

МІГРАЦІЙНА ПОЛІТИКА КРАЇН ВИШЕГРАДСЬКОЇ ГРУПИ НА ФОНІ МІГРАЦІЙНОЇ КРИЗИ В ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОМУ СОЮЗІ

Стаття присвячена розгляду особливостей міграційної політики країн Вишеградської групи – Польщі, Словаччини, Угорщини та Чехії – на фоні міграційної кризи в Європейському союзі. Вчений виокремив кілька секторів/предметних галузей дослідження означеної проблематики: історію та нормативно-правову базу міграційної політики в країнах ЄС, особливості етнічного складу населення країн Вишеградської групи, особливості позиціонування міграційного/етнічного питання в діяльності політичних партій у країнах Вишеградської групи, особливості вирішення міграційного питання (міграційної кризи) в країнах Вишеградської групи. Було аргументовано, що в ситуації, яка склалась сьогодні, країни Вишеградської групи мають поглибити свою співпрацю, зокрема і стосовно вироблення уніфікованої регіональної міграційної політики.

Ключові слова: міграція, міграційна політика, міграційна криза, етнічне питання, партія, країни Вишеградської групи.

Migration policy of the Visegrad Countries on the background of migration crisis in the European Union

The article is dedicated to analyzing the characteristics of migration policy of the Visegrad countries – Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic – on the background of the migration crisis in the European Union. The researcher has identified several sectors/subject areas of the study: the history and legal framework of migration policy in the EU, the features of ethnic composition of the Visegrad countries, the features of the positioning of migration/ethnic issues in the political parties activities in the Visegrad countries, the features migration issues (migration crisis) solving in the Visegrad countries. It was argued that in the situation that has developed today, the Visegrad countries should deepen their cooperation, including in relation to the production of a unified regional migration policy.

Keywords: migration, migration policy, migration crisis, ethnic issues, party, the Visegrad countries.

Among the manifestations of internationalization and democratization of economic and social-cultural life of the humanity, as well as the results of acute international contradictions, confrontations between nations and countries, emergency situations and natural disasters are widespread inner-state and inter-state movement of population and labor force in other words migration. It concerns voluntary migrants, who enjoy their right for employment and place of residence, refugees and displaced people, who leave their motherland against their will and under pressure of various circumstances. The dimensions of flows and dramatism of migration processes over some periods of time and years are transforming into global issues. That is why their overcoming requires wide international cooperation and consensus. That is the case why the international community and some separate countries permanently face the problem of coordinating their actions aimed at solving sharp situations and collective regulation of migration flows. Thus, the phenomenon of migration crisis and its place in the process and solution among the Visegrad countries – Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which are the EU members – is not an exception. Correspondingly, the subject of the current research is the migration policy of the Visegrad countries on the background of handling the crisis in the unite Europe in early 21st century. By the way, migration issues within the given context concerns both unified EU's directives and practices of dealing with migration flows and diversified roadmaps for overcoming the migration crisis in the Visegrad group. Moreover, current range of problems is determined by taking into account the ethnic composition of the societies in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and, consequently, its extrapolation on actual social and political divisions in the Visegrad countries, coopted into existence and functioning of the so-called anti-migration political parties.

A current range of problems and their historical interpretation have been mainly studied by such scholars as: S. Goedings¹, M. Leon-Ledesma and M. Piracha², A. Politi³, H. Werner⁴, M. Okolski and D. Stola⁵, A. Woroniecki⁶, D. Drbohlav⁷, E. Collett⁸, O. Potemkina⁹ and others. The analysis of various kinds of academic literature and examination of empirical and statistic data give an opportunity to reveal several sectors/ domains of the given research. Firstly, we are referring to the migration policy within the EU countries, secondly – to the characteristics of the ethnical composition of the Visegrad countries' population, thirdly – to the peculiarities of

¹ S. Goedings, *EU Enlargement to the East and Labour Migration to the West*, International Institute of Social History Research Paper 1999, nr 36, źródło: <http://www.iisg.nl/publications/respap36.pdf> [odczyt: 01 listopada 2016].

² M. Leon-Ledesma, M. Piracha, *International Migration and the Role of remittances in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. UK Economic and Social Research Council 2001.

