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## **Концепт технократизму та його вплив на формування непартійних урядів: теоретико-методологічні передумови й емпіричні наслідки**

Проаналізовано сутність і походження концепту технократизму у світовій політичній думці. Розглянуто теоретико-методологічні передумови та емпіричні наслідки впливу технократизму на формування непартійних урядів. Детерміновано сучасне розуміння непартійних/технократичних урядів. Окреслено особливості урядових посад, зайнятих міністрами-технократами.

*Ключові слова:* технократія, технократизм, технократичний уряд, непартійний уряд, технократ, політик, управління/урядування.

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## **Concept of technocratism and its impact on non-party cabinets formation: theoretical-methodological background and empirical implications**

The article is devoted to analysis of the nature and the origin of the concept of technocratism in world political thought. The author reviewed theoretical and methodological background and empirical effects of technocratism on non-party cabinets formation; determined current meaning of non-party/technocratic cabinets; defined the features of cabinet portfolio, employed by ministers-technocrats.

*Keywords:* technocracy, technocratism, technocratic cabinet, non-party cabinet, technocrat, politician, management/governance.

The problem of *technocratic governance (technocratism)* is very broad and complex. It cannot be understood within the single specific synthesized scientific research. Especially since there are different approaches to interpretation of technocratism within the modern scientific progress as well as in the context of approbated political practices. There are

many scientific works, devoted to historical, theoretical and methodological, and also empirical definitions of technocratism, technocratic management/governance, ideas of technocracy as such, and also search of nature and attributes of formation and functioning of so-called technocratic/non-party (technocratic, expert, minority) governmental cabinets. Some of them (usually it is the first scientific reflections on the phenomenon of technocratism) refer to the period of the beginning of the XX century, other works (reflections, based on practical implications) refer to the middle and the end of the XX century, and the rest of them (devoted to the study of implementation of technocratism in wider format) belong to the beginning of XXI century. Among them we distinguish the following scientists: G. Peters<sup>1</sup>, M. Centeno<sup>2</sup>, E. Bryld<sup>3</sup>, E. Silva<sup>4</sup>, P. Silva<sup>5</sup>, J. MacDougall<sup>6</sup>, C. Huneus<sup>7</sup>, L. Stifel<sup>8</sup>, B. Schneider<sup>9</sup>, R. Putnam<sup>10</sup>, I. Takashi ra J. Purnendra<sup>11</sup>, P. Schmitter<sup>12</sup>, M. Muramatsu and E. Krauss<sup>13</sup>, M. Cotta, A. Mastropaolo i L. Verzichelli<sup>14</sup>, F. Marangoni<sup>15</sup>, J. Gunnell<sup>16</sup>, J. Burnham<sup>17</sup>, W. Akin<sup>18</sup>, T. Veblen<sup>19</sup>, J. Straussman<sup>20</sup>, etc.

<sup>1</sup> G. Peters, *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, "Comparative Politics", 1979, vol 11, nr 3, s. 339-358.

<sup>2</sup> M. Centeno, *The New Leviathan: The Dynamic and Limits of Technocracy*, "Theory and Society", 1993, vol 22, s. 307-335.

<sup>3</sup> E. Bryld, *The Technocratic Discourse: Technical Means to Political Problems*, "Development in Practice", 2000, vol 10, nr 5, s. 700-705.

<sup>4</sup> E. Silva, *The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics*, Wyd. Westview Press 1996.

<sup>5</sup> P. Silva, *State, Public Technocracy and Politics in Chile, 1927-1941*, "Bulletin of Latin American Research", 1994, vol 13, nr 3, s. 281-297); P. Silva, *Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks*, "Journal of Latin American Studies", 1991, vol 23, nr 2, s. 385-410.

<sup>6</sup> J. MacDougall, *The Technocratic Model of Modernization: The Case of Indonesia's New Order*, "Asian Survey", 1976, vol 16, nr 12, s. 1166-1183.

<sup>7</sup> C. Huneus, *Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime. The "ODEPLAN Boys" and the "Gremialists" in Pinochet's Chile*, "Journal of Latin American Studies", 2000, vol 32, nr 2, s. 461-501.

<sup>8</sup> L. Stifel, *Technocrats and Modernization in Thailand*, "Asian Survey", 1976, vol 16, nr 12, s. 1184-1196.

