.

⁹ A. Hurrel, *Expanding in Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics*, „Review of International Studies“ 1995, vol 21, nr 4.

Regionalism and separatism in the context of politicization of Russian ethnic/national minority in Donetsk and Luhansk regions is *substantial with regard to*: 1) quantitative correlation of ethnic Russians in “eastern region” (in Donetsk and Luhansk regions number of Russians is much higher¹⁰ than in other regions of Ukraine); 2) idea creating specificity of “eastern region”, which manifests in pulverized Russian national identity; 3) party creating specificity of “eastern region”, which is explained by a more progressive growth of pro-Russian public organizations and parties; 4) language specificity of “eastern region”, which is characterized by dominating use of the Russian language in Donetsk and Luhansk regions; 5) existence of attempts to form state creating concepts and practices¹¹.

In 1991–2014 politicization of Russian ethnicity in “eastern region” to a large extent was caused by challenges of *particular regionalism*, whose important aspects were danger of alienation due to political regionalization and differences between geopolitical orientations of different parts of population; violation of effective interaction on the line “center-region” and/or interregional relations; attempts of political and economical autonomation or federalization of the region; differentiation of social indicators and population’s quality of life; imperfection of administration on regional and local levels¹². “Eastern region” in ethno-national and political measurement is specific: the policy of assimilation made its impact, the language issue is rather acute and the influence of “Russian factor” on consciousness and outlook of population is felt. That results in heterogeneity of ethnic, political and cultural identification of “eastern region”. It manifests in the fact that although certain political circles of Donbas espoused center-directed disintegration processes in the region, in general the issue of Russia-oriented regionalism and autonomism (as its consequence) before 2014 arose sporadically and didn’t always constitute system-wide

¹⁰ W. Skljjar, *Rozsiedlenie Rosjan na terytorium Ukrainy: na podstawie spisów ludności z 1989 i 2001 roku*, “Ukrainoznawstwo” 2008, nr 12, s. 55–58, s. źródło: <http://uaznavstvo.univ.kiev.ua/ua/visnyk/Visnyk-12/Skljar.pdf> [odczyt: 01.09.2014].

¹¹ *Politicization of ethnicity* defines the final stage of ethnic processes – *ethnic conflict development*. At that stage the national groups express political demands, trying to influence on power distribution and take part in controlling distribution of social benefits and economic resources; activities of ethnic groups are activated and those groups switch from only social and cultural demands to political demands. *Politicization of ethnicity* (i.e. ethnic communities’ coming to political arena and transformation into political actors that declare their readiness to protect their interests. In certain cases ethnic groups create their own political parties and organizations. *To politicize ethnicity means* to enable people to realize the role of politics in preservation of their ethnocultural values and vice versa; to stimulate their attention to this mutual relation; to mobilize them with regard to ethnic groups formation, which have the same self-consciousness; to direct behavior into the sphere of political activity on the basis of realization and group self-consciousness. In the opinion of O. Maiboroda, politicization of ethnicity is the final stage of *ethnic consolidation*, which goes through three stages of development. *At the first stage* unions of national nature are created mostly spontaneously: communities, clubs, associations; representatives of a certain ethnicity, which used to be dispersed, feel themselves as an ethnic group and realize their ethnogroup unity. *At the second stage* mobilization of an ethnic group takes place – representatives from ethnic elite articulate significance of national problems and describe the ways of their solving by uniting around common goal. Group solidarity mostly starts from humanitarian problems, namely language, cultural and religious problems, and then it encompasses the matter of social and economic status of an ethnic group. The consciousness of its members registers inextricable connection between the problem of preserving ethnic identity, their status in society and the level of material well-being. And *at the third stage* politicization of ethnicity takes place, i.e. transformation and problems realized by the group into political slogans and programs. See M. Skwarcow, *Etniczność w procesie społecznych zmian*, „Socialjno-politiczeskij żurnal” 1996, nr 1, s. 29–43.; O. Majboroda, *Debjutuje etnopolityka*, „Wicze” 1992, nr 5, s. 122–134.

¹² I. Zwaricz, *Wplyw regionalizmu na polityzaciju etniczności*, „Suczasnaja ukrainijska polityka. Polityky i politology pro neji”, Specypusk: Polityczni technologii, s. 119–135.

phenomenon¹³. It is confirmed by history of regionalism and autonomism ideas in the “eastern region” of Ukraine (we will speak about it later). On the other part the Ukrainian national idea hasn’t become the dominating one in the consciousness of the “eastern region” population, since abrupt change of status characteristics of Ukrainians and Russians is still occurring multidirectionally, as they cannot put up with their status of minority. Besides there is a strong historical, economic and cultural region’s orientation at Russia. At the same time Russia regularly calls out to use the language card and slogans to protect its nationals and “violated rights of Russians”. That’s where the “Russian problem” of the “eastern region’s” ethno-political development manifests, in the body of factors of which it is necessary to search for the reasons for pro-Russian identity popularity, eastern regionalism and autonomism in Donbas. Also it is important that Donbas is in so-called zone of increased ethno-political proneness to conflict – “big Eurasian arc of ethno-political instability”¹⁴. It means that “eastern” regionalism and autonomism have twofold nature – geopolitical one (outside Ukraine) and ethnocultural one (both outside and inside Ukraine). At the same time, regionalism or autonomism of Ukrainian Donbas have much wider nature: they are not limited exclusively to the matter of ethnicity politicization, but include linguistic, economic, social, territorial, world outlook, religious, historical, geographical, demographical and other components¹⁵. While factors of regional identification of Donbas include resettlement, ethnicity and language, religious beliefs, education, gender and age, economic condition, historical prerequisites for national identity formation, geographical/territorial proximity to Russia, external political orientation, information space, etc.