³ A. Politi, *The new dimensions of organized crime in Southeastern Europe*, "The International Spectator" 1999, nr 34, s. 49-58.

⁴ H. Werner, *Temporary Migration of Foreign Workers: Illustrated with Special Regard to east-West Migrations*, Strasburg 1996.

⁵ M. Okolski, *Migrant Trafficking in Poland – Actors, Mechanisms, Combating*, "Institute for Social Studies Working Papers", Series "Migrations" 1999, nr 24; M. Okolski, D. Stola, *Migrations between Poland and European Union: the Perspective of Poland's Future Membership*, "Institute for Social Studies Working Papers", Series "Migrations" 1999, nr 25.

⁶ A. Woroniecki, *Illegal Migration in Poland*, "Center for European Security Studies Working Papers" 2000.

⁷ D. Drbohlav, *The Czech Republic*, [w:] C. Wallace, D. Stola (eds), *Patterns of Migration in Central Europe*, Wyd. Springer 2001, s. 203–226.

⁸ E. Collett, *Beyond Stockholm: overcoming the inconsistencies of immigration policy*, "European Policy Centre Working Paper" 2009, nr 32, źródło: <http://www.mezikulturnidialog.cz/res/data/011/001314.pdf> [odczyt: 01 listopada 2016].

⁹ O. Potemkina, *Mylnatsyonny kryzys v ES: rol' stran vyshelnradskoy hruppy*, "Sovremennaya Evropa" 2015, nr 6, s. 36-45.

positioning the migration/ethnic issue in the activity of political parties in the Visegrad countries, fourthly – special aspects in dealing with the migration problems (migration crisis) within the Visegrad countries.

Being the EU members, the Visegrad countries fall within the unified rules and procedures, elaborated for pursuing migration policy, in particular within the European Union. It is represented in a number of legal acts, adopted by the Union, among which the most significant and framework acts are the Schengen Agreement, the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and so on. Their adoption and practicability are predetermined by various factors. Thus, after the fall of “the Berlin Wall” Western European countries created a new system of isolation from illegal migrants, aimed at intimidation and effectiveness of mass deportation. The so-called “Schengen Agreement” due to numerous national restrictions has established at the European level a regime, which curtails freedoms of movement and displacement. As a result of this very often one can hear a position, expressed by the critics of a new strict boundary and control regime, on which the European Union over a short period of time has transformed into “Fortress Europe”. However, the enlargement of the EU promoted elaboration of new methods aimed at fight with illegal migration/immigration. Consequently, every new EU country, including the Visegrad countries, received special counselors from other countries. Thus, in 2001 to Hungary (when it was not the EU member) were additionally sent 150 counselors and contact persons to deal with the problems of refugees and external borders, and generous financing was determined for constructing the so-called “refugee camps” and strengthening of the external borders and frontier police. A regulatory addition to “the Schengen” (1995) was at the same time represented by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), which determined the principles of extending cooperation between the country-members of the European Union in the context of immigration and security. A principal role was played by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), which predetermined elaboration of the unified policy towards the problem of immigration, which now lies within the competence of the European Economic Community. Among other acts are those adopted in Tampere, the Hague, Stockholm, Lisbon and Dublin, which specified the tasks of the EU migration policy at first till 2010, and then at a later stage. Besides, these documents are focused on deepening solidarity among the EU countries in solving migration issues, as well as they presuppose functioning of a range of financial mutual-aid programs. It was also supported by the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum¹⁰, ratified by the heads of the EU country-members at the summit in Brussels in October 2008, when the slogan “Prosperity, Solidarity, Security” was adopted to highlight the main goals of the migration policy. According to this legal-political document the politicians laid out some political arrangements between the EU countries, concerning regulation of migration processes: organization of legal migration in accordance with the priorities, needs and possibilities of some countries, ensuring migrants’ integration; prevention of illegal migration, ensuring deportation of illegal migrants to the

¹⁰ *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum*, Wyd. Council of the European Union, Brussels, 24 September 2008, źródło: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2013440%202008%20INIT> [odczyt: 01 listopada 2016].

countries of origin or transit; improvement of the effectiveness of the frontier control: development of the European system of asylums; deepening of cooperation with the migrants' countries of origin for the purpose of ensuring synergetic cooperation between migration and development.