<sup>9</sup> B. Schneider, *The material bases of technocracy: Investor confidence and neoliberalism in Latin America*, [w:] M. Centeno, P. Silva, *The Politics of Expertise in Latin America*, Wyd. St Martin's Press 1998, s. 77-95.

<sup>10</sup> R. Putnam, *Elite transformation in advanced industrial societies: An empirical assessment of the theory of technocracy*, "Comparative Political Studies", 1997, vol 10, s. 388-412.

<sup>11</sup> T. Inoguchi, J. Purnendra, *Japanese Politics Today: Beyond Karaoke Democracy*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1997.

<sup>12</sup> P. Schmitter, *Still the century of corporatism?*, [w:] P. Schmitter, G. Lehmbruch, *Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation*, Wyd. Sage 1979.

<sup>13</sup> M. Muramatsu, E. Krauss, *Bureaucrats and politicians in policymaking: The case of Japan*, "American Political Science Review", 1984, vol 78, nr 1, s. 126-146.

<sup>14</sup> M. Cotta, A. Mastropaolo, L. Verzichelli, *Parliamentary Elite transformations along the Discontinuous Road of Democratization: Italy 1861-1999*, [w:] H. Best, M. Cotta, *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848-2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 226-269.; M. Cotta, L. Verzichelli, *Ministers in Italy: Notables, Partymen, Technocrats and Mediamen*, "South European Society and Politics", 2002, vol 7, nr 2, s. 117-152.

<sup>15</sup> F. Marangoni, *Technocrats in Government: The Composition and Legislative Initiatives of the Monti Government Eight Months into its Term of Office*, "Bulletin of Italian Politics", 2012, vol 4, nr 1, s. 135-149.

<sup>16</sup> J. Gunnell, *The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy*, "Technology and Culture" 1982, vol 2, nr 3, s. 392-416.

<sup>17</sup> J. Burnham, *The managerial revolution*, Wyd. Penguin Books 1962

<sup>18</sup> W. Akin, *Technocracy and the American dream: the technocrat movement, 1900-1941*, Wyd. Berkeley 1977.

<sup>19</sup> T. Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System*, Wyd. Cosimo, Inc., 2006.

<sup>20</sup> J. Straussman, *The Limits of Technocratic Politics*, Wyd. Edison 1978.

Diversity and ambiguity of wide scientific approaches to interpretation of *technocratism* result in multiple definitions of the last one. *First*, technocratism should be understood as a theory and innovation movement for control of election processes, reform of financial institutions and reorganization of social system, built on the results of works of technologists and engineers. *Second*, this is a control system with the use of technocratic theory and its practical implications on different spheres of social life and economic management. Taking this into consideration, the first definition of *technocracy as management* should be the following, proposed in “Collins English Dictionary”: *firstly*, it is a theory or system of society according to which government is controlled by scientists, engineers, and other experts; *secondly*, it is a body of such experts; *thirdly*, it is a state considered to be governed or organized according to these principles<sup>21</sup>. Close definition has been proposed in «Online Etymology Dictionary»<sup>22</sup>, where: *technocracy* is a name for a new system of government by technical experts. However, «The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy» describes technocracy as: a type of society marked by the dominant role of people with specialized technical skills, particularly engineers; as a control of government and society by people with such skills. «Encyclopaedia Britannica» defines *technocracy* as government by “technicians” who are guided solely by the imperatives of their technology. Generally, it is obvious that *technocracy* is a form/method of management (governance), when engineers, scientists, health workers and other technical specialists control the decision-making in certain spheres (including political ones)<sup>23</sup>. It is particularly remarkable that under conditions of technocracy, the persons, who make technical decisions (including political ones), are elected depending on how highly skilled they are, but not on the powerful capital (including political one) they have<sup>24</sup>.

Meanwhile, it is clear that in the modern world of scientific inventions and information development the idea of technical decisions, which are used for the rise of efficiency of industrial production and management on the West (mostly in the USA, and in a smaller degree in the countries of Western and Eastern Europe and Latin America), as well as on the East (mostly in China, Japan and other industrialized countries of Asia), led to the origin of certain new scientific views on the governance formation according to the principles of technocratism. Therefore, in this case *technocracy* means such form of management and governance, which is critically established on the principles of social skills, and also such mechanism of problem-solving (including political one), which is based on the principles of making expert decisions by technocrats. Taking this into account, the technocratic management is often considered to be favorable even in those countries, where it was not or almost was

<sup>21</sup> *Collins English Dictionary*, Wyd. William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 2009.

