

## **Political and institutional patterns of technocratic governance in non-democratic regimes: general theoretical and empirical determination**

The article, based of general theoretical and empirical determination, is dedicated to outlining the political and institutional patterns of technocratic governance in non-democratic political regimes. The author outlined the phenomenon of non-democracy of some ideas and manifestations of technocratic governance, singled types of non-democratic regimes on the facts and features that they use the principles and tools of technocratic governance, determined examples, general theoretical features and empirical consequences of technocratic or pseudo-technocratic governance in non-democratic political regimes.

*Keywords: technocracy, technocratic governance, non-democratic political regime, authoritarianism, technocratic authoritarianism, pseudo-technocratic authoritarianism.*

## **Політико-інституційні патерни технократичного урядування в недемократичних режимах: загальнотеоретична й емпірична детермінація**

У статті на підставі загальнотеоретичної та емпіричної детермінації окреслено політико-інституційні патерни технократичного урядування в недемократичних політичних режимах. Автор статті окреслив недемократичність деяких ідей і проявів технократичного урядування, виокремив різновиди недемократичних режимів з приводу факту/особливостей застосування ними принципів і засобів технократичного урядування, детермінував приклади, загальнотеоретичні особливості і емпіричні наслідки технократичного або псевдотехнократичного урядування в недемократичних політичних режимах.

*Ключові слова: технократія, технократичне урядування, недемократичний політичний режим, авторитаризм, технократичний авторитаризм, псевдотехнократичний авторитаризм.*

The idea of technological decisions as rational ones is in the grounds of efficient business and social-economic development and managing determined the appearance of some novel

views in the social science, concerning the appropriateness of organizing governance in accordance with the technocratic principles. Within this context technocracy is regarded as the form of government and management, which is based on the precise principles of applying special skills and techniques and on the process of decision-making on the basis of experts' recommendations application. Technocracy is a political regime and method/way of governance, which is established on political/state power implementation by well-educated people and technical experts from different spheres of economy, but not politicians or businessmen. Technocratic governance may be estimated as an attractive one and can be even considered as a necessary one in case of "general weakening of the institutions' power and government inefficiency, which are burdened with financial difficulties and complexity of government bodies"<sup>1</sup>. The point is that one usually speaks of technocratic governance on the grounds of application of scientific methods of important political decisions making techniques and solution of social and economic problems. Within the described context one always takes to account traditional institutional, economic, political and philosophical approaches. Moreover, it is initially stipulated by the scientists, that the model of technocratic governance, by its definition, is less democratic, if not completely non-democratic, though it is implemented both in democratic and non-democratic regimes. It is predetermined by the fact that both in theory and practice there are different intrinsic interpretations of technocratic governance: as meritocratic (exclusively on the basis of the existing knowledge); and oligarchic (exclusively on the basis of embezzled capital and financial influence – formation of specialized groups of interests within governments). Therewith, G. Njalsson theorizes, that technocratic governance is carried out on the basis of a cognitive set of directions aimed at solving management issues<sup>2</sup>. Therefore, technocratic governance obtains specific political and institutional patterns, which, at the same time, regulate it and which, in a different way, generally and theoretically and practically and empirically are described within democratic and non-democratic regimes. Clarification of characteristics and patterns of political and institutional stipulation of technocratic governance in non-democratic regimes is the subject of the current scientific paper and determines the solution of the following task: firstly, to describe non-democratic nature of some ideas and displays of technocratic governance and technocracy phenomenon; secondly, to single out the variety of non-democratic political regimes due to the peculiarities of application of some individual principles and means of technocratic governance; thirdly, to determine true to life examples, general and theoretical peculiarities and empirical consequences of technocratic or pseudo-technocratic governance in different non-democratic regimes.

The abovementioned range of problems is rather extensively represented in modern comparative political science. It is displayed by both single cases (case-studies) and binary, regional,

<sup>1</sup> G. Peters, *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, «Comparative Politics» 1979, vol 11, nr 3, s. 339–358.

<sup>2</sup> G. Njalsson, *From autonomous to socially conceived technology: toward a causal, intentional and systematic analysis of interests and elites in public technology policy*, "Theoria: a journal of political theory" 2005, vol 108, s. 56–81.

and thematic scientific research. The crucial works, we are appealing to in our investigation, are framed by the following leading researchers as: U. Akcay<sup>3</sup>, W. Akin<sup>4</sup>, C. Baker<sup>5</sup>, Y. Bangura<sup>6</sup>, T. Bellows<sup>7</sup>, E. Berndt<sup>8</sup>, J. Bresnan<sup>9</sup>, E. Bryld<sup>10</sup>, J. Burnham<sup>11</sup>, M. Centeno<sup>12</sup>, L. Cheng and L. White<sup>13</sup>, P. Donmez<sup>14</sup>, L. Graham<sup>15</sup>, J. Gunnell<sup>16</sup>, C. Hunecus<sup>17</sup>, B. Khoo<sup>18</sup>, J. MacDougall<sup>19</sup>, M. Muramatsu and E. Krauss<sup>20</sup>, G. Njalsson<sup>21</sup>, G. Peters<sup>22</sup>, R. Putnam<sup>23</sup>, P. Schmitter<sup>24</sup>, B. Schnei-

<sup>3</sup> U. Akcay, *Technocrats in Power?*, Prepared for „The State in Capitalist Society, 40 Years On“ conference, 22 May 2009.

<sup>4</sup> W. Akin, *Technocracy and the American dream: the technocrat movement, 1900-1941*, Wyd. Berkeley 1977.

<sup>5</sup> C. Baker, *A Short Account of the Rise and Fall of the Thai Technocracy*, Unpublished draft manuscript 2009.

<sup>6</sup> Y. Bangura, *Intellectuals, Economic Reform and Social Change: Constraints and Opportunities in the Formation of a Nigerian Technocracy*, „CODESRIA Monograph Series“ 1994, vol 1, nr 94.

<sup>7</sup> T. Bellows, *Bureaucracy and development in Singapore*, «The Asian Journal of Public Administration» 1985, vol 7, nr 1, s. 55–69.

<sup>8</sup> E. Berndt, *From Technocracy to Net Energy Analysis: Engineers, Economists and Recurring Energy Theories of Value*, „Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Studies in Energy and the American Economy: Discussion Paper“ 1982, vol 11.