Peculiarity of “eastern” regionalism (since Ukraine’s independence) manifested in the fact that that phenomenon at the same time caused *separatism* and merged with it. That’s why back in 1990-ies the most often fear related with the “eastern region” of Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk regions) was expected separatism’s tendency, which lead to split on the basis of regionality and failure of Ukraine’s statehood. Back in 1994, S. Larraby, representative of RAND corporation, outlined the centrifugal tendencies, which could lead to “fragmentation of the country... even to civil war, when Russian military intervention cannot be excluded”¹⁶. Ukraine’s national security concept, adopted in January of 1997, also officially appealed to existence of separatist tendencies among certain (mostly left and left-of-center) political powers that demanded closer

¹³ It is confirmed by the following researches: A. Manewicz, *Aksiomy ukraińskiej polityki, ili Kto ugrożajet bezopasnosti Ukrainy*, „2000. Jeżenedel’nik” 2008, nr 13 (408), s. 3.; O. Krywycjka, *Regionalni modyfikaciji politykulturnych widminnostej Ukrainy*, „Naukowi zapysky”, Kurasiwjski czytanja 2005, Ser. „Politologija i etnologija”, vol 30, nr 1, s. 248–264.

¹⁴ J. Kucj, *Etnopolityczni procesy w Ukraini: upravlinjskij aspekt*, Kharkiw 2002, s. 155.

¹⁵ I. Kuras, *Etnopolitologija. Perszi kroky stanowlenja*, Wyd. Geneza, Kyjiw 2004, s. 204–206.; J. O’Loughlin, *The Regional Factor in Contemporary Ukrainian Politics: Scale, Place, Space, or Bogus Effect?*, „Post-Soviet Geography and Economics” 2001, vol 42, nr 1, s. 1–33.; A. Kolodij, N. Pogorila, *Regionalni podily w Ukraini: kiljka zapereczzenj proty dychotomiji “Schid – Zachid”*, „Dialog” 29 kwitnja 2004 r., źródło: <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/project/page1332.html> [odeczyt: 01.09.2014].

¹⁶ S. Larrabee, *Ukraine: Europe’s Next Crisis?*, „Arms Control Today” July/August 1994, s. 14–16.; E. Rumer, *Will Ukraine Return to Russia?*, „Foreign Policy” 1994, vol 3, s. 129–144.; T. Kuzio, *Ukrainian Security Policy*, Washington 1995, s. 35–51.

integration within CIS and strategic partnership or union with the Russian Federation in the “east” of Ukraine and defined them as one of the “main potential threats” to national security of Ukraine¹⁷. Broad talks about merged “eastern” regionalism-separatism should be started at the initiative of the Party of regions, to conduct referendum concerning status of the Russian language in Donetsk region. That fact is that in 1994 polling about federalization of the country took place in Donetsk region (at the same time with Ukraine’s parliamentary elections). That’s why in 2005 B. Kolesnikov, who was the head of Donetsk Regional Council, publically promised that there will be another such referendum after parliamentary elections of 2006. Also he spoke about conducting all-Ukrainian referendum on the matter of federative structure. In 2007 B. Kolesnikov decided to fulfill his promise and declared collection of signatures for referendum. It seemed that two congresses in Severodonetsk were quintessence of the Russian or Russian language issue aggravation. The first congress took place in November 2004 with ideas of *Ukraine’s federalization* and creation of *autonomous Southern-Eastern republic*. The second congress took place in March of 2008 and it had the item on humanitarian policy on its agenda, and actually – on ultimatum to the government with regard to *protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine*. Those events substantively destabilized interethnic situation in the “eastern region” and the entire country¹⁸. However, as it was discovered six years later, the events in Donbas in 2014, when unacknowledged “referendums” were conducted in Donetsk and Luhansk regions and self-proclaimed “people’s republics” were created with the “assistance” of Russia, after which the conflict between the center and “region/periphery” turned into open/armed phase, became the peak of regionalism-separatism and even irredentism. However such somewhat side-effect of regionalism/separatism in Ukrainian Donbas is not enough to understand its essence and resource base. This is because the history of “eastern” regionalism and separatism is complicated and gradual.

Everything started in the autumn of 1989 from avant-garde groups of *International movement of Donbas*. The authors of creating this public union were scientific intellectuals, student and school youth¹⁹. The main tasks were defined as consistent *struggle against “manifestations of nationalism”* on ideological, political and domestic levels and protection of national human rights. “Nationalism” was understood as “special world-view”, which interprets nation as supreme ahistoric form of people’s community,... while interests of the nation were deemed as higher

¹⁷ H. Nemyria, *L’etat et les regionales ukrainiennes et la consolidation de l’Etat*, [w:] R. Berton-Hogge, M-A. Crosnier [red.], *Ukraine, Bielorussie, Russie: Trois Etats en Construction*, Wyd. La documentation française, Paris 1995, s. 25–36.; B. Tarasiuk, *Ukraine in the World*, [w:] L. Hajda [red.], *Ukraine in the World: Studies in International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State*, Wyd. Ukrainian Research Institute 1998, s. 14.; S. Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C 1997, s. 17.; H. Nemyria, *A Qualitative Analysis of the Situation in the Donbas*, [w:] K. Segbers, S.D. Spiegeleire, *Post-Soviet Puzzles: Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union. – Vol. II: Emerging Geopolitical and Territorial Units. Theories, Methods and Case Studies*, Wyd. Nomos, Baden-Baden 1995, s. 451–466.

¹⁸ V. Holenko, V. Tykhonov, *Severodonetsk: tochky ne budet*, Wyd. PTs „Maksym“ 2008.