<sup>22</sup> *Online Etymology Dictionary*, Wyd. Douglas Harper 2010, źródło: <http://www.etymonline.com/> (styczeń 2014)

<sup>23</sup> *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, źródło: <http://www.britannica.com/> (styczeń 2014)

<sup>24</sup> T. Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System*, Wyd. Batoche Books 2001.; W. Smyth, *Technocracy – Ways and Means to Gain Industrial Democracy*, “Journal of Industrial Management” 1919, vol 57.

not realized. The fact is that there is generally accepted idea that technocratic management is needed in a case of “general collapse of power of all large institutions and inefficiency of governments, which are encumbered with financial problems and complexity of the government facilities”<sup>25</sup>. However, this conclusion contains important problematic question, and while solving it we start to perceive the meaning of technocratism. It tells us about the relation of technocratic management (technocracy or tecnocratism) to classic ideological and political management (policy), which is shown in the capacity of political authority to make and realize technical decisions. Often this relation is mutually contradicted, and that is why technocratic management and ideological and political management have a tendency to form to each other “conceptual opposition”: sometimes the ideological and political management denies any principles of technocratic management; and vice versa.

Nevertheless, a comparison of technocracy and politics within theoretical and methodological concepts is not possible. The fact is that politics and technocracy appear and function in the forms of many mutually advantageous relations. Thus, the politics in the light of political regimes and different forms of state needs technocracy for complex development of political process, realization of effective and good political choice and strengthening of all experts’ decisions as well as for implementation of methodological programs, development of well-founded conclusions, passing non-discriminating acts. However, technocracy, which means the use of work of technocrats (that is management by technocrats), requires ideological and pragmatic policy, sanctions of authority, if it wants to be heard, not to mention its efficient and effective use. In the same way we may define such distinctive categories of people, as technocrats/experts and politicians (as intellectuals). *Technocrats/experts* are people, who are experienced and indifferent to politics, and also non-ideological in performing their functions, in particular in the sphere of service of state functions.<sup>26</sup> *Politicians (as intellectuals)* are people, who aim to realize group interests, which have mostly a form of ideology; people, who appeal to ideological postulates in their attempts to explain and reach their goal. It is obvious that the consolidation of these categories of people is an effective mechanism of political development of a country. The thing is that technocrats worry about realization of social and economic reforms, and politicians-intellectuals — about political reforms. That is why, theoretically, the politicians use technocracy for clear goals, isolating it from pressure/intervention in such way, that technocracy could function “without fear and passion”.

Theoretical and methodological principles of *synthesis of politics and technocracy* are not new. G. Wilson notices that the condition for making political decisions, based

<sup>25</sup> E. Berndt, *From Technocracy To Net Energy Analysis: Engineers, Economists And Recurring Energy Theories Of Value*, “Studies in Energy and the American Economy” 1982, nr 11.; G. Peters, *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, “Comparative Politics”, 1979, vol 11, nr 3, s. 339-358.

<sup>26</sup> Y. Bangura, *Intellectuals, Economic Reform and Social Change: Constraints and Opportunities in the Formation of a Nigerian Technocracy*, “CODESRIA Monograph Series” 1994, vol 1, nr 94.; R. Tirtosudarmo, *Indonesia and Nigeria, 1965-1985: Structural factors, technocracy and the politics of rural development*, Paper prepared for the first plenary meeting of Tracking Development Leiden, 25-28 June 2008.