<sup>9</sup> J. Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1993.

<sup>10</sup> E. Bryld, *The Technocratic Discourse: Technical Means to Political Problems*, „Development in Practice“, 2000, vol 10, nr 5.

<sup>11</sup> J. Burnham, *The managerial revolution*, Wyd. Penguin Books 1962.

<sup>12</sup> M. Centeno, *The New Leviathan: The Dynamic and Limits of Technocracy*, „Theory and Society“, 1993, vol 22, s. 307–335.

<sup>13</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *China's Technocratic Movement and the World Economic Herald*, „Modern China“ 1991, vol 17, nr 3, s. 342–388.; L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, „The China Quarterly“ 1990, vol 121, s. 1–35.

<sup>14</sup> P. Donmez, *Understanding Depoliticisation as Process and Governing Strategy in the Turkish Context*, Warwick.

<sup>15</sup> L. Graham, *The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet Union*, Wyd. Cambridge 1993.

<sup>16</sup> J. Gunnell, *The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy*, „Technology and Culture“ 1982, vol 2, nr 3, s. 392–416.

<sup>17</sup> C. Hunecus, *Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime. The „ODEPLAN Boys“ and the „Gremialists“ in Pinochet's Chile*, „Journal of Latin American Studies“, 2000, vol 32, nr 2, s. 461–501.

<sup>18</sup> B. Khoo, *No insulation: politics and technocracy's troubled trajectory*, «IDE Discussion Paper» 2010, vol 236.

<sup>19</sup> J. MacDougall, *The Technocratic Model of Modernization: The Case of Indonesia's New Order*, „Asian Survey“, 1976, vol 16, nr 12, s. 1166–1183.

<sup>20</sup> M. Muramatsu, E. Krauss, *Bureaucrats and politicians in policymaking: The case of Japan*, „American Political Science Review“, 1984, vol 78, nr 1, s. 126–146.

<sup>21</sup> G. Njalsson, *From autonomous to socially conceived technology: toward a causal, intentional and systematic analysis of interests and elites in public technology policy*, „Theoria: a journal of political theory“ 2005, vol 108, s. 56–81.

<sup>22</sup> G. Peters, *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, «Comparative Politics“ 1979, vol 11, nr 3, s. 339–358.

<sup>23</sup> R. Putnam, *Elite transformation in advanced industrial societies: An empirical assessment of the theory of technocracy*, „Comparative Political Studies“, 1997, vol 10, s. 388–412.

<sup>24</sup> P. Schmitter, *Still the century of corporatism?*, [w:] P. Schmitter, G. Lehbruch (eds.), *Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation*, Wyd. Sage 1979.

der<sup>25</sup>, P-S. Seet, C. Hampden-Turner<sup>26</sup>, T. Shiraishi<sup>27</sup>, E. Silva<sup>28</sup>, P. Silva<sup>29</sup>, J. Straussman<sup>30</sup>, L. Stifel<sup>31</sup>, R. Tirtosudarmo<sup>32</sup>, G. Wilson,<sup>33</sup> J. Yoon<sup>34</sup>, X. Zang<sup>35</sup> and others.

In these studies, especially one by G. Pastorella<sup>36</sup>, it is clearly argued that technocratic governance and technocracy in general in their etymological comprehension and as to their definition are in opposition to democracy, and even have much in common with autocracy (non-democracy). Therewith, alongside with populism they (technocracy and technocratic governance) are “Scylla and Charybdis” of democratic ideals, and “political pathology”<sup>37</sup>, which can cause “the end of the democracy we all know”<sup>38</sup>. Nevertheless, the combination of technocratic and non-democratic governance can be a direct predecessor of democratic regime establishment in one country or another, or even in one region or another. It is determined by the fact, that the essence of technocratic governance, as the political practices show, was initially tested on the examples of non-democratic political regimes in various countries and in various regions. And only after that the non-democratic nature of technocratic governance and technocracy was scientifically proved or refuted. One group of researchers, namely D. Bell<sup>39</sup>, J. Burnham<sup>40</sup>, M. Centeno and L. Wolfson<sup>41</sup>, J. Galbraith<sup>42</sup>, D. Price<sup>43</sup>, M. Schudson<sup>44</sup>, M. Williams<sup>45</sup>, argues that technocracy and technocratic governance are of no serious hazard to democracy, as they

<sup>25</sup> B. Schneider, *The material bases of technocracy: Investor confidence and neoliberalism in Latin America*, [w:] M. Centeno, P. Silva (eds.), *The Politics of Expertise in Latin America*, Wyd. St Martin's Press 1998, s. 77–95.

<sup>26</sup> P-S. Seet, C. Hampden-Turner, *Technocrats and Technopreneurs – Power Paradoxes in Singapore's National Innovation System*, 4th International Critical Management Studies Conference (Technology and Power Stream), 4–6 July 2005.

<sup>27</sup> T. Shiraishi, *Technocracy in Indonesia: A Preliminary Analysis*, “RIETI Discussion Paper Series” 2006, vol 05-E-008.

<sup>28</sup> E. Silva, *The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics*, Wyd. Westview Press 1996.

<sup>29</sup> P. Silva, *In the name of reason: technocrats and politics in Chile*, Wyd. Penn State Press 2008.; P. Silva, *State Capacity, Technocratic Insulation, and Government-Business Relations in South Korea and Chile*, Wyd. Nueva Serie FLACSO 2000.; P. Silva, *State, Public Technocracy and Politics in Chile, 1927-1941*, „Bulletin of Latin American Research” 1994, vol 13, nr 3, s. 281–297.; P. Silva, *Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks*, „Journal of Latin American Studies” 1991, vol 23, nr 2, s. 385–410.; P. Silva, *The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics*, Wyd. Westview Press 1996.; P. Silva, *Towards Technocratic Mass Politics in Chile? The 1999-2000 Elections and the 'Lavin Phenomenon'*, „European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies” 2001, vol 70, s. 25–39.

<sup>30</sup> J. Straussman, *The Limits of Technocratic Politics*, Wyd. Edison 1978.

<sup>31</sup> L. Stifel, *Technocrats and Modernization in Thailand*, „Asian Survey”, 1976, vol 16, nr 12, s. 1184–1196.