At the same time, it was obvious that the EU countries do not wish to force migration issues, as the Union's efforts in the sphere of migration policy started focusing on preservation of the achieved agreements¹¹. Besides, on the basis of the international law, in particular on the Schengen Agreement, the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, the national immigration legislation of some countries, including the Visegrad group, found themselves to be quite diversified. The point is that, the national states are not fully deprived of the competence to regulate their migration policies, but on the contrary, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity may pursue their national policy towards the European legislation. Namely this and unwillingness to force the process of overcoming the migration problems resulted in the European migration crisis in early 2010-s. On the one hand, the very European migration policy failed and on the other hand the initiatives, introduced by some EU members, in our case by the Visegrad countries, appeared to be rather active.

It was contributed to by several historical preconditions and factors of generating migration policy and inner-political peculiarities of the Visegrad countries' and the Visegrad groups' development. First of all, one should know, that in late 1980-s the "Iron Curtain" disappeared and the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe (including those of the Visegrad group) gained liberty all over again. Immediately, people's migration from this region to other parts of the world, which had been artificially ceased under communist, was finally renewed. This process was characterized by an intensive and multiform nature. It is clear, that in the post-communist epoch emigration that had been inherent in the region was preserved. But now it was distinguished by a sharp increase in people's general mobility, emergence of its new forms. However, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were not seriously "affected" by a mass emigration, which was observed in other Central-European and European countries. Moreover, emigration from the Visegrad countries was distinguished at least by two factors. Firstly, it was characterized by an ethnic or ethno-cultural nature, as the inhabitants of Poland, for example, who moved before the mid 90-s of the 20th century to Germany, were ethnic Germans in their majority, and many of those who moved to Hungary appeared to be native Hungarians. Secondly, immigrants usually tended to burn bridges with their Motherland, though they were not always ready to adapt adequately into the space, within the borders of their new countries. On these grounds and trying to reconstruct a special space for themselves, they provoked amalgamation of two motherlands at the same time, and on the basis of this new networks of personal and/or professional ties have been formed. It is supplemented by the fact that at the beginning such international migration was mainly illegal, though later on it was legalized, corresponding to the European norms and directives.

¹¹ E. Collett, *Beyond Stockholm: overcoming the inconsistencies of immigration policy*, "European Policy Centre Working Paper" 2009, nr 32, źródło: <http://www.mezikulturmiedialog.cz/res/data/011/001314.pdf> [odczyt: 01 listopada 2016].

Another factor and attribute of migration policy formation in the Visegrad countries was and even still is an ethnic-language question. The point is that political and social-political challenges, which are historically faced by various countries, have a great influence on the national legislations of these countries in the sphere of migration policy and, what is more important, on the ways of dealing with such migration problems which are extremely specific, but even sometimes are contrary to the unified European directives and standards. Very often it is presupposed historically and by specific aspects of current political opposition and political order in different countries, including the region under study. Thus, it is known that being (in comparison with other Central-Eastern European countries) quite big states as to their territories and number of population, the Visegrad group countries, over the period after the collapse of the USSR and establishment of their sovereignty (in case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia), they experienced significant demographic changes, which were predominantly characterized by migration and immigration phenomena. A peculiar element which is common for all countries under study is that they were mainly left by the representatives of ethnic minorities¹². As a result, we have worked out a compiled modern ethnic map of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which significantly differs from the map of the pre-war period (see Table 1).