¹⁹ A. Iwanow, I. Syczew, *IDD i SSSR, ili kak sozdawalosj Interdviżenie Donbassa*, „Govorit Donetsk“ 29 janwarja 2010 g., źródło: <http://govorit.donetsk.ua/idd-i-sssr-ili-kak-sozdavalos-interdviżenie-donbassa.html> [odczyt: 01.09.2014].

than interests of classes and people that formed the nation". International Movement of Donbas (Interrukh) was one of the first public organizations in the Eastern Ukraine, which aimed at implementation of "state bilingualism" in Ukraine. In Manifesto of Interrukh the notion "state language" for the sake of multiethnic society was defined as violation of human rights, moreover when such status is granted only to one language²⁰. According to the authors of Manifesto, with disappearance of the language the nation will not perish, but "transfer to another language". In 1991 "Interrukh Donbasu" was the only organization, which stood for *autonomous statuses of Donetsk region*. On August 28, 1991 the Central Board of Interrukh made a statement "On social and political situation", in which it expressed "alarm by the fact that Donbas can become an arena of serious clashes of different political forces". That's why a referendum was supposed to be held before December 1, 1991 about granting Donetsk region status of autonomy in the framework of Ukraine²¹. After such statement Interrukh Donbasu was *accused in separatism* and its leader D. Kornilov had state on a number of occasions that autonomy is not a new state, but redistribution of powers between the central and territorial authorities. Disputes of that time were mainly explained by failure to understand definitions of such notions as "federalism", "autonomy" and "separatism". Opponents mistakenly called adherents of federative structure (federalization) as "separatists"²². At the same time certain public unions and organizations of Donetsk region at the dawn of Ukraine's independence were truly *the separatist ones*, since during the period from August 24 to December 1, 1991, the question was openly put not only about federative structure of the country (i.e. autonomy of Donetsk region), but also on creation of an independent state formation or jointing Russia²³.

In Luhansk region Movement "Democratic Donbas", created at the initiative of People's Movement of Luhansk region, cadets and historical and cultural society "Vidrodzhennya" (Renaissance) was deemed as separatist organization. In September of 1991 Luhansk newspaper "Molodohvardiits"

²⁰ T. Bolbat, W. Lykow, E. Halimow, *Donetskaja oblast: Polityczeskie partiji, dwiżenija, obszestwennje organizaciji*, Wyd. „Lebedj”, Donetsk 1994, s. 47–98.

²¹ *Zajawlenie Centraljnogo Soweta: Interdwiżenie nie hoczet nowego Karabacha*, „Perwaja linija” 30 nojabrja 1991.

²² T. Bolbat, *Problema nacionalno-gosudarstwenного ustrojstwa w programnych dokumentach obszestwennych objedinenij Donbassa (konec 1980–b–1993 rr.)*, [w:] *Tezy dopowidej na miżregionalnij nauk.-prakt. konf. „Regiony w nezależnij Ukraini :poszuk strategiji optymaljnogo rozwytku”* (Charkiw, berezenj 1994 r.), Charkiw 1994, s. 91–119.

²³ On July 20, 1991 newspaper "Komsomolets of Donbas" published an article by a member of Yenakiiwo city organization of Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine V. Cherednychenko "Donetsk autonomous republic – maybe it's a way out?" Being worried by appearance of "national-fascists" in Ukraine (that's how nationalists were taken) with slogans "Ukraine is only for Ukrainians", he offered to conduct a regional referendum and to figure out the matter of whether Donetsk region should remain as a part of Ukraine or should it form an autonomy in its structure, or to joint Russia as a region or autonomy, or to "increase their status and become Donetsk republic". However social-democrats of Yenakiiwo distanced themselves from that publication and on August 4, 1991 they excluded V. Cherednychenko from the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine for "distortion of the party's ideas". In September and October of 1991 analogous articles were published in the same newspaper. They were dictated by people's deputies of the Supreme Council of the USSR A. Boiko and V. Honcharov. The latter said that it was necessary to "regain" a number of eastern Ukrainian regions and to create territorial autonomous formation (republic, region, etc.), however not to split from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Publications of V. Mamutow also spoke about "Donets Federative Province" in the framework of Ukraine. Please see for details: W. Czeredniczenko, *DAR –możet eto wychod?*, „Komsomolec Donbassa” 20 ijulja 1991.; *Mnenije social-demokratow*, „Komsomolec Donbassa” 23 awgusta 1991.; A. Bojko, *Ja priderżywajusz socialisticzeskoj idei*, „Komsomolec Donbassa” 4 sentjabrja 1991.; *Czego hoczet W.Gonczarow?*, „Komsomolec Donbassa” 4 sentjabrja 1991.; N. Iwanow, W. Mamutow, N. Prokopenko, *Kak predotwratitj nacionalnij konflikt?*, „Żyznj” 2 sentjabrja 1991.

published an article of one of the members of organization committee of Movement “Democratic Donbas” – H. Lytvak. It was a call to deputies of the region to conduct Donetsk Assembly and to pass a resolution on creation of an independent republic “*Malorosiiia*” (Small Russia) consisting of Donetsk and Luhansk regions with center in Luhansk. The condition was: if Ukraine splits from the USSR, Malorosiiia will remain an independent state, otherwise, it will become an “autonomy and it will be protecting its interests in Ukraine’s parliament”²⁴. At the constituent assembly of Movement “Democratic Donbas” 24 delegates left the room after speech of B. Lokotosh (leader of “Vidrodzhennia” society). They were indignant at the proposal made in the speech to create *own armed forces* in the region for “protection of borders.” At the same time the statement on creation of republic “Malorosiiia”²⁵ wasn’t supported. The Program of Movement “Democratic Donbas” and Communication to citizens of Ukraine proclaimed implementing federative structure of Ukraine into new Constitution of Ukraine as one of the basic tasks of the organization²⁶.

