

## **Особливості та наслідки впливу концепту «інших» і «чужих» на інституціоналізацію/політизацію української та російської ідентичності й етнічності в Україні (1991-2014)**

Проаналізовано особливості та наслідки впливу концепту «інших іншості» на політизацію та інституціоналізацію української та російської ідентичності й етнічності в Україні упродовж 1991-2014 рр. З'ясовано засадничі атрибути, параметри та шляхи впливу концепту «іншості» на процес інституціоналізації та політизації української та російської ідентичності й етнічності в Україні. Розглянуто преференції української та російської етнічності в Україні. Диференційовано ідеї та сутність етнічного українського і східнослов'янського російського/пострадянського націоналізму в Україні.

*Ключові слова:* «інші», «чужі», політизація етнічності, інституціоналізація етнічності, національна ідентичність, етно-національна група, етнократичну держава, конфедеративність, партія, ідеологія, націоналізм, російська національна меншіна, російськомовні українці, Україна.

## **Features and effects of “others” and “strangers” concept’s impact on institutionalization/politicization of ukrainian and russian identity and ethnicity in Ukraine (1991-2014)**

The article is dedicated to analyzing features and effects of “other/otherness” concept’s impact on institutionalization/politicization of Ukrainian and Russian identity and ethnicity in Ukraine in 1991-2014. The author discovered basic attributes, parameters and ways of “other/otherness” concept’s impact on institutionalization/politicization of Ukrainian and Russian identity and ethnicity in Ukraine; examined the preferences of Russian and Ukrainian ethnicity in Ukraine; differentiated ideas and the essence of ethnic Ukrainian and East-Slavic Russian/post-Soviet nationalism in Ukraine.

**Keywords:** "others", "strangers", politicization of ethnicity, institutionalization of ethnicity, national identity, ethno-national group, ethnocratic state, confederation, party, ideology, nationalism, Russian minority, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Ukraine.

In the process of ethno- and natiogenesis each actor of the ethno-political process explores his view of solution and positioning of the national issue, motivating it by promoting of certain traditional arguments/ideas. With this in mind, it is understandable that certain ideological commitment is formed, as well as ideology and identity where such notions as «*native*» (or «*identical*»), «*other*» and «*strange*» frequently occur. They often act as the institutionalization and politicization resources of any national issue at the level of both ethnic core and on the periphery (namely, diasporas and national minorities). In this case, from theoretical and methodological point of view we should note that the *politicization of ethnical or national issue* (ethnicity in general) – is the process of ethnical/national communities' entering the political arena and their turning into the historical actors; *institutionalization of national ethnicity* – is the process of acquisition of main features of political actors by the ethnic groups which presupposes certain level of political acting as the well-formed ability to political activity which is defined by the level of consciousness/ organization of ethnic groups. As a consequence of such definitive understanding of the notions outlined, it becomes obvious that the politicization and institutionalization of ethno-national issue at the level of ethnic groups occurs (or can occur) at the level of formation ideas /ideologies/identities, elites, parties and organizations, society and state. The task of the suggested research is to outline the reasons, attributes, and characteristics of the concept «others» and/or «strangers» from the point of view of national identity formation and institutionalization, as well as politicization of Ukrainian and Russian identity and ethnicity and the people in Ukraine in 1990-2014.

As most modern ethnopolitologists think, formation of national identity of any ethnos always presupposes the coexistence of contrast categories– «*identical*» and «*others*». This process is quite natural, and it facilitates the ideological formation/determination of internal and external boundaries of any ethnos. On the basis of this process, any «internally-oriented» *ethno-national group* differs from any «externally-oriented» *ethno-national group*<sup>1</sup> (in the other words, each ethno-national group differs from the other one). Besides, every state consists of civil and ethno-cultural elements. Due to this, it become obvious that the state as an ethno-national phenomenon is not monolithic, internally different within different ethno-national groups (first of all by the titular ethnic group) on the basis of different stereotypes, features and national specificities. All of them make up the "strangeness" category, and are the reason of relations of the members of one ethno-national group to the representatives

<sup>1</sup> S. Hall, *Ethnicity: Identity and Difference*, [w:] G. Suny, R. Suny, *Becoming National: A Reader*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, New York 1996, s. 339-351.; I. Young, *Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of Group Political Conflict*, [w:] W. Kymlicka [red.], *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Oxford 1995, s. 155-178.

of the other ethno-national groups as to “the others”. With this in mind, E. Bruckmuller<sup>2</sup> and P. Duara<sup>3</sup> state that this is the “other/strangeness» category which is the one providing for the grounds of national identity formation and is the way of ethnic nation’s comprehension of its national identity on the basis of its separation from the identity of the «other» ethno-national groups.

The feeling of the «other/strangeness» becomes very actual when, for instance, the two ethno-national groups are very close to each other from the ethnical point of view, as well as when one ethno-national group does not acknowledge the existence of the «other» ethno-national group. In such cases the necessity of national identity defined by the difference of mutual apprehension of the «strangeness» of one ethno-national group as to the other becomes attractive for nationality with the prohibited right to exist. Russian view of Ukrainian ethno-national advancement in Ukraine completely corresponds to the described scheme, as most of the ethnic Russians in Ukraine do not perceive the ethnic Russians in Russia as their eastern neighbors. Nevertheless, the ethnic Russians in Russia do not perceive ethnic Russians in Ukraine as “foreigners”. Sometimes the two categories treat Russian and Ukrainian ethno-national groups in Ukraine as all-Russian or Eastern-Slavonic<sup>4</sup>. Nevertheless, quite often ethno-national groups of Ukrainians do not perceive ethno-national groups of Russians as «natives» (as they are more often perceived as «strangers») thus expressing their own right to formation of their personal (Ukrainian) national identity.