Table 1. Ethnic Composition in Modern Visegrad Countries before the WWII and in 2011

Country (year)	Total amount of population	Titular ethnic group	First largest minority	Second Largest minority
Poland (1931)	31 915 000	Poles – 68,9 %	Ukrainians – 13,9 %	Jews – 10 %
Poland (2011)	38 512 000	Poles – 97,1 %	Shlenzaks – 1,1 %	Kashubians – 0,04 %
Slovakia (1921)	2 989 361	Slovaks – 67,4 %	Hungarians – 21,3 %	Germans – 4,7 %
Slovakia (2011)	5 397 036	Slovaks – 80,7 %	Hungarians – 8,5 %	Roma – 2,0 %
Hungary (1930)	8 685 109	Hungarians – 92,1 %	Germans – 5,5 %	Slovaks – 1,2 %
Hungary (2011)	9 937 628	Hungarians – 83,7 %	Roma – 3,1 %	Germans – 1,3 %
The Czech Republic (1930)	9 317 841	Czechs – 68,3 %	Germans – 29,5 %	Poles – 0,9 %
The Czech Republic (2011)	10 562 214	Czechs – 63,7 %	Moravas – 4,9 %	Slovaks – 1,9 %

Źródło: *Demographics of Europe*, "Wikipedia", źródło: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Europe [odczyt: 01 listopada 2016]

Operationalization of this map testifies that Poland is a highly homogeneous country, Hungary and Slovakia are homogeneous states, and the Czech Republic is a heterogeneous country. Moreover, it is obvious that each country has various interethnic problems: in Slovakia – with the Hungarian minority, in Slovakia and Hungary – with the Gipsy/Roma minority etc. Very often these problems are historical, but sometimes can be artificially caused; however they are represented in current political processes, and thus to a great extent influence migration policy in different countries. And undoubtedly it often becomes a base for generation and practical implementation of

¹² A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, *Porivnyal'nyy analiz politychnykh institutiv krayin Vyshebrads'koyi hrupy ta inshykh krayin Tsentral'no-Skbidnoyi Yevropy: monohrafiya*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 41-92.

various social and political divisions, generated on the ethnic/ethnic-language problematics, which also have significant impact on the migration legislation. From the practical-political perspective, it is incorporated in the fact that the question of the migration policy within the Visegrad countries has been represented in constructing one of the divisions of “new” politics, which summed up such issues as: protection of right and liberties of ethnic population in some countries, solution of migration problems and protection of national heritage. It is incorporated in the fact that some “new” right-wing parties started positioning themselves as openly anti-immigrants and this phenomenon was generalized in political science. The main attribute of such parties is their profoundly populist orientation against immigrants, which is close to xenophobia¹³. It is quite notable, that anti-immigrants parties in the Visegrad countries started their formation immediately after the collapse of the USSR and the system of the Warsaw Pact. Among them the most powerful political parties and movements were: “Justice and Life Party” (MIÉP), “The Movement for a Better Hungary” (Jobbik) and “Third Way Alliance of Parties” (MIÉP–Jobbik) in Hungary¹⁴, “Ancestral Home” (DO), “Polish National Party” (PPN), “National Party” (SN) and “The League of Polish Families” (LPR) in Poland¹⁵, “Independent Democrats” (NEZDEM), “The Coalition for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia” (SPR-RSČ), “The Republicans of Miroslav Sladek” (RMS), “The Dawn of Direct Democracy” (UPD) and “The Dawn – National Coalition” (UNK) in the Czech Republic¹⁶, “The Right Slovak National Party” (PSNS), “The People’s Party – Our Slovakia” (LsNS) and “The Slovak National Party” (SNS) in Slovakia¹⁷ and others.

Anti-immigrant parties are important in the context of migration policy elaboration in the countries of the region, if only because according to their ideological principles they adhere to Euro-skepticism, anti-globalism, anti-immigration, mono-nationalism and its domination over the ethnic, religious and sex diversity (in Poland – it concerns the Jewish minority; in Slovakia – it concerns the Hungarians and Roma; in Hungary – it deals with the Jewish population and the Roma; in the Czech Republic – with the Roma minority), radicalism, extremism, chauvinism, xenophobia, neo-Nazism and populism¹⁸. In Poland one can observe clerical direction of the

¹³ R. Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1997, s. 251.; A. Romanyuk, *Sociopolitychnyj podil „novoyi polityky” v krajynax Zabidnoyi Evropy*, „Politohichnyj visnyk” 2007, nr 27, s. 239-253.

¹⁴ H. Graham, L. Ian, *Racism in Postcolonialism Europe*, Wyd. Liverpool University Press 2010.; S. A. Inder, *Democracy, ethnic diversity, and security in post-communist Europe*, Wyd. Central European University Press 2001, s. 97.; L. C. Schori, *Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right*, Wyd. Ashgate 2007.