<sup>32</sup> R. Tirtosudarmo, *Indonesia and Nigeria, 1965-1985: Structural factors, technocracy and the politics of rural development*, Paper prepared for the first plenary meeting of Tracking Development Leiden, 25-28 June 2008.

<sup>33</sup> G. Wilson, *Beyond the Technocrat? The Professional Expert in Development Practice*, „Development and Change” 2006, vol 37.

<sup>34</sup> J. Yoon, *The Technocratic Trend and Its Implication in China*, Science & Technology in Society: An International Multidisciplinary Graduate Student Conference, Washington, 31 March – 1 April 2007.

<sup>35</sup> X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, „Asian Survey” 1993, vol 33, nr 8, s. 787–803.

<sup>36</sup> G. Pastorella, *Technocratic governments: democracy by other means*, UACES General Conference, Panel: The Role of Expertise in Political Integration, Cork 2014, s. 2.

<sup>37</sup> J. Gunnell, *The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy*, „Technology and Culture” 1982, vol 2, nr 3, s. 392.

<sup>38</sup> H. Brunkhorst, *The crisis of Europe as a Crisis of Technocratic Politics*, Unpublished lecture 2012.

<sup>39</sup> D. Bell, *The coming of post-industrial society: a venture in social forecasting*, Wyd. Basic Books 1973.

<sup>40</sup> J. Burnham, *The Machiavellians: defenders of freedom*, Wyd. Gateway 1970.

<sup>41</sup> M. Centeno, *The New Leviathan: The Dynamic and Limits of Technocracy*, „Theory and Society”, 1993, vol 22, s. 307–335.; M. Centeno, L. Wolfson, *Redefiniendo la tecnocracia*, „Desarrollo Económico” 1997, vol 37, nr 146, s. 215–240.

<sup>42</sup> J. Galbraith, *The new industrial state*, Wyd. Houghton-Mifflin 1971.

<sup>43</sup> D. Price, *The scientific estate*, Wyd. Belknap Press 1965.

<sup>44</sup> M. Schudson, *The Trouble with Experts and Why Democracies Need Them*, „Theory and Society” 2006, vol 35, nr 5, s. 491–506.

<sup>45</sup> M. Williams, *Escaping the Zero-Sun Scenario: Democracy versus Technocracy in Latin America*, „Political Science Quarterly” 2006, vol 121, nr 1, s. 119–139.

cannot “challenge” the political nature of leadership in democratic regimes. However, another group of scientists warns about the non-democratic/autocratic nature and consequences of scientification/juridification of political processes on the basis of technocratic governance. In addition to the above, such position is peculiar of the researchers of political regimes, but not the investigators of technocracy. The point is that, the “hazard” of technocracy and its principal non-compatibility with democracy are depicted by the theoreticians of democratic regimes, as well as the researchers of autocratic/non-democratic regimes, who assume that there is some connection between technocratic and non-democratic governance. Thus, J. Meynaud<sup>46</sup> states that technocrats are determined by the desire to simplify the political arena by means of elimination and suppression of different political actors. Technocrats are less flexible, consensus-oriented and pragmatic than politicians are, and to a large extent are inclined to commit political errors and blunders. Moreover, technocrats usually focus on planning, economic, but not political criteria of governance, as they use detailed and technically-oriented techniques of governance, what can greatly assist in making political regimes authoritarian ones.

An interesting instance of determination of conclusions, provided by various scientific studies, concerning distinguishing non-democratic political regimes, which are described by the methods of technocratic governance, is arguing the fact that these political regimes can actually use the methods of technocratic governance, and can only pretend doing this. Therefore, all non-democratic political regimes can be divided into: those, which approve the mechanisms of technocratic governance; those, which do not approve the mechanisms of technocratic governance to full extent, but do not admit this “artificiality”; and those, which do not use the mechanisms of technocratic governance. The first are usually (though not always) represented by the cases of non-democratic regimes development (for instance, modernization authoritarianism), the second and the third are the examples of non-democratic regimes without any traces of development. Being rather formal, let’s try to dichotomize them and investigate them distinctively on the examples of different countries and regions of the world.

Apprehension of technocratic governance and its institutional and political patterns within non-democratic political regimes, which are modernized (there have been many cases throughout the history), is rather specific. As a rule, modernization in non-democratic regimes is carried out due to means and methods of technocratic governance which takes place on the grounds of combination of mobilization potential of mass movements and “energy” of intellectuals or mobilization potential of army and technocrats. In the first case, one can ensure formation of the national identity, and in another one there is reformation of the social and economic background<sup>47</sup>. Thus, it happened in Brazil, where during 30s – 50s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century civil intellectuals created the political and cultural foundations, which allowed the military regime

<sup>46</sup> J. Meynaud, *Technocracy*, Wyd. Faber and Faber 1968.

<sup>47</sup> M. Kyrchanov, *Авторитаризм, национализм и политический протест (проблемы модернизации в Бразилии 1930 – 1980-х годов)*, Воронеж 2009, s. 5.

to be in power since late 60s up to middle 80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>48</sup>. The result of the military regime (who in a technocratic way tried to solve the problems and tendencies to political regionalization<sup>49</sup>) was the non-effective system, and the country which required modernization. On the other hand, it became rather obvious that within a non-democratic model, the resources and potential for the consequent modernization had been exhausted. That is why, civil elites, which came in power in late 80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, had not only to solve the tasks of national consolidation, but also to overpower social and economic difficulties, which the nation faced. According to the same kind of logic (civil or military oriented) the processes of technocratic modernization in non-democratic regimes were executed in due time in such Latin American countries as Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador, Salvador, Uruguay and Chile (1960–1980)<sup>50</sup>, or in such Asian countries as Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, the Philippines (60s–90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century)<sup>51</sup>, as well as in Spain (1939–1975), Greece (1967–1974), Turkey (1960–1980s)<sup>52</sup> and others. But their distinctive feature was the fact, that from the point of view of economic strategy all non-democratic regimes, which are established on the technocratic techniques of governance and lead to modernization should be divided into two groups. The first one consists of the political regimes, which have been or are oriented on the essential and sometimes crucial participation of the state and civil intellectuals in economy. It became the basis for the subsequent economic successes (or “economic miracles”) in Spain in 1950–1960, in Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan in 1960–1970. On the contrary, the second group of regimes was focused on the

<sup>48</sup> F. Ferreira de Castro, *Modernização e democracia (O desafio brasileiro)*, Rio de Janeiro 1969; M. De Aquino, *A especificidade do regime militar brasileiro: abordagem teórica e exercício empírico*, [w:] D. Reis Filho (ed.), *Intelectuais, história e política (séculos XIX e XX)*, Rio de Janeiro 2000, s. 271–289; O. Freire Junior, *Sobre a relação entre regimes políticos e desenvolvimento científico: apontamentos para um estudo sobre a história da C&T durante o regime militar brasileiro*, „FRHEC” 2007, vol 4, nr 3.