on the principles of technocracy and technocratism, is the fact that such process takes place through attraction of specialists, who have knowledge about “natural iron laws of society and can adapt to them”<sup>27</sup>. Similar thoughts about relation of politics and technocratism is observed in the works of F. Bacon, who proposed a paradigm of “*knowledge as power*”. It clearly describes a phenomenon of “leader-technocrat” as theoretical “political management” with considerable expert skills in some sphere or other (economics, science, etc.). Besides that, technocratic management is closely related to the concept of M. Weber about “*rationalization of bureaucracy*”<sup>28</sup>. The point is that management is carried out only on the basis of impersonalism, dehumanization and rationalization<sup>29</sup>. Using the concept of “rationalization of bureaucracy” M. Centeno formulates the definition of *technocracy*: “administrative and political domination in society of state elite and union institutions, which aim to press a single exclusive paradigm of politics”, based on efficient power implementation methods<sup>30</sup>. Taking this into consideration, it is obvious that the phenomenon of technocracy is close to the phenomenon of bureaucracy. Their unifying and at the same time differential component is *rationality* — a characteristic of knowledge in the context of its correspondence to certain thinking principles. The fact is that the rationality of bureaucracy is to a greater extent substantive (since it belongs to more generalized value and standards system, integrated in world-view), and rationality of technocracy is formal (it can calculate and estimate when making any decision, including administrative one). The rationality of bureaucracy mostly depends on ideological and world-view beliefs, than on rationality of technocracy. The rationality of bureaucracy mostly refers to political values and beliefs, than to rationality of technocracy.

<sup>27</sup> G. Wilson, *Beyond the Technocrat? The Professional Expert in Development Practice*, “Development and Change” 2006, vol 37, nr 3, s. 505.

<sup>28</sup> M. Weber, G. Roth, C. Wittich, *Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology [Volume 2]*, California 1978.

<sup>29</sup> Among other concepts, which explain logical, theoretical and methodological propriety of synthesis of politics and technocracy we may distinguish the following: idea of “*new order*” (author — T. Veblen; it means the necessity of revolution or strike being carried out by engineers in order to establish a new system of state governance in the form of “council of technical experts”), thesis about “*end of ideology*” (authors — D. Bell, E. Shils, S. Lipset, J. La Palombara, R. Lane, etc.), *elitist technocratism* (representatives — S. Lakoff, H. Brooks, P. Piccard, N. Calder, D. Schooler, P. Bereano, G. Boyle etc.), *bureaucratic technocracy* (representatives — J. Meynaud, D. Price), concept of “*technostructure*” (author — J. Galbraith, R. Boguslaw, V. Ferkiss), concept of “*depoliticization and repoliticization*” (author — J. Ellul), *neo-Marxism* (authors — M. Horkheimer, H. Marcuse, J. Habermas, etc.), *taylorism* (representatives — A. Ranney, J. Kasson), project “*Venus*” (representative (J. Fresco), project “*Technate*”, etc. For more details, please, see: T. Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System*, Wyd. Cosimo, Inc., 2006; D. Bell, *The end of ideology: on the exhaustion of political ideas in the fifties: with “The resumption of history in the new century”*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 2000.; E. Shils, *The End of Ideology?*, “Encounter” 1955, vol 5, s. 52-58.; S. Lipset, *Political Man*, Wyd. Free Press 1972.; S. Lipset, *Political man: the social bases of politics*, Wyd. Heinemann, 1983.; J. La Palombara, *Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation*, “American Political Science Reviews” 1966, vol 60, s. 5-16.; E. Lane, *The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society*, “American Sociological Reviews” 1966, vol 31, s. 649-662.; S. Lakoff, *Knowledge and power: essays on science and government*, New York 1966.; H. Brooks, *The Government of Science*, Cambridge 1968.; P. Piccard Paul, *Science and Policy Issues*, Wyd. Itasca 1969.; N. Calder, *Technopolis*, New York 1971.; D. Schooler, *Science, Scientists, and Public Policy*, New York 1971.; P. Bereano, *Technology as a Social and Political Phenomenon*, New York 1976.; G. Boyle, *The Politics of Technology*, New York 1977.; J. Meynaud, *Technocracy*, New York 1969.; D. Price, *The Scientific Estate*, Cambridge 1965.; J. Galbraith, *The New Industrial State*, Boston 1967.; R. Boguslaw, *The new utopians: a study of system design and social change*, Wyd. Englewood Cliffs 1965.; V. Ferkiss, *Technological man: the myth and the reality*, New York 1969.; J. Ellul, *The Political Illusion*, New York 1967.; J. Fresco, *The Venus Project: The Redesign of Culture*, Wyd. Global Cyber-Visions 1995.; J. Fresco, *Designing the Future*, Wyd. The Venus Project 2007.

<sup>30</sup> M. Centeno, *The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy*, “Theory and Society” 1993, vol 22, nr 3, s. 314.