¹⁵ S. Auer, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2004, s. 94.; S. L. Langea de, S. Guerrab, *The League of Polish Families between East and West, Past and Present*, “Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 2009, vol 42, nr 4, s. 527-549.; J. B. Michlic, *Poland’s Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present*, Wyd. University of Nebraska Press 2006, s. 363.; R. Pankowski, M. Kornak, *Poland*, [:] C. Mudde (ed.), *Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2005, s. 157-159.; S. Ramet, *Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010, s. 80.

¹⁶ V. Hlousek, L. Kopeček, *Origin, Ideology and Transformation of Political Parties: East Central and Western Europe Compared*, Wyd. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2010, s. 213-214.

¹⁷ S. Ramet, *Whose democracy?: nationalism, religion, and the doctrine of collective rights in post-1989 Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield 1997, s. 128.

¹⁸ M. Mareš, *National and right-wing radicalism in the new democracies: Czech Republic*, Wyd. Friedrich Ebert Foundation 2010, s. 11-12.; J. Smolik, *Česká krajina pravice ve volbách do Evropského parlamentu v roce 2009*, „Rexter” 2010, vol 8, nr 1, s. 75-96.

“new right-wing” parties. Anti-immigrants parties are a product of the post-materialistic society and are on the grounds of market economy and parliamentary democracy, though they are characterized by a tendency to change national identity, protect national culture, in particular by means of isolationism and strengthening of national homogeneity, preservation of high living standards, as well as employment of national population, intensification of security of domestic national life, immigration restrictions, protection of traditional family values. These parties determine migration policy by the fact that reasonably all countries of the region in the context of electoral and parliament-governmental achievements of anti-immigration parties can be divided into two groups: to the first one belong those, where the influence of the “new right-wing” parties is transitional (they are represented in the parliaments) – Hungary and the Czech Republic; the second one is represented by those, where the influence of the “new right-wing” parties is significant (they are or were previously represented in parliaments and governmental cabinets) – Poland and Slovakia. Cooperation between these parties and governmental cabinets is believed to be a normal phenomenon, especially over the last decade of their political development.

This (together with the peculiarities of the ethnic composition of population in the Visegrad countries) is imposed on the parameters of the migration policy in the region, elaborated within the frames of their membership in the EU. As a result one can name generating of their own (national and regional, in particular in the Visegrad group) migration policies, which to a great degree are in controversy with the subsidiary migration policy of the European Union. It presupposes quite significant and expressed incompatibility of some migration policy measures in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic on the background of the migration processes and measures, presupposed and taken in the EU, especially over the last years of its political and institutional development, in particular over the period of the migration crisis intensification in early 2010-s. Often it happens sporadically, though sometimes it is reason for the goal-oriented measures, taken by national governments, which are aimed at elaborating their own migration policy, which is first of all beneficial to some separate countries, and not the European Union in general.

Thus, in late July 2012 the government of Poland adopted the document “Poland Migration Policy – the Current State of Play and Proposed Actions”. The studies show that Poland requires foreign employees and that is why one of the main theses in the document is adjusting of the EU migration policy to the priorities of the labor market. It is believed, that attraction of foreign employees will let Poland’s economy develop and be competitive. In accordance with the document, the priority groups of migrants are composed of people of Polish origin, students, graduates, scientists, foreign entrepreneurs and create new jobs, professionals with required qualifications, immigrants’ families, who have already resided in Poland and so on. Legal regulations of staying and working in Poland have been simplified for them. Besides, new migration policy of Poland stipulates a more effective integration program of foreigners; special attention has been paid to the immigrants’

children's education, simplification of access to professional legal consultations. The government of Poland trying to make its fight against illegal migration more effective started giving priority to willful return rather than compulsory deportation. Considering the program of migration policy adopted by the government as a basis, in 2016 Poland's high officials stated that the country could not accept any other new migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, as it must provide help to refugees from Ukraine (as a result of the Russia's military aggression). It was explained by the fact that till there are military conflicts between the pro-Russian fighters and armed forces of Ukraine in eastern Ukraine "thousands of new refugees will keep on leaving the country, mainly directing towards Hungary and Poland". Thus, Poland migration policy, since 2012, has started its sharp diverging from the subsidiary migration policy of the European Union.