<sup>49</sup> L. Baêta Neves, *História intelectual e história da educação*, „RBE” 2006, vol 11, nr 32, s. 340–376; L. Paschoal Guimarães, *IV Congresso de História Nacional: tendências e perspectivas da história do Brasil colonial (Rio de Janeiro, 1949)*, „RBHF” 2004, vol 24, nr 48, s. 145–170.

<sup>50</sup> J. Coralles, *Presidents without Parties: The Politics of Economic Reform in Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s*, Wyd. Pennsylvania State University Press 2002, s. 121–122; P. Smith, *Leadership and Change, Intellectuals and Technocrats in Mexico*, [w:] R. Camp (ed.), *Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Ten Years*, Wyd. Westview Press 1986, s. 101–117; C. de la Torre, *In the Name of the People: Democratization, Popular Organizations, and Populism in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador*, „European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies” 2013, vol 95, s. 27–48; M. Becker, *Pachakuti! Indigenous Movements and Electoral Politics in Ecuador*, Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield 2011; C. Martínez Novo, *The Indigenous Movement and the Citizen's Revolution in Ecuador: Advances, Ambiguities, and Turn Backs*, The Conference Outlook for Indigenous Politics in the Andean Region, Washington 2009; H. Schamis, *Reconceptualizing Latin American Authoritarianism in the 1970s: From Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism to Neo-conservatism*, „Comparative Politics” 1991, vol 23, nr 2, s. 201–220; C. Huneus, *Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime. The „ODEPLAN Boys” and the „Gremialists” in Pinochet's Chile*, „Journal of Latin American Studies”, 2000, vol 32, nr 2, s. 461–501.

<sup>51</sup> J. Lie, *Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 1998; A. So, S. Chiu, *East Asia and the World Economy*, Wyd. Sage 1995; F. Deyo, *State and Labor: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development*, [w:] F. Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1987; R. Barrett, S. Chin, *Export-Oriented Industrializing States in the Capitalist World System: Similarities and Differences*, [w:] F. Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1987; S. Haggard, C. Moon, *The State, Politics, and Economic Development in Postwar South Korea*, [w:] H. Koo (ed.), *State and Society in Contemporary Korea*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1993; B. Cumings, *The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences*, [w:] F. Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1987; M. Woo-Curnings, *The Political Economy of Growth in East Asia: A Perspective on the State, Market, and Ideology*, [w:] M. Aoki (ed.), *The Role of Government in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis, Market, and Ideology*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1996; G. Rodan, *Class Transformations and Political Tensions in Singapore's Development*, [w:] R. Robison, D. Goodman (eds.), *The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald's and Middle-Class Revolution*, Wyd. Routledge 1996; M. Thompson, *Late Industrialisers, Late Democratizers: Developmental States in the Asia-Pacific*, „Third World Quarterly” 1996, vol 17, nr 4, s. 625–647.

<sup>52</sup> Ü. Akçay, *Sermayenin Uluslararasılaşması ve Devletin Dönüşümü: Teknokratik Otoriterizmin Yükselişi*, „Praksis” 2013, vol 30-31, s. 11–39.

military-supported ultra-liberal economic strategy, minimization of the government regulation of economy, refusal of protectionism, severe reduction of state expenses, and also dismantlement of the state sector (Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and others). It makes us conclude that the processes of parallel technocratization and modernization in non-democratic political regimes can occur in accordance with different approaches: reformist/temperate and radical/heavy-handed.

Therefore, the biggest peculiarity of combination of attributes and principles of non-democratic modernization and technocratic governance in most countries, where such synthesis appeared to be rather successful, was the fact that the main emphasis was laid not only on army, bureaucratic apparatus and technocrats, but also on other resources of non-democratic regimes stabilization. For instance, in Indonesia, General Suharto was supported by the middle class: namely, scientists and artists, professors, journalists, doctors, lawyers, qualified executives, engineers and technicians, non-elite businessmen. In Chile General Pinochet gained great support among higher classes of the society, concentrated in rich quarters in Santiago – Las Candas and La De Hesa. In Salvador the army was backed up by ancestral, while the latter was not only independent of military men, but also controlled their activity and authority, in the way that they did not play any important role in the state governance. In Mexico relative independence of the executive branch was explained by the fact that the technocratic government was supported by the traditionally predominant in the society the Institutional Revolutionary party, which has been in power since 1929. It was able to control main rural and working organizations, which appeared as a result of the revolution and agrarian reform. Being consolidated by the complex system of institutional interrelations and redistribution of state resources after coming into power, namely peasantry support and acquiescence of trade unions ensured the President and the National Congress stable positions in relations with the opponents to the party line aimed at open economy/privatization, enabling them to suppress dissatisfaction of the main mass of urban population, whose living standards had lowered in course of taking stabilization/modernization measures. In fact, only real, but not an imaginary support of various social groups contributes to legitimatization of a non-democratic regime under conditions of technocratic governance. On the other hand, the success of such transformations, according to some scientists, depends on those social factors, which influence non-democratic regimes.

Another interesting point is that the combination of military or non-military/civil (but force) regime and technocratic governance (supported or not supported by social groups of population) form the most rigid type of authoritarianism. It is stipulated by the fact that, to a large extent, such political regimes function with the aim at improving disbalance in the national economic policy by means of harsh suppression of democratic liberties with the help of military or other kinds of force at the intellectual and technocratic instigation. It usually occurs in the countries, where such disbalance can be found and together with other economic disproportions it starts threatening with economic collapse and causes escalation

of social and political conflicts in society<sup>53</sup>. But even despite this, it becomes quite obvious that non-democratic nature of a regime does not guarantee accomplishment of necessary transformations in the economic sphere, even if such transformations are implemented by means/methods of technocratic governance.