In this context, most significant is the fact that national identity is never fixed but dynamic, i.e. developing and changing. Its structure changes with the time and is never complete or finished. This is testified by the practice of most world countries, not only the by problem of mutual perception between the Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine. The peculiarity of the latter is that after the collapse of USSR the intensive revival and later development of Ukrainians’ self-consciousness took place. Consequently, Ukrainians, as ethno-national group managed to make national identity more self-confident as to the external world and as to the category of the «others» or «strangers» in Ukrainian ethno-political process. This process was significantly influenced by the official Eurointegrational incline of Ukraine during 1991-2013. It was explained that Ukraine and Ukrainian nation (from ethnic point of view) have to integrate within the European space, with the focus on its belonging to the Central-Eastern Europe. About formation of Ukrainian politico-national identity (as identity of European Ukrainians) explicitly testify to the protest of 2013-2014, when official Ukrainian government ceased the integration process, resulting in the Ukrainian citizens’

<sup>2</sup> E. Bruckmuller, *The National Identity of the Austrians*, [w:] M. Teich, R. Porter, *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1993, s. 196-227.

<sup>3</sup> P. Duara, *Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When*, [w:] G. Eley, R. Suny, *Becoming National: A Reader*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, New York 1996, s. 151-178.

<sup>4</sup> T. Kuzio, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: The East Slavic Conundrum*, [w:] [w:] T. Kuzio [red.], *Contemporary Ukraine*, Wyd. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY 1998, s. 221-244.

protest not only against the government but against the Russian approximation, which, from ethno-political point of view would mean the weakening of Ukrainian ethno-political identity. With this in mind, it is quite understandable that even opposition to Russia (moreover, to the Soviet past) is the reflection of the influence of the concept of «strangeness» on formation of national identity of Ukrainian citizens. The divergent position is characteristic of the part of Ukrainian citizens (very often these are ethnic Russians) who view the "pro-European" citizens as traditionally "other".

In this context, special attention should be given to the role of Ukrainian elite in the process of development of new Ukrainian «nation» and «state», as the elite plays the main role in formation of national identities of ethno-national groups according to the top-down principle. Theoretical basis of suggested process interpretation of formation the ethno-national identity – is the constructivist approach as to the manipulation of the public opinion from the side of the elite during the national and state formation process and its significant phases/events. Main idea is that formation of Ukrainian collective ethno-national identity differs from the Russian by the fact that the first, being differential, is still in the process of formation<sup>5</sup>. The thing is that the differentiation is the main constituent of formation of state and political community as such. From this point of view, I. Neumann states that ethno-national identity is impossible without the difference, therefore in the process of new ethno-national identities formation the ruling elites should focus on ethnical identity of the others<sup>6</sup>. J. Armstrong states: «Usually the groups define themselves not by understanding their own characteristics but by elimination method, as compared to the «strangers»<sup>7</sup>.

Thus, when discussing the differences of ethno-national culture the focus is placed on «natives»/»natives» as opposed to the «others»/»strangers»<sup>8</sup>. The relations between «identical» and «the others» – is the substance which by causing the future confrontations<sup>9</sup> leads to the formation of ethno-national identity of the ones and the others. «Strangeness» and ethno-national identity are interconnected, as they define who «we» are, and who – «they»<sup>10</sup> are. «The others» – are those ethno-social groups who are not considered as a part of ethnic group, ethnical community, ethnic nation or even the citizens

<sup>5</sup> W. Zimmerman, *Is Ukraine a Political Community?*, "Communist and Post-Communist Studies" 1998, vol 31, nr 1, s. 45.

<sup>6</sup> I. Neumann, *Russia as Central Europe's Constituting "Other"*, "East European Politics and Society" 1993, vol 7, nr 2, s. 350.

<sup>7</sup> J. Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, [w:] J. Hutchinson, A. Smith, *Nationalism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1994, s. 5.

<sup>8</sup> A. Gupta, J. Ferguson, *Beyond "Culture": Space, Identity and the Politics of Difference*, "Cultural Anthropology" 1992, vol 7, nr 1, s. 6-23.

<sup>9</sup> J. Penrose, *Essential Construction? The "Cultural Bases" of Nationalist Movements*, "Nations and Nationalism" 1995, vol 1, nr 3, s. 402.

<sup>10</sup> W. Connor, *Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond*, "Ethnic and Racial Studies" 1993, vol 16, nr 3, s. 373-389.; T. Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, Wyd. Pluto Press, London 2002, s. 11-18.; B. Parekh, *Discourses on National Identity*, "Political Studies" 1994, vol 42, nr 3, s. 492-504.; J. Pieterse, *Deconstructing/Reconstructing Ethnicity*, "Nations and Nationalism" 1997, vol 3, nr 3, s. 365-395.; G. Schopflin, *Obstacles to Liberalism in post-Communist Politics*, "East European Politics and Societies" 1991, vol 5, nr 1, s. 189-194.; R. Taras, *Nations and language-building: old theories, contemporary cases*, "Nationalism and Ethnic Politics" 1998, vol 4, nr 3, s. 79-101.

of the country. Therefore, ethno-national and public (political) national formation includes two processes – excluding of ethnically «other» and including the citizens in the context of «natives». Besides, identity can not be understandable outside the relations with the ethnically «others»<sup>11</sup>, as without the «strangeness» it is hard to form the “inside groups” within the ethnical identity. Therefore, J. Penrose<sup>12</sup> states: «If the individuals compare themselves to some people and differentiate themselves from «the others», it leads to the formation of relationships between the people who consider themselves “identical”. That is why the task of the state and its creators (elite) is about including and excluding, codification and support of different ethno-national groups<sup>13</sup>, namely into the political nation. Without this, it will be impossible to form the national identity, because this is due to the confrontation with «the others» that ethno-national community lacks “external institutionalization»<sup>14</sup>.