However, other countries of the Visegrad group, not least of all due to the drawbacks in the European legislation, started arguing against the unified EU rules. Predominantly, it was presupposed by the consequences and specific character of the migration processes from the Middle East countries (especially from Syria) and North Africa. The point is that through the Visegrad countries one of the main routes of immigration to the EU is mapped, that is a direction: Turkey – Greece – Macedonia – Serbia – Hungary. The essence of blocking the European migration law is diversified, but quite similar. Thus, on September 4, 2015 at the railway station Keleti were clashes of migrants with Hungarian nationalists, and in the village of Ruske the refugees started throwing stones into police, while the latter used tear-gas in response. On September 14, 2015 Hungary due to the massive flow of migrants from Serbia was made to close the state border in some of its parts, what consequently led to huge backups of migrants in many border areas in Serbia (similar action were taken at the border with Slovenia and Croatia). On September 15, the Serbian government announced that they are ready to involve their armed forces to resist migrants' return from Hungary. On September 16, 2015 migrants who were in Serbia made an attempt to assault the Hungarian border in border crossing checkpoint Khorogos. On this day strict immigration legislation came into force in Hungary, according to which police obtained a right to arrest and present charges against people, who came into the country illegally. Act of protest against the migration policy took place in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. On October 28, 2015 in the Czech Republic occurred a range of acts of protests against migrants. The biggest movement of 1500 people took place in Brno. However, the highest point of resistance against the EU norms and legislation was reached when the referendum on the "migrants' issue" (mandatory quota of migrants) was held in Hungary in October 2016, when the authority tried to present it as a question of "national sovereignty" (the voters were asked "Do you want the EU to legitimate the mandatory resettlement of non-Hungarian people in Hungary without the consent of the parliament?"). And though the referendum appeared to be a complete failure for the authority (due to a low, about 45%, voter turnout), almost 95% (according to the exist poles) of respondents were against the EU policy, what represented a prolonged conflict between the Hungarian government

and the EU, and witnessed an overall European migration crisis. A bit earlier the summit in Bratislava had not managed to change migration policy of the European Union, as a result of which the leaders of the Visegrad countries agreed that such kind of policy is to a great extent “self-destructive and naïve”.

In general, it actualized the question of the Visegrad countries’ resistance against the subsidiary migration policy of the EU. At first, a new system of mandatory quotas of refugee resettlement among the EU countries was criticized. This, as the leaders of the Visegrad group believe, throws back all previous accomplishments in overcoming migration crisis in the EU and in many aspects does not correspond to the reality. As a result of this the Visegrad group’s leaders’ positions were consolidated, and according to which the problem of elaborating common migration policy within the EU does not only have an economic and a humanitarian component, but also is mainly inclined to political divergences. It became quite clear that northern and southern European countries, as well as “periphery” countries and those states that are situated within the continent, in the same way as before defend various approaches, due to which there was no forcing of the EU migration policy over the previous stages of its development. The problem was admitted by the EU authorities and its sense is in the fact that “stumbling block” is not the influx of immigrants, but the absence of solidarity in adopting new rules of solving the problems, concerning their resettlement, what in fact leads to a substantial unbalanced load on migration services in some EU countries. As a result, it became clear, that the mass flow of immigrants threatens the existence of the Schengen Agreement and the system itself, and the conflicts between the EU countries as to the immigrants’ resettlement deepens the split in the EU. It also became clear that a massive flow of immigrants forms a serious financial and social burdens on the EU countries.

From this perspective the peculiarities of marking out the migration policy of the Visegrad countries are rather actual and specific. It was confirmed on the Prague summit of the Visegrad countries in February 2016, when the leaders of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic on the background of the 25th anniversary of the organization showed a united front while discussing the possibility of tightening security on the borders between the Visegrad group and Bulgaria, Macedonia and Greece and institutionalization of the process. Moreover, the position according to which the Visegrad group must have its own point of view on dealing with the migration crisis was actualized. It is presupposed by the fact that the countries of the Visegrad since 1990-s have become a buffer area between Eastern and Western Europe. As a result, a lot of immigrants trying to get to Western Europe settle on the way to it, namely in the Visegrad countries, where they may obtain quite decent living standards and conditions.