On the other hand, harshness of non-democratic regime, which contributes to modernization by means of technocratic governance, can be justified by the fact that technocrats are always perceived as cold-blooded, rational and effective civil servants, as well as national leaders, who have certain “moral” missions, namely to revive their nations and peoples, to ensure their progress and development, to update and modernize them. For instance, Sergio de Castro, guru of Chilean “Chicago boys”, assumed, that he had to experience not only three years of unsuccessful socialist policy during S. Allende’s governance, but also “half a century of mistakes”. In his turn, Domingo Felipe Cavallo saw himself as “a Messiah who had to solve all Argentinean economic calamities”. Technocrats in Ecuador had the similar mission, aimed at designing the concept of “sumak kawsay”, which metaphysically was comprehended as “harmony between community and space”, as the non-western type relations between society, nature and development. Taking this into consideration, technocratic elites in non-democratic political regimes could play a very important role in demobilization of various social groups. Within the frames of the process, they focused their attention on the political problems, which had been urgent earlier, but they did it in the light of technocratic interpretation. That is why, for instance, in Brazil after 1964, Argentina after 1966 and Chile after 1973, the appropriateness of combination of military goals and security and development has been reasonably determined, namely in the context of setting up new intelligence services and creating new institutions of technocratic planning. As a result, traditional reasons for technocratization in non-democratic political regimes, which have managed to undergo modernization, can be named. Firstly, one can speak of a very high level of social or social and economic differentiation, which is accompanied by industrialization. It leads to the increase of the role of technocrats in the society, both in private and in state sectors. Secondly, technocrats are characterized by a low level of tolerance towards prolonged political and social and economic crisis, as they regard a high level of private sector politicization

<sup>53</sup> In this case the events which occurred in Chile are rather representative. In September 1970 the representative of the block “Popular Unity” socialist S. Allende won at the presidential elections. The “Popular Unity” government nationalized a number of the biggest industrial enterprises, bought many private banks, and took over the control of other banks. The agrarian reform was implemented as a swift rate. As a result of the government’s actions the state sector was on the rise, people’s living standards increased, the unemployment level was reduced. However, the “Popular Unity” government nationalized the main Chile’s treasure – copper industry, which was in hand of American companies. The USA in return declared economic and financial blockade to Chile. Production was suspended, strikes went on, prices grew, and the most important goods disappeared from the stores. Direct confrontations between the left-wingers and right wingers and were held in the streets and at the enterprises. Allende’s government lost control over entire provinces. Having come to power in 1973 A. Pinochet’s military government chose neoliberal monetary model, elaborated by M. Friedman’s Chicago school. The dictator put the so-called “Chicago boys” headed by E. Bichi in control of the country. And, despite two economic crises in 1976 and 1982 did not fall off the line. He used the cut and try approach and the model worked. Nowadays, the economy of this country is one of the most dynamic in the world, with the highest living standards across Latin America, and with an annual 5-6 percent GDP growth. See in detail: V. Sukhonos, *Sutnist ta funktsii avtorytarnoho derzhavnogo rezhymu v umovakh perekhodu do demokratii (teoretyko-metodolohichniy analiz)*, Kyiv 2000.; C. Huneus, *Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime. The „ODEPLAN Boys” and the „Gremialists” in Pinochet’s Chile*, „Journal of Latin American Studies”, 2000, vol 32, nr 2, s. 461–501.

as the obstacle for the social and economic growth. Thirdly, in the midst of military and force structures technocratic orientation is represented by the so-called “new professionalism”, which, first of all, is focused on the active military interference in political, economic and social life. Fourthly, it is reflected by the increasing connection and communication between civil and military/force technocrats, as well as their growing disappointment in existing political and social and economic conditions. This, in its turn, leads to emergence of some “coalition for upheaval”, which, at the end installs repressive regime of authoritarian and bureaucratic nature, which, if we take into consideration technocracy, can put an end to political and social and economic crisis. This determines the phenomenon of technocratic rationality of non-democratic political regimes. The essence lies in the fact, that any non-democratic regime can be more effective in accomplishing goals at the first stages of industrialization, namely in the context of reliable infrastructure development, raising funds, great amounts of import technologies, and selection and extension of the industrial base of manufacturing at low prices<sup>54</sup>.

However, the peculiarity of technocratic governance (in the light of technocratic cabinets’ and managers-technocrats’ functioning) in those non-democratic countries, which do not carry out modernization, to B. Hel’man and A. Starodubtsev’s<sup>55</sup> point of view, lies in the fact that technocrats at different management positions cannot guarantee and implement effective political responsibility, and therefore, governments/administrations and other institutions, which consist of managers-technocrats’, are determined by very low political autonomy. As a result, technocratic governments in non-democratic, especially post-Soviet political regimes are often transformed from collective bodies, which take mainstream decisions into functional sets of officials, who are responsible for decision of problems, which are posed by the heads of states and/or governments. It happens this way because in such non-democratic regimes the basic principles of technocratic governance are violated, as the so-called managers-technocrats, who are usually represented by the government ministers “are hired” individually in accordance to the president’s or Prime Minister’s will<sup>56</sup>. Due to this technocratic governance in some non-democratic regimes is quite distorted and serves as a communicative/discursive “cover”, as the governments and other authoritative institutions, made up of the so-called “managers-technocrats”, do not form either a totality of politically responsible functionaries or a team of professionals, united by a common approach towards executive and managerial tasks. As a result we can face complication of management decision-taking process, inefficiency in managerial solutions coordination between various ministries and departments (as the links of

<sup>54</sup> F. Deyo, *State and Labor: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development*, [w:] F. Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1987.; I. Pirie, *Better by design: Korea’s neoliberal economy*, “The Pacific Review” 2005, vol 18, nr 3.; I. Pirie, *The Korean Developmental State: From Dirigisme to neo-liberalism*, Wyd. Routledge 2007.

<sup>55</sup> V. Hel’man, A. Starodubtsev, *Vozmozhnosti i ogranicheniya avtoritarnoi modernizatsyy: rossiyskiye reformy 2000-h hodov*, „Polytyia” 2014, vol 4, nr 75, s. 11.