At the beginning of its independence (national existence) new states have to establish their ethnical identity and sovereignty against the former metropolitan countries or the other states defined as «the others». If national identity of ethno-national community is threatened, as in some cases in Ukraine, the codification of ethnical borders is much more significant<sup>15</sup> (and then antagonism to the “other/strangeness” is much more obvious). According to A. Finlayson, in order «to be itself» the nation should always produce the idea of antagonistic others who prevent it from «being itself»<sup>16</sup>.

Some researchers believe that the «strangeness» can also be created among the communities without any essential ethno-social differences: the communities can even be territorially close, but «the other» can be perceived as the threat to the ethnical *identity*. These «*significant others*» destroy the uniqueness of ethno-national groups and threaten the identity of titular ethnic group. Therefore, I. Neumann and J. Welsh note that “public enemy” «shall not be moral evil, it should not be esthetically ugly, he should not act as the economic competitor, and, probably, it would be even profitable to have business relations with him»<sup>17</sup>. Reverse situation is characteristic of the relations between Ukrainian and Russian ethnoses in Ukraine after USSR collapse. It is conditioned both by internally-Ukrainian factors (peculiarity of Ukrainian political elite and aspiration to create the phenomenon of ethnical and not political Ukrainian nation from legislative point of view), and position

<sup>11</sup> T. Nieguth, *Beyond Dichotomy: Concepts of the Nation and the Distribution of Membership*, “Nations and Nationalism” 1999, vol 5, nr 2, s. 155-174.; A. Alonso, *The Politics of Space, Time and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism, and Ethnicity*, “Annual Review of Anthropology” 1994, vol 23, s. 379-405.

<sup>12</sup> J. Penrose, *Essential Construction? The “Cultural Bases” of Nationalist Movements*, “Nations and Nationalism” 1995, vol 1, nr 3, s. 402.

<sup>13</sup> P. James, *Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*, Wyd. Sage, London 1996, s. 33.

<sup>14</sup> S. Hall, *Introduction*, [w:] S. Hall, P. de Gay, *Who Needs Identity? Questions of Cultural Identity*, Wyd. Sage 1996, s. 4-5.

<sup>15</sup> T. Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, Wyd. Pluto Press, London 2002, s. 68.; A. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: a critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism*, Wyd. Routledge 1998, s. 182.

<sup>16</sup> A. Finlayson, *Ideological Discourse and Nationalism*, “Journal of Political Ideologies” 1998, vol 3, nr 1, s. 116.

<sup>17</sup> I. Neumann, J. Welsh, *The Other in European Self-Definition: A Critical Addendum to the Literature on International Society*, “Review of International Studies” 1991, vol 17, nr 4, s. 332.

of the former USSR metropolitan, this is what Russia currently is (not as a consequence of implementation of the "compatriot" policy, but as a consequence of geopolitical pressure of Russia on Ukraine). As a consequence the states and Ukrainian and Russian ethnos in Ukraine compete for the territory, history and cultural heritage, stating that specific myths, symbols and origin are the part of their national past. Moreover, the historiography, myths and legends which are culturally structured often form different ethno-political positioning of Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine as to who is the titular nation (or group), and who is national (or ethnical) minority in this state<sup>18</sup>. Nevertheless, during 1991-2014 with the gradual acceleration in Ukraine quite "new" definition of ethno-national discourse takes place as well as formation of new nationally-political identity of Ukrainians and Russians. They essentially differ from ethnically-national identity of Ukrainians (as «the others») and Russians/Soviet people (as «natives») of USSR epoch and the Russians as «strangers» and Ukrainians as «natives» (Russian-speaking Ukrainians – as the «others») in nowadays' Ukraine<sup>19</sup>.

*Language*<sup>20</sup> can be an important aspect of difference between the «natives» and «the others». Thus, the elevation of Ukrainian language and decrease of the role of the Russian language at the dawn of Ukrainian independence was used as a differentiating factor between Ukraine and Russia<sup>21</sup>. But the Russians are accustomed to the conclusion: their language is «supreme», it is used by the «cultural» peoples and society where Ukrainians get the access to the external world. For the Russians Ukrainian language is «provincial», «country-like», and unacceptable to the national elite, culture and science. Nevertheless, for Ukrainian principal language difference is less significant and even secondary. They not necessarily identify the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine as the Russians or the «strangers» (although, this differentiation becomes stronger during the elections period, i.e. is politically conditioned at most).

One more significant factor of theoretical discussions designating ethnically «significant others», such as Russians in case of Ukraine, – «the feeling of belonging to the groups,

<sup>18</sup> G. Schopflin, *The Functions of Myth and A Taxonomy of Myths*, [w:] G. Hosking, G. Schopflin, *Myths and Nationhood*, Wyd. Routledge, New York 1997, s. 20.

<sup>19</sup> A. Wilson, *Myth of National History in Belarus and Ukraine*, [w:] G. Hosking, G. Schopflin [red.], *Myths and Nationhood*, Wyd. Routledge, New York 1997, s. 182-197.; C. Wanner, *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Post-Communist Cultural Studies*, Wyd. Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park 1998.; T. Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building*, Wyd. Routledge, London-New York 1998.; J. Janmaat, *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population*, Wyd. Royal Dutch Geographical Society, Amsterdam 2000.