On the basis of such scientific interpretation of technocracy and technocratism, and also their synthesis with politics, we come to categories “technocratic management/governance”, “technocratic official/leader” and “technocratic government”. The fact is that the term “technocracy” in political context refers to the processes of knowledge examination, reserves for solving political issues and, which is important, neutrality of political decisions for society. That is why technocratic governance, technocratic official, technocratic government and minister-technocrat as categorical components of technocratic management by political processes are *neutral and apolitical phenomena*, which can lead to political results. That is why it is believed that the governmental cabinet can be “dispassionate” or apolitical while performing executive authority, and at the same time it remains collegiate and it even can be caused by political necessity. Besides this, being apolitical, such cabinet can influence political process and social life in general. The only emphasis that should be placed in this context is that such governmental cabinet should consist of ministers and other officials, who are technocrats or follow the principles of technocratism. As a result, it is obvious that impolitic government is a government of technocrats. It consists of non-party/impolitic ministers-technocrats (some ministers in the cabinet can be political, but their party or political affiliation do not matter or it is of second (after expert skills) importance), nevertheless, it has some political consequences.

As a result, *technocratic/non-party government* a priori is determined with such characteristics: 1) in spite of the fact that political/apolitical ministers in technocratic cabinet participate in political process, political parties do not dominate. Actually, this means that any party affiliation of the ministers does not matter, since technical skills of the candidates for ministers are taken into account (by political authority); 2) in technocratic government the key powers concerning control of bureaucratic processes and organizations are executed on the basis of “technocratic management, built on scientific and technological innovations by non-party officials, who are not recruited, and also are not responsible to parliamentary parties; 3) in the process of functioning of technocratic government the most important is not the support of political priorities of parliamentary or other parties, but the support of technologically-oriented interests, associated with the ministers/departments, headed by the ministers-technocrats.

Also it is evident that in technocratic government not only non-party positions can be filled, but also the posts for party ministers. Nevertheless, the candidates from parties do not occupy any important positions in technocratic government, since they do not control important bureaucratic organizations and structures. What is more, in technocratic cabinet the ministers-technocrats are officials, who hold the posts of prime-minister and key ministers. So, the number of party posts in technocratic government is limited: either there are no party posts or just few of them (usually not more than half of the cabinet).

Technocratic governments can be formed in different ways — politically or apolitically, by parliament or head of state (in particular by president). This depends on constitutionally stipulated mechanisms of governmental cabinets formation, and also on constitutional/

formal and political/actual formats of state government systems. In most countries with parliamentary/political method of governmental cabinets formation (where the parliament approves the composition and/or the program of the government), the initial reason for formation of technocratic government is inability of parties of parliament to agree on formation of the cabinet on the party basis. Nevertheless, it does not mean that technocratic government in such constitutional and political systems functions in the same way as other governments do (in particular party governments). The fact is that technocratic governments (as well as party governments) in countries with such systems depend on support of parliaments, associated, first of all, with parties. In most countries, where the head of state forms the government (without approval of composition and/or program of the government in parliament), the initial reason for formation of technocratic governments is position of head of state. This means that functioning of technocratic governments in such constitutional and political systems is not always regulated on the basis of positions and negotiations of parliamentary/other parties. Synthetic non-institutional reason for formation of technocratic governments in countries with different methods of governments formation is periods of social and economic (system) crisis, when the confidence in political parties and leading political actor decreases. As a result it is believed that one of the measure of crisis recovery in these cases is formation of politically neutral governments, which would consist of specialists-technocrats, in other words technocratic governmental cabinets.

Nevertheless, the methods of understanding of technocratism, and so technocratic governance and technocratic governments are fundamentally different — from country to country, from region to region. For example, in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and Central Asia (in particular in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine) the phenomenon of so-called technocratic management is quite approbated and has considerable historical background. The fact is that in 1980<sup>th</sup> in the USSR almost ninety percent of people from political bureau of Communist party were engineers. There was a stereotyped idea that control of society/state should be made on the basis of administrative management, which was built on scientific principles. It did not mean that politics should disappear. On the contrary, its role should increase, but the role of political orders should change essentially. The task of such “politics” was to rationalize the society through strategic use of scientific knowledge. In other words, the politics was supposed to transform in accurate sphere of social life with its own laws and principles. In Soviet and post-Soviet era this did not happen, but an idea of “pseudo-technocracy” is still developing and its result is raising and solving a question about “conservation” of political regimes and elimination of elements of ideological confrontation. The truth is that this practice in most cases was implemented by countries, which appeared on the ruins of Soviet union. Moreover, it still dominates there even now. And this happens despite that idea of technocratic government formation in post-Soviet

countries is called “communist”, it is realized on principle “working class stays in power, and experts administrate.”