<sup>56</sup> I. Shevchenko, *The Central Government of Russia from Gorbachev to Putin*, Wyd. Aldershot 2004.; E. Huskey, *Elite Recruitment and State-Society Relationships in Technocratic Authoritarian Regime: The Russian Case*, “Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 2010, vol 43, nr 4.

the governing process), wasting time and efforts on the inner-staff fighting<sup>57</sup>, which interferes with the process of political course implementation<sup>58</sup>.

On the basis of constructing the abovementioned concept of “pseudo-technocracy” in many countries, including the post-Soviet and Chinese<sup>59</sup> non-democratic regimes, one can observe, according to B. Makarenko<sup>60</sup>, E. Meleshkyna<sup>61</sup>, as well as S. Berglund, J. Ekman, F. Aarebrot<sup>62</sup>, formation and institutionalization of the so-called “parties or ruling coalitions”, which are “incarnation of bureaucracy, technocracy or military elite” (the examples of such parties are: “The Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government” affiliated with J. Pilsudski in the Republic of Poland, “The Party of Unity” during M. Horthy’s regency in Hungary, the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico, “The Joint Secretariat of Working Groups” in Indonesia, “The United Russia” in Putin’s epoch in Russia, “Nur Otan” in Kazakhstan, “New Azerbaijan” in Azerbaijan, “The Union of Citizens of Georgia” affiliated with E. Shevardnadze in Georgia, «Ak Zhol» during Bakiyev’s ruling in Kirgizstan, the Republican Party of Armenia, the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan and others). It is notable that in this context the definition of the “ruling party” proposed by V. Bruter<sup>63</sup> in 1999 as mainly the post-Soviet phenomenon is rather valid. According to this the party in fact is ruled by the non-party head of state, the party has majority in partially non-party parliament and who constructs a depoliticized government, which is liable to the parliament to a limited extent. In this light “technocratic government pretence” directly contribute to the “ruling party” formation and the consequent authoritarianization of non-democratic political regimes, but do facilitate their modernization.

Moreover, namely within this context the doubts are aroused as to the principles which are in the basis of state governance construction and governance in non-democratic political regimes – technocratic or populist. The point is that technocracy and populism are absolutely opposite notions, as the former is based on the art of management and the latter – on charisma; the former stands for gradual changes, the latter “attracts” by its high-flown rhetoric; the former is focused on specific problems solution, the latter – on policy of identity. They also differ in models of political power legitimacy Technocrats strive for strengthening of power legitimacy, trying to achieve positive results for various groups of interests (entrepreneurs, farmers, pupils and so on). Populists, in their turn, appear when the means of political representation are not factories and party meetings, but communication facilities. Thus, populists’ claims are aimed at putting identity in the first place. The main peculiarity of non-democratic political regimes,

<sup>57</sup> M. Kas’janov, *Bez Putina: Politicheskie dialogi s Evgeniem Kiselevym*, Moskva 2009.

<sup>58</sup> M. Gilman, *Defolt, kotorogo moglo ne byt*, Moskva 2008.

<sup>59</sup> M. Pei, *Is China Democratizing?*, “Foreign Affairs” 1998, vol 77, nr 1, s. 68–82.; B. Dickson, *Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation*, “Political Science Quarterly” 2001, vol 115, nr 4, s. 517–541.

<sup>60</sup> B. Makarenko, *Postsovetskaja partija vlasti: “Edynaja Rossija” v sravnitel’nom kontekste*, „Polytycheskye issledovaniya” 2011, vol 1, s. 45.

<sup>61</sup> E. Meleshkyna, *Domynirovanie po-russky ili myrovoi fenomen?*, „Polytycheskaia nauka” 2006, vol 1.

<sup>62</sup> S. Berglund, J. Ekman, F. Aarebrot, *The Challenge of History in Central and Eastern Europe: The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. E. Elgar 2004.

<sup>63</sup> V. Bruter, *Partii vlasti ukhodiat?*, *Sodruzhestvo NH* 1999, vol 5, nr 17.

especially those, which are not modernized, but appeal to technocratic means of governance, is that they combine principles and postulates of technocratic/non-party (pseudo-technocratic) state governance and policy of identity, i.e. populism and technocracy. As a result one may observe the specific phenomenon of technocratic populism in many non-democratic, especially post-Soviet political regimes, which becomes apparent in the fact that “technocrats-populists” by means of their activity manipulate society, create political arenas for political actors, offering their own rules of the game, roles, plots, created by the so-called “directors” represented by political consultants. Their political technologies are based on four constituents, closely interrelated between each other and implemented almost immediately. These are imitational procedures, positioning, background context formation for the specific politician and political party, and also setting-up and organizing systems/channels of communication between the actors and “audience” represented by the people<sup>64</sup>.

The essence of the imitational procedures of technocratic/pseudo-technocratic governance in non-democratic political regimes consists in imitation of democratic norms and principles (even on the grounds of appealing to the concept of post-democracy, what is especially inherent to Russia) within the elections, imaginary multiparty system, competitiveness, people’s interests representation etc. the result is the absence of serious attention to the problems of transitional period, formation of the so-called “hybrid” political system, which combines traditional and modern forms of political culture, where the former predominates, and which leads to non-functionality of political (in particular ruling) institutions. Moreover, application of imitational structures inevitably strengthens authoritarian tendencies within non-democratic political regimes, absence of competitiveness within the electoral system and real distribution of power, creates preconditions for oligarchical regime, legal precariousness of social policy etc.

Positioning as an inseparable part of technocratic populism of non-democratic regimes is revealed through selection of specific sets for certain political leaders and officials and parties, which are headed by them, their programs, mottos, themes, mythologemas and even rules of conduct. But the main point of these sets is not realistic goals, but mobilization of people around certain complex ideology with the stress on stimulating motivation. It is quite obvious, that this mechanism contributes to reproduction and deepening of non-democratic tendencies, including such characteristics as citizenship, passiveness, self-sacrifice. Negative effects of positioning implementation are revealed in the constitutional crisis, non-agreed rules of the contract between the state and the people, adjustment of legal, economic cultural systems to political conjuncture, internal and external policy orientation to natural resources exploration etc.

Creation of the background context within technocratic populism in non-democratic political regimes is one of the most vivid technological elements of modern political processes. Background context “is in charge of” reputation formation of the party and its political leader.