In general the research shows that being the “anti-heroes” of the European migration crisis, the Visegrad countries follow playing a role of an individual player, who tries to adhere to the nationally oriented principles of migration policy. The point is that in spite of the pressure exerted by the European commission, the Visegrad group (together with the United Kingdom

and the Baltic countries) voted down the plan of the quota principle of refugee resettlement across Europe. Political fight over these quotas eclipsed other important problems of regulation the migration crisis and revealed the intention of the opposed parts to defend their positions till the end, even despite the fact that such situation is an institutional threat to the European Union. The theoretical consequence is a position in accordance with which, a self-preservation instinct must be dictating the unification of efforts and strengthening of solidarity, but in real life the inner-political problems of the EU country-members became crucial in motivating their political actions. And in general it means that the migration policy of the EU is dependent on political processes in separate countries-members of the EU, in our case on regionally and nationally determined policy of the Visegrad countries. In practice, it looks like all members of the Visegrad group, taking into account all descending and ascending processes that takes place on their domestic political arenas, in fact and as a matter of principle do not resist the EU migration policy, but stand for preserving a voluntary character of solidarity events taken in the EU countries in a way that each country-member could apply their own actions on the basis of their own experience, own achievements and available resources (in fact, not violating the legislative principles of the migration policy of the EU, which were elaborated before).

And this is even in spite of the fact that the unified position of the Visegrad countries looks at least strange and illogical in the light of the Eurostat data. The thing is that as on the third quarter of 2015 the Visegrad countries had objectively opposed interests in questions of the citizenship applicants' resettlement, as in Poland per 1 mn of people in the mid of 2015 there were 98 applicants obtaining a shelter, what equaled 0.9% of all applications in the EU, in the Czech Republic – 25 applicants and 0.1% correspondingly, in Slovakia – 3 applicants and 0% respectively. Quite a different situation was observed in Hungary: there were 10974 applicants per 1 mn of people and 26.1% of all applications made in the EU. That is why, namely Hungary among other Visegrad countries objectively requires the EU assistance and must have been mostly interested in introducing the system of quotas for refugees. However, till the autumn 2015, as it has been mentioned above, the situation in Hungary worsened greatly, and this gave the Euro commission a possibility to put this country in one line with other participants of the process, which also suffer from the excessive migration flows and to presuppose that if Hungary is in the same boat with Greece and Italy and at the same time rejects the mandatory quotas, then other countries will have a chance to refuse to accept refugees from Hungary in accordance with quotas.

On the one hand, quite important role in this context is played by political factors, as the contradictions between the inner-political situation and the rise of anti-immigrant attitudes in the Visegrad countries over the period of the social and economic crisis (as the result of the financial country) explain their eagerness in questions of quotas and the attempt of independent maneuvering from the perspective of the migration issues. It is rather notable in cases of Slovakia and Hungary, where support of national voters appeared to be more important than the European solidarity. In due time, no one explained the voters that the EU membership

bears not only subsidies and bonuses, but also responsibility and possible difficulties in case of crisis situations. On the other hand, the position of the Visegrad group is truthful if to look at it from the point of view that the inflow of refugees is extremely bigger than the number of the quotas. To confirm such quotas and mechanisms of a multiple resettlement, as well as to choose people among those who are looking for refuge is extremely difficult. In this regard, it would be a mistake to understate the importance of the Visegrad group, since the discussions over quotas largely divert the EU countries from the main issue – loss of ability to regulate migration¹⁹.

In this context even more interesting political and integration consequences are for the Visegrad countries. In the circumstances concerned, the countries-members of the Visegrad group must deepen their cooperation, as this is the only possible way-out in reaction to the challenges, which take place in the European Union. Besides, intensification of such cooperation must be multidirectional and in any case concerns elaboration of the unified regional migration policy. Moreover, nowadays there are all necessary preconditions for this, since governmental, as well as oppositional parties, being traditionally diversified, stand for the migration policy, pursued by the governmental cabinets of their countries.