<sup>20</sup> But it is not always so. Thus, in Germany and Austria they speak one (German) language, but post-war Austrian national formation has never even created separate identity. In some cases, such as Hyeres (Ireland), which now speaks English, different groups were used in producing the differences from its closest neighbor, Great Britain. Despite this, «the strangeness» can still play the role of the sameness determination even where the people speak the same language (for instance, English in Ireland or Scotland). The other factors work here – history, political culture, foreign policy, etc. They play the role of determination of «strangeness». This happens because, probably, it is hard for individuals to determine their national identity, and possible intuitive feeling – individuals meet the foreigners which causes their differences». This process is accelerated by the formation of titular groups within the states. A. Triandafyllidou, *National Identity and the Other*, "Ethnic and Racial Studies" 1998, vol 21, nr 4, s. 598.; T. Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building*, Wyd. Routledge, London-New York 1998, s. 110-118.

<sup>21</sup> T. Kuzio, *Status of Russian Language Again Threatens Ukrainian-Russian Relations*, "RFE/RL Newslines" 2001, vol 5, nr 6, źródło: <http://www.ualberta.ca/CIUS/stasiuk/st-articles/an-rus-lang.htm> (lipiec 2013).

as well as demarcation of territory, ethnical and cultural *boarders* «<sup>22</sup>. Understanding that Russia wants to deplete the strength of Ukrainian political elite in the foreign country, forces to watch the defenders of Ukrainian sovereignty, argue about delimitation and demarcation of the boarders, and disagree with the Russian suggestion as to the «transparent» internal boarders of CIS<sup>23</sup>.

Generally, it is obvious that the formation of «the others» is connected with the *internal/external policy*, as well as with the ethnical or political understanding of nation. Thus, for example, during 1991-2013 the integration of ethno-national identity in Ukraine presupposed the national formation from the part of the national elites, stressing internal similarities in the ethno-national group of Ukrainians as opposed to the ethno-national groups of foreigners or «the others» and «strangers» (for instance, Russians). Thus, for the ethnical nation, in order to exist in the form of titular group both unity and homogeneity are necessary. It is due to this that the ideological, ethnical or territorial peculiarities are determined (or their combinations) of the «strangeness» in Ukraine<sup>24</sup>. The existence of the other causes the «synthesizing of the native» in the ethnical context.

Therefore, growing ethno-national self-identification of Ukrainians at the dawn of independent Ukraine was closely connected with the differential principle of self-differentiation from «the others». Russia is the closest to Ukraine from historical, cultural, lingual and ethnical views. Therefore, it is necessary to make «distances» between Ukraine and Russia in a wider relation than the correlation of Central-Eastern Europe and Russia. For this reason, V. Hryniov in his day said that «main supremacy of Ukrainian policy for a long period of time is ... in demonstration of the tendency «as much as possible « and as «separate as possible» from Russia»<sup>25</sup>. In this case the language played a very important role in Ukrainians' self-identification, because this is a potential symbol of titular ethnos identity. At the same time, the language has not become integral and self-sufficient «symbol» of strangeness in Ukraine from political strangeness in Ukraine from political view or from the point of view of the probability of political nation formation (it will be discussed later).

But still *Russian-speaking Ukrainians* constitute an extraordinary problem. Their language preferences have long been confirmed by the foreign-political orientations, which almost always were Eurasian, therefore, they have become the object of territorial constructions in Russia, which made and makes explicit and implicit attempts to intervene into the ethnical territories of the other titular ethnos, namely into Ukrainian on behalf of the Russians'

<sup>22</sup> A. Triandafyllidou, *National Identity and the Other*, "Ethnic and Racial Studies" 1998, vol 21, nr 4, s. 603.; A. Motyl, *After Empire: Competing Discourses and Inter-state Conflicts in Post-imperial Eastern Europe*, [w:] J. Snyder, B. Rubin, *Post-Soviet Political Order*, Wyd. Routledge, New York 1998, s. 30-31.

<sup>23</sup> P. D'Anieri, *Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations*, Wyd. SUNY Press, New York 1999.

<sup>24</sup> S. Shulman, *Asymmetrical International Integration and Ukrainian National Disunity*, "Political Geography" 1999, vol 18, nr 8, s. 913-939.

<sup>25</sup> V. Hryniov, *Nova Ukraina: Iakou ia ii Bachu*, Wyd. Abrys 1995, s. 81.

motherland. The so-called «Russian protection of Russian-speaking population» («compatriots») on the territory of the former USSR, especially in Ukraine, constitutes the serious threat to the safety of this country. It also provides for the attraction for this new country (actually mono-national with two main languages) to go against the russification process (in contrast to the changes in the process of ukrainisation)<sup>26</sup>.

Therefore, it is obvious that the concept of ethnic «strangeness» in Ukraine was formed by different vectors of influence: first of all external, with the involvement of internal. *External* is significantly bound by the Russia's aspiration to participate in formation of priorities of national and political development of Ukraine (of Ukrainian ethnos through the prism of protection of ethnical Russians and Russian language in Ukraine). *The internal* is usually realized on the basis of functioning of pro-Russian parties in Ukraine, in particular of the Communist party of Ukraine, Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, the party «Russian-Ukrainian Coalition (Rus)», «Kyiv Ruis», «Russian Block», «Motherland», Left Coalition, «Union», «Rusichi» and their derivatives, etc. The synthesis of external and internal vectors of ethnical «Russian strangeness» in Ukraine is the position about acknowledgement of inefficiency of Ukrainian national idea first of all by the representatives of Russian ethno-national minority. Additional motive of different times were /are the doubts of world community about probability of successful realization of Ukrainian identity. Along with the economic factors who influence the level of life in Ukraine, Russian national minority obtained the subconscious motive to get institutionalized as internal ethnical (to a lesser extent political) «others» with relation to whom there are very few interpretational ideas of future development. This motivation acquired practical realization in the context of Eurointegrational perspective of Ukraine. It has become the key factor of controversies among the part of the citizens of Ukraine (ethnic Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians independent of the language of communication), particularly, in the context of future development problem solution and its planning in Ukraine<sup>27</sup>.