The peculiarity of pseudo-technocratic governance in the said countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia is synthesis of classic technocratism and authoritarian (less hybrid) regimes, since they, coexisting in parallels, strengthen each other. As a result, with the help of political apathy and neutrality of government, they ensure, on the one part, the preservation of political system integrity, and on the other part, the improved performance of autocratic centers, represented by heads of state (in all post-Soviet countries, which approbate the experience of non-party governments formation, the constitutional and political leading actors of power-holding processes are elected presidents, who could manage to incorporate elected legislatures). Thus it is obvious that the idea of technocratism in post-Soviet countries is modified and “distorted”. In this regard R. Miliband notices that non-party ministers (who were supposed to be “technocrats”) — are those, who govern and do business as well”. At the same time they easily maneuver between two fields of action<sup>31</sup>. That is why it is evident that post-Soviet countries deformed the classic idea of technocratism to the advantage of their power-holding institutions. As a result, no system of scientific values was created, but substitution of the concepts took place. However, there is an idea in post-Soviet countries that technocratic/non-party management is more important, than implementation of party-ideological principles of political process. Besides this, in political practices of post-Soviet countries a rule of obtaining power-holding authorities by technocrats was broken — the power is taken on the basis of political delegation, assignment of rights/authorities, which do not ensure efficiency of governance, but only prolong the stability of authorities.

At first sight, such dynamics, except the procedures and some elements of electorate (the last one is absent), throughout long period of time was peculiar for authoritarian capitalistic and communist *China*. In addition to that the difference of Chinese model of technocratic government lies in the fact that rejection of idea of general electorate is made by emphasizing on “quality” of appointing governmental community. Nevertheless, the scientists often notice that such interpretation of governance with the help of technocratic cabinets is not a guarantee of organizational effectiveness of governmental cabinets. Probably, the non-party/one-party domination is related to non-party structure of governmental cabinets<sup>32</sup>. In addition to that, in the case with China, the principle of technocratism is embedded in the activities of Communist party in power. Moreover, the rule of “transformation of engineers into politicians/party members” has been approbated and it proved to be effective. This means that in most cases the experts with scientific degrees in exact, social sciences and the humanities

<sup>31</sup> R. Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society*, Wyd. Merlin Press 2009.

<sup>32</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *China's Technocratic Movement and the World Economic Herald*, “Modern China” 1991, vol 17, nr 3, s. 342-388.; L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, “The China Quarterly” 1990, vol 121, s. 1-35.; X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, “Asian Survey” 1993, vol 33, nr 8, s. 787-803.

become the members of Communist party. Very often such peculiarity of technocratic development of China is connected with modernization of this country.

Nevertheless, there is another aspect of the issue of technocratic governance and authoritarianism correlation. The point is that strengthening of technocratic character of management occurs not only in non-party regimes, but also in countries, which are non-party (in Belarus with weak parties, and party system is actually absent), militaristic or personified dictatorships (now it concerns Egypt, earlier it was peculiar for Singapore (the period of so-called "authoritarian corporatism"<sup>33</sup>), Indonesia (especially in 1960<sup>th</sup>)<sup>34</sup>, South Korea (in 1960-1970<sup>th</sup>)<sup>35</sup>, Turkey (formation of so-called military and technocratic governmental cabinets in the second half of XX century)<sup>36</sup>, Hong Kong, Mexico, Thailand, Ghana, Philippines<sup>37</sup>, etc). However, the technocratic management in its classic understanding is rarely approbated in multi-party systems. Even if it is approbated, it happens only in the systems of clientelist type (for example, Ukraine and Russia)<sup>38</sup> or systems with dominating parties (for example, Japan<sup>39</sup>).