At the same time with the mentioned organizations, *some parties and societies* arose in Donbas, which intended to protect Russian national minority in the region: Constitutional-Democratic Party of USSR (till 1991), All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks – VKP(b) with office in Luhansk, organization “Unity” (which stood for Marxism-Leninism ideals)²⁷, regional branch of group “Union” in Donetsk, etc. However after declaration of Ukraine’s independence in the autumn of 1991, *confrontation of public union*, which were “for” or “against” federalization took place in Donbas. On one side those were Interrukh of Donbas, Movement “Democratic Donbas”, Democratic Movement of Donbas “Bratstvo” (Fraternity), People’s Movement of Luhansk region, society “Vidrodzhennia” (Renaissance), on the other side – regional organizations of Ukrainian Republican Party, Democratic Party, Party of Democratic Renaissance of Ukraine, People’s Movement of

²⁴ G. Litwak, *Boris, ty snowa byl praw*, „Molodogwardejec” 17 sentjabrja 1991.

²⁵ S. Szejnikow, „Intery” na Luganszynie, „Gorod” 21-27 oktjabrja 1991.

²⁶ Obrazsenije DDD k grahdanam Ukrainy, „Luganskaja prawda” 2 sentjabrja 1991.

²⁷ T. Bolbat, *Periodyzacija istoriji gromadjanjskich objednanj shidnoji Ukrainy (kwitenj 1985 – czerwenj 1996 rr.)*, „Doneckijj wisnyk nauk. Towarystwa im. T.Szewczenka” 2006, nr 13, s. 107–123.

Ukraine, T. Shevchenko Society of the Ukrainian language and Union of Ukrainian Youth²⁸. As the result a session of Donetsk Regional Council of people's deputies adopted an appeal to the Supreme Council of Ukraine proposing to make *provision on federative framework of the state* to the new Constitution of Ukraine. On October 26, 1991 a *Council of people's deputies of all levels of the South and East of Ukraine* took place in Donetsk, to which applied delegates of constituent conference of Democratic Movement of Donbas "Bratstvo" (Fraternity) with the call to support the idea of federalism, which makes it possible to preserve historical, economic and national-cultural uniqueness of regions. Participants of the Council adopted an appeal to the people and petition to the Supreme Council of Ukraine. That's how *the first stage* of regionalism development in the "eastern region" ended.

Thus, concerning the period after Ukraine's gaining independence, *it is expedient to conclude*, that: separation of Donbas from Ukraine wasn't included into program documents; there were only statements of separate persons, whose opinions were not supported by the majority. Attempts of certain public unions to distribute powers between the central and local government bodies, expressed in their demands to create federative territory "Donbas" or granting that region status of autonomy in the framework of Ukraine, cannot be called separatism. It was rather concern of certain public unions about the circumstances connected with adoption of the Ukraine's Independence Act. They were worried by perspective of forced Ukrainization, which could lead to interethnic confrontation due to majority of Russian-speaking population in Donbas. Also they were afraid of outburst of national-extremism. That's why the idea of federative structure found its adherents among numerous public organizations, which saw federalism as prerequisite to preserve economic and national-cultural uniqueness of the region, as well as the social and interethnic peace²⁹.

The second stage of regionalism development in "eastern region" fell on 1992–1994, when *social and political pallet was actively forming* in Donbas. Due to the region's specifics, social organizations and parties of left, right and centrist range emerged. In the middle of 1990 the phenomenon of high

²⁸ The confrontation was expressed in different forms. The most often the expressions were used, which were not moderate enough and had a rather offensive nature. One of the parties accused the "separatists-Bolsheviks" in raising idea of creating "soviet-type republic", while the other party accused "repainted partycrats" or "hardcore nationalists that hate everything Russian". Resolutions of the authorized bodies of the organizations were equally categorical. The statement of organization of Democratic Party of Ukraine, Kirovske of Donetsk region stated, "Separatists wish to create communist preserve" in Donbas, that's why they instigate interethnic hostility. Appeals of Luhansk organization of People's movement of Ukraine to regional Council of people's deputies and statement of its report and election conference were analogous. "National-chauvinists" from "Democratic Donbas" were accused of calls to creation of separatist princedoms that provoked the population of eastern regions of Ukraine to interethnic hostility. The confrontation reached its peak in October of 1991, when the session of Donetsk regional Council of people's deputies considered the issue of the region's status. On October 6, 1991 protest meetings took place in many cities with the slogan, "No to Donetsk soviet-type republic!" On October 8, 1991 picketing of the regional Council's building took place under the same slogans, in which representatives of national-democratic organizations and miners took place. At the same time, in the central square of Donetsk members of Interrukh of Donbas performed collection of signatures in support of Donbas autonomy. Please see details: *Protokol zboriu Kirowskoji misjkoi organizaciji Demokratycznoji partiji Ukrainy*, Archiw Kirowskoji misjkoi organizaciji DemPU 4 zowtnja 1991, nr 5, s. 4.; *Zwernenja Luganskoji krajowoji organizaciji Narodnogo Ruchu Ukrainy do oblastnoji Rady narodnych deputatiw*, Archiw Luganskoji krajowoji organizaciji NRU HPU 1991.; *Zajawa III zwoitno-wyborczoji konferencji Luganskoji krajowoji organizaciji Narodnogo ruchu Ukrainy*, „Molodogwardec“ 17 weresnja 1991.; S. Grebenjuk, *Federatiwnaja zemlja Dombass?*, „Perwaja linija“ 12 oktjabrja 1991.