At the same time the Soviet past produces totally different emotions for Ukrainian people: this is a positive nomination of «the other» ethno-national groups from the socially-economic point of view, as well as negative positioning of «the other» ethno-national groups in political plane. Political aspect was initiated by Ukraine's obtainment of its independence, as well as by the «zero version» of the law about citizenship. It acquires its permanent particular significance in the context of electoral cycles, as well as in solving the pressing issues of geopolitical choice of Ukraine. It is noteworthy that during 1994-2013 the role of «*Russian others*» has been strengthening in its influence on the political process in Ukraine. At the same time,

<sup>26</sup> D. Arel, *Ukraine. The temptation of the Nationalizing State*, [w:] V. Tismaneanu [red.], *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Wyd. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY 1995, s. 157-188.; Kuzio, 'Nationalising states' or nation-building? A critical review of the theoretical literature and empirical evidence, "Nations and Nationalism" 2001, vol 1, nr 2, s. 135-154.

<sup>27</sup> O. Haran, O. Majboroda, *Ukrains'ki Livi: Mizh Leninizmom i Sotsial-Demokratieiu*, Wyd. KM Academia 2000.

the level of Ukrainian nationally-political identity has deepened. The reason is that on the one hand the pressure of the Russians' ethnic motherland is increasing and on the other hand more and more people are socialized in new Ukrainian historiography discussing negative sides of the Soviet power and its Russian heritage and possible alternative variants of the future development. Moreover, judging by the situation in 2000 which was the first year of Ukrainian economic growth, this vector is able to minimize the influence of *economic plane* of ethnic «strangeness», and maximize its *political (civil) component*<sup>28</sup>. The reverse tendency has shown itself starting from 2008-2009 (under financial crisis conditions), when the political component of the «strangeness» has taken the first position. The burst was observed in 2013-2014 when the phenomenon of the «others» and «strangers» synthesized in itself the internal and external economic, ethnical and political components due to which «Ukrainian people» and «Ukrainian political nation» with its own politico-national identity have become the key factor (this will be discussed later in the context of assessment the intermediate consequences of Euromaidan and national establishment in Ukraine). Interestingly, in the said context, ethnic Ukrainians (independent of their communication language) most frequently consider ethnic «strangeness of the Russians» a favorable factor for the development of ethnic identity and national consciousness of Ukrainian people as a titular ethnos. At the same time, the citizens of Ukraine (independent of their communication language and very frequently from ethnic origin) become more and more aware of their political and national significance in the very fact of their existence and future development of Ukraine as an indigenous nation.

Therefore, from the point of view of many ethnic Russians in Ukraine the «strangeness» tendency is dangerous. The matter is that according to this principle, it is suggested to create an *ethnocratic nation* with many positive factors in monoethnic societies, though, according to the ethnic Russians there are no reasons of existence in Ukraine. Ethnic Russians understand that in the ethnocratic nation titular Ukrainian groups occupy the top position of the ideological pyramid of identity in the society. At the same time, the Russians' role is secondary which, from the position of the possibility of their institutionalization, is insignificant. V. Shved says that this idea causes a number of restrictions for the ethnical Russians<sup>29</sup>. In political process these dichotomies are reflected in positioning of different political forces: 1) *the concept of ethnocratic nation* is expressed by such parties as Rukh (Movement), Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Ukrainian Nationalists Organization, «Svoboda» («Freedom»); 2) *the confederacy idea* (as an example of the former USSR) is supported by the Communist party of Ukraine, Progressive socialist party of Ukraine, Organization of Russian minority in Ukraine. Despite this, most of political parties of Ukraine keep to the medial position. Though, this slowed

<sup>28</sup> J. Urban, *The Communist Parties of Russia and Ukraine on the Eve of the 1999 Election: Similarities, Contrasts and Interaction*, «Democratization» 1998, vol 7, nr 1, s. 111-134.; T. Kuzio, *Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine before and after Independence: The Right and its Politics, 1989-1994*, «Nationalities Papers» 1997, vol 25, nr 2, s. 211-242.

<sup>29</sup> V. Shved, *The Conceptual Approaches of Ukrainian Political Parties to Ethno-Political Problems in Independent Ukraine*, «Journal of Ukrainian Studies» 1994, vol 19, nr 2, s. 69-84.

down the process of formation of consolidated Ukrainian national and political or civil identity up to 2013-2014. It was very much influenced by the focus of Ukrainian legislative policy on formulation of the principles of Ukrainian ethnic nation. This problem is aggravated by the positioning of ethno-national issue by the parties in Ukraine.