<sup>64</sup> M. Demetradze, *Osobennosti tekhnokratycheskogo traditsyonalizma v gosudarstvennom upravlenii v sovremennoi Rossii*, zdrojlo: [http://www.rusnauka.com/27\\_NPM\\_2012/Gosupravlenie/2\\_116139.doc.htm](http://www.rusnauka.com/27_NPM_2012/Gosupravlenie/2_116139.doc.htm) (odczyt: 10.10.2015).

The main point in reputation formation is creation of a visible image of personal characteristics: operational efficiency, businesslike character, courage, patriotism, interpersonal skills. As a result, the artistic portrait of a “sociable, nice fellow” with charisma and so on is created<sup>65</sup>. The peculiar role in the process of background context formation in the course of the electoral processes is played by recruitment and creation of suitable reputation, in accordance with the people’s well-established ideas of defense and defenders of their interests, despite the fact how this is implemented in practice. Due to this technology of background context formation incorporates all the above-mentioned procedures – imitational techniques and positioning. All together they play the role of special effects. That is why the task of a technocratic-populist non-democratic regime is a constant “revival” and permanent stabilization, though in the form of pseudo-democratic procedures and resulting in them. That is why, the main goal of PR-experts is to achieve the victory of the created candidate and to “remove” everyone who is on the way or may just interfere with this. At the same time, one can use the so-called “dirty tricks”, but their organizers are always in the shadow and never take any responsibility.

Finally, communicative channels of technocratic populism of non-democratic regimes, being a component of political operative procedures, form the arena of “reputation wars”. The main task of communication systems and channels is to ensure the introduction of political leaders and their parties on the political arena, popularity, immensity of proclaimed principles, as well as create the appearance of faithfulness for the beforehand programmed actions (despite real effectiveness or non-effectiveness of the results of technocratic/pseudo-technocratic governance). All this requires from the ruling institutions in non-democratic regimes, and party groups (“parties or ruling coalitions”) investment of great material and other, including administrative resources. It helps to conclude that under conditions of technocratic populism in non-democratic political regimes everything depends on resources and closeness to political elite<sup>66</sup>. At the same time all communicative channels incorporate all mass media spheres and types, paying regard even to rumors, and they form an informational field, aimed at certain political behavior of citizens, forms and results of which are already programmed. Political technologies can acquire distorted and non-legal character, where the main role belongs to ideology, within the frames of which a leader, being a “technocratic center” is provided with “charismatic characteristics”, what ensures paternalism, sacralization of authorities etc. In other words, a system of communication by means of certain ideology creates an “I-image” of the political leader-regime, the image, which obtains supernatural qualities, which can play a sacral role<sup>67</sup>.

That is why in non-democratic regimes, which are being modernized or are not being modernized, technocratic or pseudo-technocratic principle of governance is described in natural (gossip, fashion, history, traditions etc.) and informational (information, advertising,

<sup>65</sup> E. Shabarova, *Polytycheskaia reklama v Rossii kontsa XX – nachala XXI veka: Struktura i problemy effektivnosti*, Moskva 2005.

<sup>66</sup> E. Shabarova, *Polytycheskaia reklama v Rossii kontsa XX – nachala XXI veka: Struktura i problemy effektivnosti*, Moskva 2005, s. 16.

<sup>67</sup> G. Voronina, *Makrosotsialnye faktory formirovaniia obraza polytycheskogo lydera Rossii*, Moskva 2003, s. 12.

communication and so on) forms. Due to appealing to technocratic governance one can implement various old-fashion political stereotypes, archetypes, traditions, customs, rituals, games, non-critical attitude towards political decision-making processes, ideologemes of “enemy image”, “friend-image”, glorification of own nation and achievements in different spheres of social and cultural life (even if there are none of them), hierarchical model of interrelation between society and authorities, suggestibility, figurativeness, illusiveness and other things. Such symbiosis of new, but twisted and misinterpreted technologies and traditions ensures legitimacy of non-democratic ruling elite, regulates the essence of paternalistic-subject political culture<sup>68</sup>.

Determining differences between non-democratic political regimes, which by means of technocratic/pseudo-technocratic governance contribute or do not contribute to modernization, we appeal to G. O'Donnell's classification of non-democratic/authoritarian regimes. The scholar singles out the following types of authoritarianism as oligarchic, authoritarian-bureaucratic and populist. Authoritarian-bureaucratic authoritarianism corresponds to the non-democratic regime, which by means of technocratic governance contributes to modernization, and populist authoritarianism conforms to such non-democratic regime, which by means of pseudo-technocratic governance do not promote the process of modernization<sup>69</sup>. The essence of authoritarian-bureaucratic authoritarianism consists in composing the elements of non-democracy and industrialization (it means that bureaucratic authoritarianism according to the modern theoretical and methodological paradigm must be considered as authoritarianism of development). However, the nature of populist authoritarianism lies in the fact of distinguishing various degrees of competitiveness, as well as such consolidating peculiarity as “economic nationalism”.

**Table 1.** Distinction of authoritarian-bureaucratic (technocratic) and populist (pseudo-technocratic ) non-democratic regimes

Non-democratic regime	Populist (pseudo-technocratic)	Authoritarian-bureaucratic (technocratic)
Political regime	Considerable rises and falls of political competitiveness and democracy	Non-democratic (the absence of political pluralism)
Coalitions	“Inclusion” on the basis of multiclass coalitions of city industrial interests, industrial elites and “middle class”	Central actors, who are high-level technocrats (military and civil), closely cooperate with foreign capital; electoral competitiveness if excluded; “middle class” control
Policy directions	Economic nationalism; state facilitates the initial industrialization	Centralization of economic policy, “promotion” of advanced industrialization

<sup>68</sup> M. Demetradze, *Osobennosti tekhnokratycheskogo tradytsionalyzma v gosudarstvennom upravlenii v sovremennoi Rossii*, zdrojlo: [http://www.rusnauka.com/27\\_NPM\\_2012/Gosupravlenie/2\\_116139.doc.htm](http://www.rusnauka.com/27_NPM_2012/Gosupravlenie/2_116139.doc.htm) (odczyt: 10.10.2015).

<sup>69</sup> G. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*, Berkeley 1979. H. Li, *Technocrats and Democratic Transition: the Cases of China and Mexico*, “Journal of International and Area Studies” 2001, vol 8, nr 2, s. 67–86; D. Collier, *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1979, s. 1–31.