²⁹ T. Bolbat, *Problema nacionaljno-gosudarstwenmogo ustrajstwa w programnych dokumentach obszestwennych objedinenij Dombassa (konec 1980-h – 1933 rr.)* [w:] *Tezy dopowidej na mizregionalnij nauk.-prakt. konf. «Regiony w nezaleznij Ukrainii: poszuk strategii optymalnogo rozwytku»* (Charkiw, berezenj 1994 r.), Charkiw 1994, s. 91–119.

degree of the society's politicization was clearly reflected in public organizations. They kept to *certain political landmarks*. For political forces, which stood for interests of Russian national minority, such were: democratic state with Eurasian (including pro-Russian) orientation (those were "Movement for Donbas revival", "International Movement of Donbas", "Donetsk Regional Congress of Public Actions", Donetsk Regional Committee for Peace Protection, branch of Ukrainian Peace Foundation)³⁰; socialist/communist state with predominantly Eurasian orientation (those were Movement for the USSR Revival, Donetsk Regional Organization of Lenin's Communist Union of the Young People of Ukraine); indifferent/polyvariant foreign-policy orientations with establishment for market and private ownership as dominant means for society reforms; polyvariant professional interests. In such conditions *regional consultative referendum on the matters of autonomy, as well as free functioning of the Russian language* was conducted in Donetsk region in 1994. The ballot contained two questions. The first one was, "Do you agree that Russian will be used in record-keeping, education and science parallel to Ukrainian?" The second question was about implementing into Constitution of Ukraine (which didn't exist at that moment) the principle of federative structure of Ukraine. Donetsk region "gave" 90 percent of votes for federalization of Ukraine, and 80 percent for the Russian language³¹. The General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine protested against the legitimacy of the referendum and sent the case to court, which judged that conclusions of the local referendum had no legal status. However, that's how Donbas expressed its claims for *special status in Ukraine*. The results of will expression were presented to Kyiv as a suggestion to the draft Constitution of Ukraine³². *Other actions*, made in identical direction (to protect the idea of Ukraine's federalization and granting special status to the "eastern region"), directly or indirectly *were*: miners' pickets of the Parliament (Supreme Council) of Ukraine in October of 1992 (as the result of which the speaker of the Ukraine's parliament I. Pliushch adopted the idea of federalization); failure of the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine to react to actions of federalization adherents; proposal to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine from Donetsk Regional Council to implement economic and legal experiment in Donetsk and Prydniprovsk (near Dnipro) region with creation of stabilization mechanisms for industry and structural rebuilding of the economy, which included extension of powers of the "eastern region" administrations (the actual proposal to create free economic zone)³³; decisions of Donetsk Regional Council to implement temporary standards for deductions with regard to consideration of "federative" issue (April 1993); miners' strike in June 1993, which demanded autonomation of Donetsk region in the form of establishing standards of deductions for the budget of the region from general

³⁰ W. Bilecjkij, *Gromadsjko-polityczni ruchy na Doneczczyni: zarodzenia, rozwytok, transformacja*, [w:] Z. Lychobolowa [red.], *Nowi storinki istorii Donbasu, Kn. 7*, Donetsk 1999, s. 104.

³¹ W. Gewarin, *Batjky doneckogo separatyzmu*, „Wseukrainskij zagaljnopolitycznyj oswitjanckij tyznewik „Personal“ 2007, nr 35 (238), źródło: <http://www.personal-plus.net/238/2480.html> [odczyt: 01.09.2014].

³² W. Krawczenko, *Ednannja czerez riznomanitistj. Decentralizacija wlady i formuwannja regionalnych elit w umowach demokratycznego onowlenja suspiljstwa*, [w:] S. Maksymenko [red.], *Rozwytok gromad i regioniw Ukrainy*, Kyjiw 1999, s. 135.

³³ It was characteristic regime for banks functioning, delegation to the regional level of the right to determine quotas and to issue licenses for products and, passing the center, to enter into relations with foreign investors.

state taxes and duties on the level of average indicators in Ukraine, but no less than 70 percent; creation in the autumn of 1993 of regional economic self-government by four regions of Ukraine; approval of decision to establish the standards of deductions by approving own regional budget by Donetsk Regional Council against decision of the Supreme Council of Ukraine in March of 1994, which actually blocked deductions from the region to the state budget³⁴.

It is interesting that the majority of manifestations of “eastern” regionalism and separatism in the middle of 1990-ies were caused by *economic problems*. It is clearly seen from the position of Donbas miners. On the one hand they demanded granting autonomous status to Donbas, but on the other hand they were the most active and the best organized opponents to Soviet regime and founders of new Ukrainian statehood in the region in the end of 80-ies and in the beginning of 90-ies of the 20th century. In the opinion of V. Biletskyi, during those years a formula was tested, which united all directions, – it was the idea of spiritually and materially rich nation. It set aside the question “socialism or capitalism?”, it wasn’t enemy for non-Ukrainians, it consolidated all the citizens of Ukraine. It was that idea that worked in 1991, since industrial Donbas was the most consolidating state-creating entity, which voted on the level of 93 percent for Ukraine’s independence on referendum of December 1, 1991³⁵. Nevertheless that idea of rich nation helped to reduce the problem of regionalism/separatism in the middle of 1990-ies, and actions of the National Bank of Ukraine and the new president L. Kuchma, elected at early presidential elections in 1994, strengthened unitary model of state structure of Ukraine, since in August of 1994 L. Kuchma subjected to himself previously publicly elected chairmen of regional, city and district councils. It was a very important event, since after that the unitary model of power distribution in Ukraine was depicted at first in Constitutional Agreement of 1995, and later in the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996.