Interestingly, political parties, depending upon their ideological orientation, consider the idea of the "Strangeness of Russians" differently. *The right and center-right parties* appeal to the idea that one should differentiate between the «Ukrainian Russians» and «the other Russians», living in the Russian Federation outside Ukraine. *Centrist parties* do not deny the fact that Russians who live in Ukraine are the part of political nation (although they do not work enough to provide for the legislative support of political nation phenomenon). In contrast to this, ethnic «other Russians» – is the category of all Russians from Russia and from Ukraine who do not support the idea about formation of Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group, as well as Ukrainian nation as a permanent unity. *The left and left-centrist parties* are inclined to think that Ukraine and Russia should be considered in the context of the unified Europe and Eurasia, and the Russians and Ukrainians as the kindred ethno-national unity. This actually means that the denial of such ethno-national group as Ukrainians (quite frequently the representatives of these parties appeal to the notion of «the people» which is formally deprived of ethno-national association). Extrapolation of these positions of the parties in Ukraine on the perspectives of the future development of Ukrainian sovereignty, namely from the point of view of interethnic relations shows that: 1) most of Ukrainian parties view ethnic Russians in Ukraine as the "strangeness constituting the national minority (except for the radical right parties which view the Russians in Ukraine as the «fifth column»); also sometimes left radical parties also distinguish themselves as they view Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine as the representatives of one Slavonic ethnos, actually denying the right of Ukrainian people to self-identification); 2) political parties treat ethnic country of the Russians (Russia) from different points of view: radical right parties – ethnical, right parties – from ethno-territorial and ideological, centrists – as territorial and ideological, left and radical left parties – as ideological.

Generally the following conclusion can be made: most parties at the national level accept the idea of ethnic «strangeness» of Russian past and Russian national minority in Ukraine. Therefore, institutionalization and politicization of Russian minority in Ukraine in the parties' views is caused by the phenomenon of ethnocratism of some political forces. At the same time, the attitude of official power to the problem of Russians perception in Ukraine varies between territorial and ethno-territorial<sup>30</sup>. It means that as of 2014 in Ukraine the *formation of integral civil or political national identity failed* (the perspectives of political nation

<sup>30</sup> In 1991-1994 . (presidency of L. Kravchuk) Russia as the «strangeness» was the enemy as to the ideological component. In 1994-2004 and 2010-2014 during the presidency of L. Kuchma and V. Yanukovich, the other view of Russian "strangeness" – territorial has formed. The period of 2005-2009 (during V. Yushchenko's presidency) was characterized to the ethnic Russians as to the ethno-territorial differentiation. Partially see.: R. Szporluk, *The National Question*, [w:] J. Colton, R. Legvold, *After the Soviet Union: From Empire to Nations*, Wyd. W.W. Norton, New York 1992, s. 105.

formation in the context of ideas at the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014 are discussed below). From legislative point of view Ukrainian people and national development projects are related with the debates about how Ukrainian identity will be consolidated and how ethnical “others” will be viewed in the context of national establishment. Anyway, there is total tension, as the idea of self-identity requires complex consideration of ethnic and political «strangeness»<sup>31</sup>. Moreover, in case Ukrainian and Russian national identities diverge, this is most obvious in how they perceive the external world. For instance, it is understandable that «Ukrainians ... work for perception of their political world which significantly differs from the respondents in the regions of the European part of Russia «<sup>32</sup>. Generally, it should be noted that Ukraine is characterized by «transitional ethnic and political identity», which, sooner or later, under the influence of different, including the described factors, will acquire the features of permanence (it bears repeating that the paces of acquisition of permanence of Ukrainian political identity have significantly grown from 1991 to 2014). In 2013, though, the two factors were noticed in the development of identity of Ukrainian people representatives (not ethnoses) : 1) hierarchical pattern of several ethnic identities; 2) mutual exclusion of these ethnic values. Inconsistency of ethnic identities which is the reason of institutionalization and politicization of Ukrainians and Russians, is reflected in such tendencies as absence of common history and culture, common legal rights and liabilities, common view of the future.

This is significantly testified to by the differentiated positioning of Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine. This is it and political process inflicted on it (namely during the elections period) which constitutes the problem of future geopolitical and foreign-economic establishment of the new nation. The matter is that Russians and Ukrainians identify themselves with different communities:

**Table 1.** Relation of the ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine to their belonging (as of 2010)

Marker	Ukrainians	Russians	Other	Totally
To Ukraine	56,9	28,3	29,2	48,3
To CIS	5,3	10,4	8,0	6,7
To USSR	15,5	33,0	27,4	20,5
To the region	13,2	15,9	23,9	14,5
To Russia	1,0	5,3	1,8	2,0
To Europe	2,3	2,1	2,6	2,3
Hard to tell	5,8	6,1	7,1	5,7

Źródło: T. Kuzio, *Nationalism, identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution*, „Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 2010, vol 30, s. 1-12.

<sup>31</sup> I. Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge 1998, s. 18.

<sup>32</sup> W. Zimmerman, *Is Ukraine a Political Community?*, „Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 1998, vol 31, nr 1, s. 52.