The peculiarity of implementation of technocratic management and formation of technocratic governments in democratic/polyarchival political regimes (which usually reflect the models of parliamentary democracy in the form of parliamentarism or semi-presidentialism) is that this phenomenon of filling political process with elements of technocratism is considered to be exceptional. The fact is that in such countries political apathy/neutrality of political process occurs in situations where political, social and economic crises and agitations take place. Thereafter, from a perspective of theory of rational choice, politics and politicians should be neutral to overcome negative crisis consequences as soon as possible. However, since politics is a phenomenon with ideological overtone, it is considered that technocrats can

<sup>33</sup> T. Bellows, *Bureaucracy and Development in Singapore*, "Asian Journal of Public Administration" 1985, vol 7, nr 1, s. 55-69.; P-S. Seet, C. Hampden-Turner, *Technocrats and Technopreneurs – Power Paradoxes in Singapore's National Innovation System*, Paper presented at 4th International Critical Management Studies Conference (Technology and Power Stream), 4-6 July 2005.

<sup>34</sup> C. Huneeus, *Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime: The 'ODEPLAN Boys' and the 'Gremialists' in Pinochet's Chile*, "Journal of Latin American Studies" 2000, vol 32, nr 2, s. 461-501.; P. Silva, *In the name of reason: technocrats and politics in Chile*, Wyd. Penn State Press 2008.; P. Silva, *State, Public Technocracy and Politics in Chile, 1927-1941*, "Bulletin of Latin American Research" 1994, vol 13, nr 3, s. 281-297.; P. Silva, *Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks*, "Journal of Latin American Studies" 1991, vol 23, nr 2, s. 385-410.; P. Silva, *Towards Technocratic Mass Politics in Chile? The 1999-2000 Elections and the 'Lavin Phenomenon'*, "European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies" 2001, vol 70, s. 25-39.

<sup>35</sup> P. Silva, *State, Public Technocracy and Politics in Chile, 1927-1941*, "Bulletin of Latin American Research" 1994, vol 13, nr 3, s. 281-297.

<sup>36</sup> U. Akcay, *Technocrats in Power?*, Prepared for "The State in Capitalist Society, 40 Years On" conference, 22 May 2009.; P. Donmez, *Understanding Depoliticisation as Process and Governing Strategy in the Turkish Context*, Wyd. University of Warwick 2010.

<sup>37</sup> W. Bello, D. Kinley, E. Elinson, *Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines*, Wyd. Institute for Food and Development Policy 1982.

<sup>38</sup> L. Graham, *The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet Union*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1993, s. 73-74.

<sup>39</sup> T. Pempel, *Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1998.; J. Chalmers, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*, Wyd. University of California Press 1982.

guarantee neutrality. According to this scenario the governmental cabinets of specialists-technocrats (non-party technocratic governmental cabinets) were formed for several times in Finland, Italy, Iceland, Portugal, Greece, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Moldova.

For a conclusion we should mention that extrapolation of technocratism on the idea of formation of governments of non-party/impolitic type (that is technocratic governments) does not fully correspond to theoretical and methodological determinants of technocratism. The fact is that technocratism is not substantive (relative), even though it may depend on national and regional peculiarities. When the notion of “technocratism” was studied in the science, the scientists paid attention to the idea that state management had to be realized on the principles and achievements of science and technology in those countries, which were considered to be or aimed to be industrialized/modernized. But not in all countries and regions, where state management is ignored, modernization took or is taking place. Apparently, in some cases the sense and the purpose of technical management are changing. It correlates from modernization of social and economic political system (Singapore, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Korea, Chile in due time) to the idea of servicing political regime (Georgia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, etc., in due time) or its synthesis (to some extent in China, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia). That is why the understanding of technocrats changes: in some countries they are distinguished on the basis of expert and professional skills, in other countries — on the basis of political apathy and indifference, in third countries — on the basis of loyalty to political regime, in fourth countries — on the basis of synthesis of the abovementioned characteristics. It allows us to distinguish at least two aspects of correlation of technocratism and non-party governments: 1) so-called non-party or apolitical governments not necessarily are governments of experts-technocrats, in other words technocratic governments; 2) technocratism and technocracy may be used as “cover”, under modernization intents of which the mechanisms of keeping loyalty to political regime, and also prolongation of its stability are hiding. On the other side, it means that currently the classic understanding of phenomenon of technocratism becomes blurred because of certain personal or collective demands of some political authors.. As a result, the idea of technocratic management is explained descriptively as governments of non-party cabinets, which do not fully correspond to canons, established in the science.