However even that didn’t fully help to solve the issue of “eastern” regionalism/separatism in Ukraine. *The third stage* of regionalism development in Ukrainian Donbas started in the end of 1990-ies. That’s when they understood that processes in Donbas are very interesting and indicative, important not only for the coal and metallurgy region, but for the entire Ukraine. A certain “matrix” of the Ukraine’s society civilization choice, standards of attitude with regard to the past and future and specific stylistics of political behavior³⁶ were formed there. The problem is in the fact that Donbas *doesn’t have historically formed ethnocultural identity*, since for numerous advantages of Ukrainian national element it is sometimes called “the region of Russian culture”. That’s the consequence of the Soviet reception. That’s why the identity of Donbas isn’t Russian, but rather Soviet. Yes, this is Ukraine, but Soviet Ukraine to a large extent. That’s why we observe there cultivation of Soviet

³⁴ Politicians, which at that time were associated with federalization or separatism, as well as persons that helped them in this: V. Chuprun, P. Symonenko, Yu. Boldyriev, O. Bazyluk (and other “red directors”), A. Mryl, D. Kornilov, V. Yanukovych, L. Kravchuk, I. Pliushch, Ye. Zviahilskyi, V. Landyk. Between political forces/organizations of analogous direction were as follows: “Movement for Donbas Revival”, Party “Slovianska”, “Interrukh Donbasu” as well as Independent Trade-Union of Miners of Ukraine.

³⁵ W. Bileckij, *Gromadsjko-polityczni ruchy na Donieczczyjni: zarodzenja, rozwytok, transformacja*, [w:] Z. Lychobolowa [red.], *Nowi storinki istoriji Donbasu: Kn. 7*, Donecjk 1999, s. 90–107.

³⁶ I. Losew, *Donbasyzacija Ukrainy*, „Ukrainskij Tyzden” 11 Listopada 2009 r., nr 50 (111).

period, its symbols, cultural codes, red flags, sickles and hammers, Soviet heroes, traditions and customs. “Capitalism with Bolshevik grin” is striking, when “sharks of large capital”, which would have been immediately expelled from the communist party, demonstrate their love to the Soviet symbols, monumental propaganda, red army and the Soviet past. The “Bolshevik grin” manifests in workers’ complete rightlessness toward their employers, control of local oligarchs over the government bodies and judicial system. The criminal world also holds a special place. That’s why, at the dawn of the Ukraine’s independence the Ukrainian language, culture and history held a rather non-prestigious place at the outskirts of political, social and cultural life of the “eastern region”.

The *Party of Regions*, formed in 1997, embodied the peculiarities of mental separation of Donbas. From the very beginning it started to position itself as political power, which developed “eastern” regionalism, and later, as political power, which depending on political consequences in the state, espoused the principles of “eastern” separatism/federalism. “Ukrainian” was never an asset for the Party of Regions and its leaders, only something electoral and situational. It caused several conflicts: how could political force, which had been only the party of “eastern region” before, become the party of numerous regions of the country, where did the changes start – in Donbas’s drift toward Ukraine or Ukraine’s drift toward Donbas; whether the Russia-oriented position of the Party of Regions would influence on the Russian national minority? The specifics of that party was predominantly in the fact that it was permanently supported by those circles of voters, which still don’t accept (didn’t accept before) the Ukraine’s independence and see/saw the party as the implementator of their views. That’s why it is obvious that in the “Ukrainian” perspective the Party of Region, representing the region with almost completely destroyed Ukrainian language and cultural tradition, turned out separated from civilizational advance of Ukraine. That concealed the “root” of regionalism/separatism of the Party of Regions and, obviously, its electorate and “eastern region”, which practically started to manifest from the middle of 2000s. For example, during the election presidential campaign of 2004 at the meeting in Alchevsk of Luhansk region people refused to listen to V. Yushchenko in Ukrainian, that’s why he was forced to speak Russian. Starting from 2010 the successful experience of effective total deukrainization of Ukraine, accumulated in Donbas, spread to the entire country. As the result of this the Party of Regions, as electorally successful party, especially during 2004-2012, became stronghold for those, for whom Moscow is “the capital of Motherland” and Ukraine is a temporary phenomenon or a whim of the history. Since the majority of persons with such views are in the “eastern region”, it is another proof for the fact that the Party of Regions from the moment of its creation was “dissident”, “separatist” and truly “regional” (although, pursuant to the Ukraine’s legislation it is prohibited to form regional parties in Ukraine). A good example of that were statistical data of I. Volosevych that in 2006 37% of adherents of the Party of Regions wished to unite with Russia. Such tendency was supported by representatives of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which electorally was

also mainly oriented at the “eastern region”. On the contrary, openly pro-Russian projects, such as “Russian block” and party “For Ukraine, Belarus and Russia” turned out to be ineffective.

The key *reasons and events* that characterize *the third stage* of the “eastern” regionalism and separatism development are as follows: losing results of presidential elections in 2004; influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, for example, call for creation of “South-Eastern Ukraine” (by metropolitan Hilarion of Donetsk and Mariupol); congresses in Severodonetsk in 2004 and 2008, where at first they raised the issue on federalization of Ukraine and creation of autonomous South-Eastern republic, and later – on rights protection of Russian-speaking population of Ukraine; winning results of presidential elections in 2010. The “Eastern” regionalism from the beginning of 2000s outlines so-called *regional patriotism*. In fact it is “*masked separatism*”. It is interesting that till certain time, while “Donetsk group” hoped to “get control over” the entire Ukraine, they didn’t speak about separatism. For example, before 2005 the Party of Regions refused to perform administrative reform, which was supposed to unite Donetsk and Luhansk regions. However, when it became clear that the Party of Regions lost the presidential elections in 2005, they hurriedly produced the plan of Donbas separation, and then separation of the entire south-eastern Ukraine and their joining to Russia. Analogous situation took place in 2014, when the revolutionary events toppled the dictatorship autocratical regime of V. Yanukovich. However it is the subject and reason for singling out entirely different kind of “eastern” regionalism and separatism, about which we will speak later. In general, the specifics of the third stage of “eastern” regionalism and separatism, unlike the second stage, became the fact that it merged the economic constituent of the regional processes, peculiar to 1990-ies, but at the same time superimposed the national/ethnic constituent on it, which became especially popular in the beginning of 2000s, having become the key means for electoral manipulations.