The difference is noticeable also to the determination and description of peculiarities of nationalism in Ukraine, which should be characterized by the attributes of «banality»<sup>33</sup> in the context of formation of national identity of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians. In Ukraine the two nationalism phenomena have spread: «ethnic» (Ukrainians) and «East-Slavonic» (Russian/Post-Soviet). The first one embraces the ideas of the right / radical right parties, the second one – the idea of left/radical parties. *Ukrainian nationalism* is the ethno-political (more frequently ideologically-political) direction which determines Ukraine as the exclusive nation in its narrow (or ethnical understanding). It has the following exponents – Ukrainian National Assembly, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Federation of National independence of Ukraine, the party «Svoboda» (Freedom), Social-National party, organization «Right sector». *Russian nationalism* is very weak in Ukraine. Since imperial and soviet domination the specific intentions of the Russian ethno-national formation have not been formed, but still the idea of general national identity has been realized<sup>34</sup>. Therefore, Russian ethno-nationalists in Ukraine always felt the weakness during the elections. *Post-soviet nationalism* has become more attractive because it was incorporated in the ideas of the Communist party of Ukraine that the russified Ukrainians avoid the ethnic Russian nationalism<sup>35</sup>. But despite this, post-soviet nationalism comes from the pre-soviet belief that Ukrainians are ethnographic and regional Russian group, which should be unified with the other ethnic Russians. Thus, quite obviously, ethnic and east-Slavonic nationalisms in Ukraine are mutually strange. Moreover, their identity contradicts to the multi-national composition of Ukrainian population and constitutes the threat of «ethnic domination»<sup>36</sup> in Ukraine. The most vivid separation between the types of nationalism in Ukraine occurred in 2004 – during the president's election. From the first sight the similar separation has occurred in 2013-2014 during the conflict due to the expected perspectives of the later geopolitical choice and socially-economic development of Ukraine<sup>37</sup>. It is also noteworthy that ethnic «strangeness» and «nationalism»

<sup>33</sup> T. Kuzio, *Nationalism, identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution*, „Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 2010, vol 30, s. 1-12.

<sup>34</sup> A. Lieven, *The weakness of Russian nationalism*, „Survival” 1999, vol 41, s. 53-70.

<sup>35</sup> A. Wilson, *Competing models of Ukrainian national identity*, [w:] *Ukraine: Challenges of the Continued Transition*, Conference Report, 30 June 1999, Wyd. National Intelligence Council and Department of State, Washington August 1999, s. 7-10.

<sup>36</sup> J. Bugajski, *Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems in Independent Ukraine*, [w:] S.Wolchik, V. Zviglyanich [red.], *Ukraine. The Search for a National Identity*, Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham 2000, s. 173.

<sup>37</sup> «*Ethnic Ukrainian*» nationalism includes those national democratic parties which, during 2004 elections supported the candidacy of V. Yushchenko, and radical right ethnic nationalists who focused their views and beliefs on the ideals of ethnic nationalism of the epoch of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. In 2013-2014 they showed themselves as the proponents of Eurointegrational searching of Ukraine (before that radical right parties declaimed against any integration of Ukraine). «*East-Slavonic*» *Russian/post-soviet nationalism* incorporated at first radical left Communist party, and then left-centrist party of regions as their ideological inspirers. Starting from 2000 East-Slavonic nationalism because of the decrease of the popularity of Communist party in Ukraine and left its radical left orientation for the left-centrist vector incorporated in the Party of regions. This ideological direction appeals to the Russian-speaking population and is «pro-Russian», although to the different extent from the point of view of interpretation this *pro-Russian orientation* – first of all, as to the ideology (left wing, Communist party of Ukraine), but secondly, as to the *pragmatism* (the matter is about centrist wing, which is mostly constituted by the Party of Regions). In 2013-2014 the proponents of Russian/post-soviet nationalism were against the Eurointegrational intentions of Ukraine, but were the proponents of the closeness with Russia.

in Ukraine are territorially-conditioned. Thus, «ethnic» Ukrainian nationalism gravitates toward Western Ukraine, and the east-Slavonic Russian (post-soviet) nationalism – to the Eastern Ukraine and Crimea<sup>38</sup>.

Though, the events of the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014 (Euromaidan, its reasons and all the events related thereto) turned out to be more unexpected from the point of view of comparing «natives-others-strangers» in the ethnical and political contexts. For the first time in the history of Ukraine after its independence obtainment the scientists started to talk about the possibility of political nation formation in Ukraine, which reflects totally different system of values, than the one prevailing in Ukraine in the context of ethnic view of Ukrainian natiogenesis. Surely, the changes in perception of significance of ethnic and political factors is the result of the events of two-three months. They are caused by the whole complex of objective and subjective factors of the development of Ukrainian sovereignty, etc. In the end of 2013 it became obvious that the ethnic (ethno-lingual)national component of national understanding and identification of Ukrainian population was stratified by the political component, which should define the natiogenesis perspectives and future nation-building. Main reason is the awareness of non-realization and/or delay of the systemic reforms in Ukraine, which, judging by the practice of the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe should have been implemented in 1990-s. Instead of reforms and changes usual phenomenon has become the concern of Ukrainian government first of all not about the national matters but about their personal enrichment. Thus, usual Ukrainian (as Ukrainian citizen – independent of his ethnic origin, native language and communication language) has become actually isolated from his national resources. These processes, from political point of view, resulted in the decline of confidence in the state government, its identification with «the others» or with «strangers», but not with its own people («natives») as political substance delegating the authorities to the government.

But this political interpretation of differentiation between «native-other-stranger» does not fully coincide with generally-accepted ethno-lingual differentiation between the “native” or “stranger”. Great number of unexpected instances of non-correspondence between ethnic and political interpretation of «native» or «stranger» was noticed at the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014. For instance, the question arises of how the part of ethnic Ukrainians supporting Euromaidan perceives ethnic Ukrainians who do not support Euromaidan, but prefer political regime/government. Do ethnic Ukrainians view each other as «natives» or «strangers»? The similar problem arises in how Euromaidan participants belonging to different ethnic nations or to the same ethnic nation but speaking different (Ukrainian and Russian) languages perceive each other. And vice versa, how Euromaidan opponents and government proponents also belonging to different ethnic groups and speaking different languages

---

<sup>38</sup> V. Kipen, Y. Pasko, *Donetsk regional identity: some dimensions of analysis*, „Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona” 2006, vol 1., s. 56-59.