Appearance, social influence and dynamics of authoritarian-bureaucratic (technocratic) type of non-democratic predominance, according to G. O'Donnell's<sup>70</sup>, are connected with the structural changes of the specific type of capitalism (which, for instance aroused in Latin America, South-Eastern Asia) – with the process of transition from “light” to “weight” phase of industrialization or to post-industrialization, with deepening of peripheral dependent capitalism, with demands as to radical transformation of the mechanisms of capital, with redistribution of social benefits and losses of the process itself. Describing authoritarian-bureaucratic type of non-democratic regime (which we compare with the phenomenon of technocratic non-democratic regime), G. O'Donnell singles out dialectic interaction between three aspects of social-economic modernization: 1) industrialization; 2) increase in politicization of popular sectors; 3) grows in roles of “technocratic employment” in state or private bureaucracy. Crucial features of bureaucratic (technocratic) non-democratic political regimes mainly are: 1) Organization of political predominance on behalf of greatly oligopolized and transnational middle class; 2) obtainment compulsion of crucial political role by the apparatus; 3) realization of political isolation of previously active social sectors; 4) suppression of citizenship; 5) economic isolation of popular sectors (by means of objecting populist slogans); 6) increasing transnationalization; 7) depoliticalization of social development; 8) “closing” of current democratic channels. Political tension within bureaucratic authoritarian regime with technocratic means of governance is mainly caused by the processes of denationalization of the civil society and “compression” of nation. Moreover, such regimes fail due to political/economic “discordance” within the elite circles: middle class and technocrats have different transnational orientation, and military men first of all represent national sector. Thus it is obvious, that systematically such regime is extremely dangerous and fragile. Nevertheless, bureaucratic authoritarianism of technocratic type is considered to be an optimal form of “political predominance” under conditions of serious menace to the capitalistic order<sup>71</sup>.

However, populist (pseudo-technocratic) non-democratic regime hold itself out as an example of attempt to integrate society from “above” by means of the state interference, which aspires to incorporate workers and the middle class in the process of creating models of corporate structures. The most important structures – trade unions, “vertical”, clientilistic and institutions, which are fully under the state control directly, take part in “mass participation institutionalization”. It is stipulated that corporate organizations must create a new system of class and interest group representatives, and also change liberal system of representative authority. These organizations should be created and directed by a state, which task is to overcome private interests for the sake of national ones. None democratic regime of populist type have not been able to do that, but separate regimes under the national guise of social fairness and on the

<sup>70</sup> G. O'Donnell, *Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State*, “Latin American Research Review” 1978, vol 14, nr 1, s. 3–38.

<sup>71</sup> H. Li, *Technocrats and Democratic Transition: the Cases of China and Mexico*, “Journal of International and Area Studies” 2001, vol 8, nr 2, s. 67–86.

basis of pseudo-technocratic values managed to mobilize a great number of the masses and to establish parties and trade unions, which “have survived” both the regimes, and their creators. In general, the attributes of such regimes are the following features: 1) idea of society integration “from above” – through corporatism and collectivism; 2) idea of “social fairness”, which must be achieved by means of large-scale involvement of people’s movements; 3) concentration on “objecting” certain systems of values, which serves a unifying point for populist slogans (Latin America and some post-Soviet countries have been characterized by such a distinctive feature as objection of liberalism principles); 4) support on collective identity and mediation between the state and society, which is represented through the category “the people” (“we” is the bearer of requirements, concerning “essential and real fairness”, on the contrary to the abstract citizen equality); 5) economic basis for populist authoritarianism is import-substitution industrialization, creation of national industries and protection of internal market from foreign capital and goods rivalry; 6) gradual “breakage” of institutional mechanisms and patterns of democratic system of governing and/or their simulation; 7) “plebiscitary legitimization” of the executive branch and its “legislative supplements”: decision-taking process is fully isolated from the mechanisms of political participation (politics is solely treated as the management sphere, though rhetoric of participation is the most important element of ideology); 8) weakness of modernization and transformation of social relations, which reveal itself in total corrupt practices.

To summarize, we argue that non-democratic regime, which is based on the principals of “faithful” technocratic governance is far more rigorous, than non-democratic regime, which is based on the principals of pseudo-technocratic governance. However, the former one is less stable and unified (in the light of interrelationship between technocrats) in middle term range, than the latter one. It depends on the fact that within the former (authoritarian-bureaucratic) type of non-democratic regime, technocrats are closely connected with international financial structures; in particular IMF and World Bank, which to some extent can exert pressure on technocrats’ way of managerial roles implementation. On the other hand, it is not peculiar of the latter (populist) type of non-democratic political regimes, where technocrats/pseudo-technocrats are more unified due to clientilistic relations and pay less attention to criticism or even isolation on the part of global financial structures<sup>72</sup>. We can also conclude that the real technocratic non-democratic political regime obtains the following features: establishment and development of liberal and capital or liberal economy; fixation of the norm, that the state has extensive ownership right for means of production, and that is why it participates in capitalistic economy with the help of profit-oriented companies and firms; regulation of rules, concerning

<sup>72</sup> The conclusion was made on the basis of personal generalizations and findings, provided by the following researchers: S. Levitsky, L. Way, J. Pevehouse, M. Centeno, S. Haggard. See in detail: S. Levitsky, L. Way, *The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism*, “Journal of Democracy” 2002, vol 13, nr 2, s. 51–65.; S. Levitsky, L. Way, *International Linkage and Democratization*, “Journal of Democracy” 2005, vol 16, nr 3, s. 20–34.; J. Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2005, s. 190–192.; M. Centeno, *Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico*, Wyd. The Pennsylvania State University Press 1994.; S. Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1990.

the fact that institutions of civil society and private life are closely regulated and controlled by the state, determining political authoritarianism; introduction into practice tendencies towards the support provided by ruling elites to the network of technocratic experts, private entrepreneurs and local capitalists; support to hegemony of a ruling elite by means of mobilizing concordance aimed at ideology of civilizational differences and differences of the group identity. It means that relevant technocratic non-democratic regime is mostly non-democratic in political, but not economic sense, as a large number of economic liberties are stipulated and regulated within such a regime.

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