On this basis the specific “eastern” Donetsk/Donbas *national-regional identity* (with regional flavor) has been formed³⁷ – not pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian, but Soviet (although the number of people that position themselves with Russian identity in the “eastern” region has been significantly decreasing during 1991–2014)³⁸. From this perspective it is also interesting that the majority of Donbas population doesn’t identify Ukraine’s citizenship with belonging to Ukrainian nation. It shows the success of communist policy of denationalization and creation of “new historical community – Soviet people” (that’s why the “eastern region” is still considered as the “Soviet region”); also it rejects

³⁷ J. Hrytsak, *National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk*, [w:] Z. Gitelman, L. Hajda, J.-P. Himka, R. Solchanyk [red.], *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute 2000, s. 263–281.; J. Hrytsak, *Peretjaguwanja Ukrainy*, „Forum. – Czasopys „Krytyka” 4 lypnja 2001.; J. Hrytsak, W. Kipenj, *Czy możliwa uniwersalna modelj naciji, abo czogo wczytj pryklad Donbasu*, Rozszyfrowka audiodzapisu kruglogo stolu, jakij widbuwsja 30 czerwnja u meżach VI Miznarodnogo kongresu ukrainistiw, Donecjk, 28 czerwnja – 01 lypnia 2005 r.

³⁸ A. Kolodij, *Radjansjka identycznistj ta jji nosiji w nezależnij Ukraini*, [w:] *Ukraina w suczasnomu switi. Socialjni, etniczni i kulturni aspekty globalizaciji ta Ukraina* (Konferencija dlja ukrajnskich wupusknjuk program naukowego stazuwanja u SZA. – Jalta, 12–15 weresnja 2002 r.), Wyd. Stylos, Kyiv 2002, s. 36–37.

hypothesis that people with denationalized consciousness (which, according to terminology of E. Wilson and T. Kuzio, is marginal, ambivalent, inconsistent, wavers between Russian and Ukrainian identity) were a “buffer” in relations between Ukrainians and Russians, not allowing the flame of separatism to flare up. Hence, from theoretical and mental part, people of multiple identity, with indefinite and unformed national identity in general are not an independent reason for separatism actualization³⁹. However, if specific national and regional identity is subjectified from outside, on the contrary it serves as the reason for separatist tendencies, in particular in the “eastern region” (it was especially true in 2014). Then the latter turn out very dangerous, since the bearers with attributes of imperial consciousness of Soviet type manifest intolerance with regard to everything national, manifest mania of state greatness and enemy attitude toward other civilizations. Over the decade the national and regional identity went through two peaks of its development: the first one in 2004, when strengthening of regional divisions was observed as the result of struggle during the presidential elections, and the second one in 2013–2014, when strengthening of separatist divisions was observed due to determination of further vector of Ukraine’s geopolitical development, collapse of V. Yanukovych and Party of Region’s political regime, which turned out to be promoters of federalization and separatism.

In 2013–2014 a *new development stage* of “eastern” regionalism and separatism started, which combined the features of all the previous stages, but was strengthened and actualized on the basis of external subjectification in the form of Russia’s influence. It is noteworthy that in the course of initially peaceful and then armed actions of both the representatives of the “eastern region” and the foreign mercenaries, both separatism and irredentism were detected. It was relevant for active representatives of “eastern” *national and regional identity*. At the same time aspiration to federalization, which had prevailed at the previous stages of separatism development, faded into insignificance. On the other part the passive part of conflict between the center and “eastern region” still keeps to the position on necessity of federalization or decentralization of power, i.e. of deepening of “eastern” regionalism, not separatism. That is a good evidence that regionalism in format of separatism in Ukrainian Donbas remains non-systemic and predominantly artificial phenomenon. Another peculiarity of this fourth wave of “eastern” regionalism is in the fact that the latter to a large extent has lost language orientation and is determined by geopolitical and economic vector. At the same time seeing the center also as regional, although enemy to “eastern region”, identity, even despite the fact that there are a lot of its adherents in Donbas, remain unchanged. Nevertheless it is the fact that the “eastern” regionalism is internally outlined not simply as opposition to generic notion of Ukraine, but also to specific notion of European choice of Ukraine, which is territorially, geographically, culturally and mentally closer to Europe. It is in this context that “eastern” regionalism and separatism are actualized

³⁹ T. Kuzio, *The National Factor in Ukraine’s Quadruple Transition*, “Contemporary Politics” 2000, vol 6, nr 2.; J. Hrytsak, *National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk*, [w:] Z. Gitelman, L. Hajda, J.-P. Himka, R. Solchanyk [red.], *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute 2000, s. 276.

by politicization phenomenon of Russian national/ethnic minority, which is predominantly not European, but rather anti-European. It also allows to conclude that modern “eastern” regional identity (especially in the light of events of 2014) also isn’t the system of equal parameters of social choice. On the one hand it depends on stable objective features, with which an individual and community identify themselves (it is so-called cognitive element, on which access to information has a significant influence). On the other hand it is a subject way of perceiving and substantiating (or emotionally-affective element). Their synthesis can be different and it outlines in different ways, without system, the essence of “eastern” regionalism: in one case as aspiration to decentralization, in the other case to federalization and in the third case – to separation. Only external subjectification of events makes us think about modern “eastern” regionalism as about separatism and irredentism.