perceive each other. The said dispositions force to think about the nature of not just ethnic or ethno-lingual differentiation in Ukraine (actually, it has become secondary, because ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians, Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking population constitute equal parts of those who support or do not support Euromaidan), and about its political governmental and oppositional component. Today for oppositional Ukrainian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians «the other», but not «the stranger» is ethnic Russian-speaking Ukrainian who does not support the government/regime. Moreover, quite a great number of oppositional ethnic Ukrainians who do not support the government/regime, consider each other as «the natives» even despite the fact that they speak different languages (Ukrainian and Russian). The situation becomes even more expressive when comparing oppositional ethnic Ukrainians who speak exclusive Ukrainian and ethnic Ukrainians who can or can not speak Ukrainian on condition that both groups do not support the regime. Instead, the difference between the “natives” and “the others” (but not “strangers”) is more tangible when comparing ethnic Ukrainians who speak Ukrainian and ethnic non-Ukrainians who do not speak Ukrainian but support Euromaidan. The worldview distance becomes shorter when comparing the ethnic Ukrainians (who speak and do not speak Ukrainian) and ethnic non-Ukrainians (for instance, Russians, Armenians, Byelorussians) who speak Ukrainian or other language and support Euromaidan. Actually, it means that today the boundary between the “native” and “the other” becomes less separate, it loses its primary ethnic and ethno-lingual nature, shifts to the political plane of understanding the natiogenesis and national building.

In this non-homogeneous composition and/or structuration of Ukrainian people in the context of Euromaidan events the interpretation of “strangers” has become very interesting. They are represented by those citizens or non-citizens of Ukraine who do not support political regime, independent of their ethnic or ethno-lingual belonging. But here certain deviations are noticed. For example, the worldview distance between such variants of cooperation is quite different: 1) ethnic Ukrainian who speaks Ukrainian and supports Euromaidan and ethnic Ukrainian who speaks Ukrainian and supports the government/regime; 2) ethnic Ukrainian who speaks Ukrainian and support Euromaidan, and ethnic Ukrainian who does not speak Ukrainian and supports government /regime (or vice versa); 3) ethnic Ukrainian who speaks or does not speak Ukrainian and supports Euromaidan, and ethnic Ukrainian who, independent of language supports the government/regime; 4) ethnic non-Ukrainian who, independent of his language, supports Euromaidan, and ethnic Ukrainian or non-Ukrainian who, independent of his language supports the government/regime, etc. Actually, political “strangers” can embrace ethnical and ethno-linguistical “natives”, “others” and “strangers”.

The suggested patterns of application of the concepts «natives-others-strangers» from ethnic and political view in the context of Ukrainian people structuration at the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014 allows making the conclusion about gradual transformation of ethno-lingual mechanism of national self-identification of Ukrainians into political mechanism

of national formation. And this shows that the citizens cease identifying themselves as Ukrainians or non-Ukrainians most on the basis of ethnic and ethno-lingual belonging and lingual practice, and instead resort to political self-identification, perception of Ukraine as a “nation”. Main reasons and leitmotifs of the beginning of political nation formation in Ukraine today should be considered as follows: consolidated and intended position which unifies most of Ukrainian people and reduces itself to the necessity of conducting the system reforms and facilitating the civil civilizational development; realization of the fact by the representatives of Ukrainian people (independent of its ethnic origin and linguistic practice) that conducting the efficient reforms is possible only according to the results of establishment of efficient governmental institutes; the intention to find and realize innovative for Ukrainian people business model which is different from the previous practice of national establishment, denies it and adopts new alternative (in this respect Eurointegrational intentions of Ukrainian people are most significant, independent of its ethnic and linguistic structuring).

The attainment of the beginning of political nation formation in Ukraine today can be considered the efforts to avoid ethnic and lingual extremes – «Ukraine for Ukrainians», «Ukrainian Ukraine», etc. The peculiarity of political nation or political identification of nation is the aspiration to avoid the attempts to form the ideology of «titular nation». Instead, political nation realizes itself in the plane of national and political ideology, which always has consolidated (but not separating) goals and/or objectives, is able to synthesize the phenomenon of «Ukrainian people». It actually means that political nation incorporates the right to self-identification which is constitutionally assigned to people.

The evidence of the beginning of formation of political nation in Ukraine according to the results of the events of the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014 there aroused the perception of the civil ideology values by most of Ukrainian people reflected in the feeling of responsibility for the fate of Ukraine, patriotism and humanism, democracy and social justice, education, etc. Moreover, the beginning of political nation formation in Ukraine is testified by the fact that ethnic Ukrainians, despite their language increasingly strive for scientific and objective presentation of history and real events. It means that the phenomenon of political nation bears the potential of ideological difference decrease between «the others», and “strangers”. The aspiration to overcome the corruption, introduce the transparent and independent judicial system, realize the consensus of political class and society on all the primary national issues is the Catalyzer of political nation formation in Ukraine. These 2014 aspirations were reflected in the realization of the fact by Ukrainian people that mutual rapprochement and mutual penetration between the government and civil society should always take place. It means that the first manifestations of political nation in Ukraine should be actually incorporated in the two decentralized processes – national socialization and society politicization. Generally, it is obvious that the concept of ethnic and political «strangeness» constitutes the cornerstone of relations between ethnic Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine,

though, it can be weakened on condition of political nation formation. With this in mind, it is obvious that the concept of «strangeness» plays an essential role in the national self-identification and should be underwent. First of all politico-national identity is differentiated as a consequence of the influence of the “natives”, “the others” and “strangers” and then consolidated. And only after that it is believed that political nation is full-fledged.