References

1. Auer S., *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2004.
2. Collett E., *Beyond Stockholm: overcoming the inconsistencies of immigration policy*, "European Policy Centre Working Paper" 2009, nr 32, źródło: <http://www.mezikulturniialog.cz/res/data/011/001314.pdf> [odczyt: 01 listopada 2016].
3. *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum*, Wyd. Council of the European Union, 24.09.2008, źródło: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?!=EN&f=ST%2013440%202008%20INIT> [odczyt: 01 listopada 2016].
4. Drbohlav D., *The Czech Republic*, [w:] Wallace C., Stola D. (eds), *Patterns of Migration in Central Europe*, Wyd. Springer 2001, s. 203–226.
5. Goedings S., *EU Enlargement to the East and Labour Migration to the West*, International Institute of Social History Research Paper 1999, nr 36, źródło: <http://www.iisg.nl/publications/respap36.pdf> [odczyt: 01 listopada 2016].
6. Graham H., Ian L., *Racism in Postcolonialism Europe*, Wyd. Liverpool University Press 2010.
7. Hlousek V., Kopeček L., *Origin, Ideology and Transformation of Political Parties: East Central and Western Europe Compared*, Wyd. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2010.
8. Inder S. A., *Democracy, ethnic diversity, and security in post-communist Europe*, Wyd. Central European University Press 2001.
9. Inglehart R., *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1997.

¹⁹ O. Potemkina, *Myhratsyionniy kryzys v ES: rol' stran vychodnoy hruppy*, "Sovremennaya Evropa" 2015, nr 6, s. 36–45.

10. Langea de S. L., Guerrab S., *The League of Polish Families between East and West, Past and Present*, "Communist and Post-Communist Studies" 2009, vol 42, nr 4, s. 527-549.
11. Leon-Ledesma M., Piracha M., *International Migration and the Role of remittances in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. UK Economic and Social Research Council 2001.
12. Mareš M., *National and right-wing radicalism in the new democracies: Czech Republic*, Wyd. Friedrich Ebert Foundation 2010.
13. Michlic J. B., *Poland's Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present*, Wyd. University of Nebraska Press 2006.
14. Okolski M., *Migrant Trafficking in Poland – Actors, Mechanisms, Combating*, "Institute for Social Studies Working Papers", Series "Migrations" 1999, nr 24.
15. Okolski M., Stola D., *Migrations between Poland and European Union: the Perspective of Poland's Future Membership*, "Institute for Social Studies Working Papers", Series "Migrations" 1999, nr 25.
16. Pankowski R., Kornak M., *Poland*, [:] Mudde C. (ed.), *Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2005.
17. Politi A., *The new dimensions of organized crime in Southeastern Europe*, "The International Spectator" 1999, nr 34, s. 49-58.
18. Romanyuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivnyal'nyy analiz politychnykh institutiv krayin Vyshebrads'koyi hrupy ta inshykh krayin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: monohrafiya*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 41-92.
19. Potemkina O., *Myhratsyonniy kryzys v ES: rol' stran vyshebradskoy hrupy*, "Sovremennaya Evropa" 2015, nr 6, s. 36-45.
20. Ramet S., *Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.
21. Ramet S., *Whose democracy?: nationalism, religion, and the doctrine of collective rights in post-1989 Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield 1997.
22. Romanyuk A., *Sociopolitychnyj podil „novoyi polityky“ v krayinax Zabidnoyi Evropy*, „Politologichnyj visnyk“ 2007, nr 27, s. 239-253.
23. Schori L. C., *Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right*, Wyd. Ashgate 2007.
24. Smolik J., *Česká krajní pravice ve volbách do Evropského parlamentu v roce 2009*, „Rexter“ 2010, vol 8, nr 1, s. 75-96.
25. Werner H., *Temporary Migration of Foreign Workers: Illustrated with Special Regard to east-West Migrations*, Strasburg 1996.
26. Woroniecki A., *Illegal Migration in Poland*, "Center for European Security Studies Working Papers" 2000.