Allocation of resources and setting up stages of the “eastern” regionalism and separatism formation allows to *conclude* that: 1) the majority of population of the “eastern region” still isn’t ready to perceive the principle of “nationality in accordance with citizenship”; 2) the majority of population of the “eastern region” includes into the notion of a “nation” also its ethnicity (interpretation of “nation by blood” prevails); 3) according to definition of Y. Haberman the majority of the “eastern region” doesn’t know to “reasonably identify”⁴⁰, also today they express respect to the place of their permanent residence as to their motherland more often, that place doesn’t coincide with the Ukraine’s borders; 4) the “eastern region” being motley⁴¹, internally is different from the point of view of selection of the kind of regionalism – autonomization, federalization, separation, etc.; 5) the “eastern” regionalism is still a form of preservation of conservative “Soviet” ideology and psychology, it has no own content (deficit of own philosophy and identity, as well as political conservatism are peculiar to it); 6) sometimes the “eastern” regionalism is positioned as a tool for customary system and ideas preservation, i.e. it has a “protective” feature; 7) the linguistic factor gradually loses its influence in the “eastern” regionalism, definition of the Ukrainian language as the native one serves as the determinant for loyalty to the Ukrainian state, and the language of communication mostly doesn’t coincide with the national self-perception and identity⁴²; 8) the “eastern” regionalism manifests as “bereaved of ethnic origin”, since it doesn’t have clear signs of interest to the process of Russian nationalism development in Russia, and the regional identity in the “eastern region” is neither monoethnic nor multiethnic – simply the factor of the Russian language prevails⁴³; 9) the “eastern” regionalism at the same time with regional identity, specific transitional identity, which reacts to the current government

⁴⁰ J. Habermas, *W poskach nacjonalnoy identycznosti. Filozofskie i polityczeskie statji*, Donetsk 1999, s. 5.

⁴¹ N. Czernysz, O. Malanczuk, *Dynamika identycznostej mieszkanicw Ljwowa i Donecjk: komparatywnyj analiz (1994–2004 rr.)*, [w:] *Ukraina moderna („Lwiv – Donecjk : socialjni identycznosti w succasnij Ukraini“*, Specialnijj wyppusk), Kyjiw-Ljwiv 2007, nr 12 (2), s. 75.; *Ukraina moderna („Lwiv – Donecjk: socialjni identycznosti w succasnij Ukraini“*, Specialnijj wyppusk), Kyjiw-Donecjk 2007, nr 12 (2).

⁴² N. Chernysh, *Pokolinnewi modeli grupowych identycznostej ljwuwjan ta doneczczan (1994–2004rr.)*, [w:] *Ukraina moderna („Lwiv – Donecjk: socialjni identycznosti w succasnij Ukraini“*, Specialnijj wyppusk), Kyjiw-Ljwiv 2007, nr 12 (2), s. 113.; *Regionaljna identycznostij w Ukraini : widminnosti, podobnosti, dynamika*, „Litteralis“ 28 zowtnja 2009 r., zdrojlo: <http://www.litteralis.com/2009/10/regional-identity-in-ukraine/> [odczyt: 01.09.2014].

⁴³ J. Bugajski, *Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems in Independent Ukraine*, [w:] S. Wolchik, V. Zviglyanich [red.], *Ukraine. The Search for a National Identity* Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham 2000.

policy and existing economic conditions instead of influence of ideological pressure; 10) in accordance with the experience of 1991 – 2014 the main tendencies of the “eastern” regionalism are increase of regional autonomy and control over resources in the context of the central government national construction strategy; increase of regional autonomy in the middle of Ukraine, increase of regional autonomy by way of gradual transfer of power within the frames of European policy and regulation of closer integration with Russia; 11) turning of the “eastern” regionalism into separatism supports the veracity of the following formula: “the less etatism – the more separatism”, “the more regionalization/decentralization – the less separatism”.

Specification of *the “eastern” regionalism resources* allows to single out such key groups of elites that take part in the “region’s” institutionalization and politicization of Russian national/ethnic minority in it: 1) *“the old nomenclature”* is a group of former high party functional bureaucrats, directors and top managers in coal industry, metallurgy, military and industrial complex that have managed to keep their positions; 2) *“the second echelon”* is the former middle level, party and Komsomol leaders and managers of industrial enterprises, which are pragmatic without any ideological complexes, they have managed to keep their old connections and to set up new ones, based on obvious commercial interest or on aspirations to political career; 3) *“modernizers”* – business from “shadow” economy, which accumulated wealth by brokerage and commercial transactions, as well as the people that came to politics in the turbulent years of glasnost and perestroika, including the ones that have managed to turn the political capital into material wealth and vice versa; 4) *national-democrats* are representatives of scientific circles, as well as the intellectuals and former dissidents that embrace the idea of the “national revival” and strong political identity, that are explicitly pro-European and often anti-Russian and recreate priorities of cultural and national construction. The variety of elite-agents of the “eastern” regionalism, although in favor of nomenclature, second echelon and modernizers, also shows lack of system in regionalism in the “eastern region”. At the same time that variety of elite, which used to be only a danger, today is the factor, which cannot assist in consolidation of the “eastern region” in producing the vision for further development. It is another feature of the “eastern region’s” elite – its provinciality⁴⁴. Donbas is an example of adaptation, but not confrontational changes of elites (at least to a larger degree than the entire Ukraine).

In general, on the basis of the “eastern” regionalism and separatism analysis, its stages are singled out as follows: the first stage – 1989–1992 (with regard to determination of further fate of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the status of the “eastern region” within its framework); the second stage – 1992–1994 (with regard to expansion of financial and economic powers of the “eastern region”); the third stage – 1997-2013 (with regard to synthesizing financial, economic, national and ethnic constituents of the “eastern region’s” individuality); the fourth stage – from 2013 (on the basis of applying geopolitical reasons for further development choice, as well as the struggle forms radicalization).

⁴⁴ A. Motyl, B. Krawchenko, *Ukraine: from empire to statehood*, [w:] I. Bremmer, T. Ray [red.], *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997.